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The year 2020 went down in economic history due to the dramatic and 
drastic changes in economic and social conditions that resulted from the 
outbreak of the global pandemic of COVID-19. This book offers a multi-
level narrative about the pandemic, written from national and international 
perspectives, enabling the authors to construct several macro- and 
mega-scenarios.
The book consists of six chapters. Four of them discuss the process of 
the COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus in Europe in 
2020, i.e. the directions and dynamics of the spread and its socioeconomic 
consequences, and provide a comparative analysis of fiscal and monetary 
packages employed by Europe, with an emphasis on Eastern European 
countries. The remaining two chapters contain forecasts and scenarios. The 
fifth chapter, dedicated to forecasts, provides readers with a comprehensive 
description of possible consequences of any epidemic leading to severe social 
losses such as high percentages of infected and dead, limited interpersonal 
contacts as a result of lockdown, a lowered level of general individual 
and social well-being, as well as economic losses, for example a decline in 
production as a result of the collapse of aggregate demand and a reduction in 
the supply capacity of the economy, consequently slowing down the pace of 
capital accumulation. The sixth, final chapter describes possible scenarios of 
the spread of the pandemic in Poland and Ukraine, depending on measures 
taken by the governments of those countries.
The Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19 on Eastern European 
Countries is designed as a practical reference for scholars, researchers and 
policymakers.
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The problem of distortion in the social and economic sphere, caused by a 
dramatic increase in incidence or other health issues, was not systemati-
cally studied in economics over recent decades. However, it must be empha-
sized that in the 1980s and 1990s, economic consequences of tuberculosis, 
malaria and HIV/AIDS in Africa, Asia, and selected European and American 
countries were analyzed.
The scale and dynamics of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
caused by a coronavirus, in 2020 and 2021 entailed serious disturbances in 
social and economic life. The 2020+ pandemic was not only the most seri-
ous global health crisis since the Spanish flu of 1918 but also one of the most 
economically expensive pandemics on a global scale. The events observed 
give rise to several questions. Those questions relate to the balance of costs 
and benefits of a lockdown policy, the substitution between public health 
and economic growth under pandemic conditions.
The 2020+ pandemic is a health phenomenon that strongly affects soci-
ety (limited spatial mobility, losses in social capital, increased mortality of 
people at various ages) and the economy (decelerated or inhibited business 
activity in dozens of industries, dramatic growth in public debt, the deepest 
recession since World War II in 2020).
The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic could not be foreseen in 2019. 
Closed border checkpoints, severe limitations to the freedom of movement 
and an almost complete ban on service activities (especially in the hospital-
ity industry) were beyond the imagination in early 2020.
In view of this type of unpredictable major external shock, all attempts 
to propose a forecast entail a substantial risk of losing touch with reality. It 
is difficult to construct reliable scenarios of the future spread or halt of the 
pandemic, the effect of vaccination on lifting restrictions imposed on social 
and economic life or the future pace of economic growth in European coun-
tries, but the authors of this book take on this challenge.
The book consists of six chapters. Four of them discuss the process of 
COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS CoV-2 virus in Europe in 2020 
(the directions and dynamics of pandemic spread, its socio-economic con-
sequences and measures of fiscal and monetary intervention implemented 
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in European countries with an accent on Eastern European countries). The 
remaining two sections contain forecasts and scenarios. The fifth chap-
ter dedicated to forecasts aims to provide readers with a comprehensive 
description of possible consequences of (any) epidemic leading to severe 
social losses (high percentages of infected and dead, limited interpersonal 
contacts as a result of lockdown, a lowered level of general individual and 
social well-being) and economic losses (a decline in production as a result 
of the collapse of aggregate demand and a reduction in the supply capacity 
of the economy, consequently slowing down the pace of capital accumula-
tion). The sixth, final chapter, describes possible scenarios of the spread of 
the pandemic in Poland and Ukraine, depending on measures taken by the 
governments of those countries.
It must be clearly emphasized that nobody could imagine the future in 
early 2020. The potential consequences of the pandemic were unknown. 
First, the scale of hazard to public health and lives of people had to be iden-
tified before considering economic consequences. The COVID-19 pandemic 
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus will come to an end. But its economic and 
social consequences will be suffered for a long time. This book principally 
constructs a picture of the global pandemic of 2020, a major demand and 
supply shock in the global economy, unprecedented in the economic history 
of recent decades.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)1 (Gorbalenya 
et al. 2020: 536) is the virus that causes the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19), the respiratory illness responsible for the COVID-19 pan-
demic (BBC: February 11, 2020).2 The World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared the disease a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 
January 30, 2020 and a pandemic on March 11, 2020 (WHO: January 30, 
2020; WHO: March 11, 2020). The last time WHO announced a pandemic 
was during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak3 (the 2009 swine flu pandemic), which 
infected nearly a quarter of the world’s population.4
The so-called Wuhan virus (COVID-19) spreads among people primar-
ily through close contact and via respiratory droplets produced by coughs 
or sneezes, and epidemiological studies estimate each infection results in 
5.7 new ones (Sanche et al. 2020). Each case of infection has an individual 
1  SARS-CoV-2 is a positive-sense single-stranded RNA virus (Machhi et al. 2020: 359–386) 
and hence Baltimore class IV (Baltimore 1971) that is contagious in humans (Chan et al. 
2020). As described by the US National Institutes of Health, it is the successor to SARS-
CoV-1, the virus that caused the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak (NIH: March 17, 2020).
2  Colloquially known simply as ‘the coronavirus’, it was previously referred to by its pro-
visional name, 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (WHO January 2020 Report; CDC 
 February 11, 2020) and has also been called human coronavirus 2019 (HCoV-19 or 
hCoV-19) (Andersen et al. 2020: 450–452). 
3  In virology, influenza A virus subtype H1N1 (A/H1N1) is a subtype of Influenza A virus. 
Well-known outbreaks of H1N1 strains in humans include the 2009 swine flu pandemic 
as well as the 1918 flu pandemic. It is an orthomyxovirus that contains the glycoproteins 
haemagglutinin and neuraminidase. For this reason, they are described as H1N1, H1N2 
etc. depending on the type of H or N antigens they express with metabolic synergy (Lim, 
Mahmood 2011). 
4  The 2009 swine flu pandemic was an influenza pandemic that lasted about 19 months, from 
January 2009 to August 2010. The number of lab-confirmed deaths reported to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) is 18,449, though the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic is estimated to 
have actually caused about 284,000 (range from 150,000 to 575,000) deaths.
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course of the disease. Usually, the virus causes a severe inflammation of the 
airways but it also affects other organs and organ systems.
As of September 8, 2021, there have been 222,903,649 total confirmed 
cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection during the ongoing pandemic and the number 
of virus infections is increasing quickly, particularly in the United Kingdom 
and in the United States. The total number of deaths attributed to the virus 
is 4,603,035 (CSSE: September 8, 2021). And although it should be noted 
that many recoveries from both confirmed and untested infections go unre-
ported since some countries do not collect this data, at least 199,461,542 
people have recovered from confirmed infections (CSSE: September 08, 
2021). The number of confirmed cases is lower than the number of actual 
cases; the main reason for that is limited testing.
The large scale of the COVID-19 pandemic is causing unprecedented 
human and economic costs throughout the world. Trying to reduce the 
spread of the virus and thus the number of people infected and deceased, 
most state governments in the world introduced limitations for many indus-
tries and activities, which contributed to the ongoing economic decline. In 
this chapter, we analyze the origins, development, and current state of the 
COVID-19 epidemic, the ways in which the governments are trying to fight 
the deadly virus and the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, and the 
differences in perception of the threat caused by COVID-19. We also men-
tion new challenges the world faces in 2021 as well as introduce the reader 
to the broad spectrum of costs of the pandemic, including the possible costs 
for people’s mental health.
1.2  Origin and spread of SARS-CoV-2
The origin of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus has not yet been explained. Journal 
of Medical Virology (three special issues on the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-
19), 2019, 2020) indicated snakes (serpentes), then bats (chiroptera), and 
currently Asiatic pangolins, sometimes known as scaly anteaters (manidae),5 
as the source of the coronavirus disease. There are also a lot of theories on 
how the virus transferred to humans. However, none of them is coherent 
and reliable enough and publications on this subject are increasingly moving 
away from the norms of scientific literature.
Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (originally called 2019-nCoV) was officially 
identified for the first time in the Chinese city of Wuhan (武漢市) in the 
province Hubei (湖北) in central China in December 2019. However, it can 
be assumed that it had already affected humans earlier as Spanish virologists 
found traces of the novel coronavirus in a sample of Barcelona wastewater 
collected in March 2019, nine months before the COVID-19 disease was 
5  Shou-Jiang (ed.) ‘Three special issues on the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)’, Journal of 
Medical Virology, monthly editions for years 2019–2020.
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identified in China (Reuters: June 26, 2020). But there is no reliable data 
on the source of the SARS-CoV-2 and the geography of its spread before it 
was identified in Wuhan, and this very fact caused speculations that China 
spread the virus around the world.
Currently, there are many hypotheses about how this dangerous virus 
was released – from global warming and melting glaciers to being artifi-
cially created in a military laboratory as a new kind of biological weapon. 
Disagreements on this topic among scientists and members of the public are 
accompanied by conspiracy theories pouring globally into the media, thanks 
to which they gain the popularity and trustworthiness of scientific theories.
The claims of virologists and “experts” are also not consistent. Some 
claim that they have sufficient evidence that SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus was 
produced naturally, in wildlife not in a laboratory, and that SARS-CoV-2 
coronavirus is not suitable for biological weapons. Others say the oppo-
site and claim that the virus has “escaped” from a Chinese laboratory (see 
the statement by the US President Donald Trump from May 1, 2020 (The 
Guardian: May 1, 2020)).6
1.3  SARS, MERS and COVID-19
The human coronavirus was first identified in 1962 in a child with cold 
symptoms and was called B814. Since then, six species of this type of 
virus have appeared in the world. The most severe diseases were caused by 
SARS in 2003, with 812 deaths, and MERS-CoV which between 2012 and 
2017 resulted in the deaths of 712 people. SARS-CoV-2 is the seventh 
known coronavirus that is dangerous for humans. COVID-19 does not 
cause high mortality compared to acute respiratory failure MERS-CoV or 
SARS. However, it spreads rapidly and has already caused more deaths 
worldwide than SARS and MERS combined.
According to Worldometer Data (WMD) (https://www .worldometers 
.info /coronavirus/, data collected as of December 31, 2020), there were 
83,135,180 global cases of COVID-19 infection by the end of 2020, of 
which 1,813,389 cases resulted in humans’ death, and 58,933,056 peo-
ple recovered. The coronavirus COVID-19 is affecting 218 countries and 
6  “Donald Trump claims to have seen evidence to substantiate the unproven theory that the 
coronavirus originated at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, despite US intelligence agencies’ 
conclusion that the virus was ‘not manmade or genetically modified’. ‘We’re going to see 
where it comes from,’ Trump said at a White House event on Thursday. ‘We have people 
looking at it very, very strongly. Scientific people, intelligence people, and others. We’re 
going to put it all together. I think we will have a very good answer eventually. And China 
might even tell us.’ Pressed to explain what evidence he had seen that the virus originated 
in a Chinese lab, Trump responded, ‘I can’t tell you that. I’m not allowed to tell you that’” 
(The Guardian: May 1, 2020). 
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territories around the world and two international conveyances. The fatality 
rate is still being assessed (WMD: December 31, 2020).
When it comes to the pandemic’s development over time, as of September 
08, 2021, we are expecting the fourth wave, we are experiencing the third 
wave of an increased number of people infected. After originally erupting 
in China in November and December 2019, the first worldwide wave of 
the COVID-19 pandemic started at the end of March 2020 and peaked 
in April 2020. Governmental responses across countries differed greatly at 
that time, from severe lockdown introduced in Italy – the country most 
affected among those in Europe – to the United Kingdom and Sweden who 
were convinced that the economic and social costs of a lockdown would be 
too big and decided against introducing severe restrictions, at least at the 
beginning. The summer of 2020 brought hope, encouraging many govern-
ments to lower restrictions and people to protest against the restrictions as 
the numbers of new COVID-19 cases dropped in many countries. However, 
in October and November 2020 it became clear that the second wave of the 
pandemic was inevitable. This time, similar but often less severe restrictions 
were introduced around the world. Spirits were kept up by the news about 
vaccines against the deadly virus which were already invented and during 
the last phases of testing. After reaching peaks in the winter of 2020, the 
beginnings of 2021 saw a decline in the worldwide number of new COVID-
19 cases. From late December 2020, the vaccination process started as well, 
letting some experts believe that the COVID-19 pandemic was a thing of 
2020. However, as new virus mutations appeared in the United Kingdom 
and South Africa and the European Union governments avoided early imple-
mentation of a new lockdown, in March 2021 the third wave of the pan-
demic began, leaving experts to wonder about the future (Johns Hopkins 
University: March 25, 2021).
Geographically, the highest number of cases of infection and death have 
been reported in the United States (41,206,672 total cases and 669,022 total 
deaths), India (33,096,718 total cases and 441,443 total deaths), Brazil 
(20,913,578 total cases and 584,208 total deaths), Russia (7,065,904 total 
cases and 189,582 total deaths), the United Kingdom (7,056,106 total cases 
and 133,483 deaths), France (6,854,028 total cases and 115,159 total deaths), 
Turkey (6,542,654 total cases and 58,651 total deaths), Argentina (5,211,801 
total cases and 112,851 total deaths), Iran (5,210,978 total cases and 112,430 
total deaths), Colombia (4,921,410 total cases and 125,378 total deaths), 
Spain (4,892,640 total cases and 85,066 total deaths), Italy (4,579,502 total 
cases and 129,638 total deaths), Indonesia (4,147,365 total cases and 137,782 
total deaths) and Germany (4,029,849 total cases and 92,949 total deaths), 
Mexico (3,449,295 total cases and 264,541 total deaths), Poland (2,891,602 
total cases and 75,403 total deaths), (September 08, 2021).
Moreover, it should be noted that many cases and deaths have not been 
statistically recorded as they have been asymptomatic, and not every coun-
try has provided reliable data on cases and deaths.
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1.4  Virus denial and miscalculations
One of the biggest problems connected with the pandemic is that many 
countries around the world have denied the existence of the pandemic and 
the virus itself, or have neglected the threat. The well-known examples of 
such a denial include Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which 
even decided to organize mass sporting events during the pandemic. What 
is more, the US President Donald Trump, the British Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson, the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Polish President Andrzej 
Duda, the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, and the Mexican President 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador have repeatedly downplayed the coronavi-
rus threat. This “cavalier” leadership approach as well as the lack of social 
safety nets and strong public health systems have worsened the crisis. The 
lack of an effective response to the virus’s spread in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Brazil, Poland or Russia has been one of the most surpris-
ing developments of the pandemic.
With some political leaders openly neglecting the threats of the COVID-
19 pandemic, so do the people as well. Those affected strongly by govern-
mental restrictions – denied the right to run their businesses, losing jobs, 
or just opposing the fact that a lot of human, political, and social rights 
have been suspended for a year now and probably also for the indefinite 
future – express their skepticism towards the measures taken by the govern-
ments and even raise concerns about the existence and extent of the pan-
demic itself. According to the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project that 
included a survey of about 26,000 people in 25 countries, significant groups 
of people believe that the death rate of the virus is deliberately exaggerated 
to a large extent. This statement is believed by 59% of Nigerians; 46% of 
Greeks; over 40% of Poles, South Africans, and Mexicans; about 38% of 
Americans; 36% of Hungarians; 30% of Italians; 28% of Germans; and 
22% of Britons. In 10 out of 25 countries studied, 20–30% of respondents 
go even further, claiming that the pandemic is a hoax to deceive people (The 
Guardian: October 26, 2020).
Even if not doubting COVID-19 itself, many people around the world 
are tempted to believe in one or more of several leading conspiracy theories 
connected with the virus. More than 50% of Nigerians; more than 40% 
of South Africans, Poles, and Turks; more than 30% of Americans and 
Brazilians; and more than 20% of French, Britons, Italians, and Germans 
believe that the virus has been deliberately created and spread by China 
(The Guardian: October 26, 2020). There are also many others who think 
that COVID-19 is not more harmful than regular flu, that there is no need 
to wear a mask and that the vaccines are unsafe or include miniature devices 
that may be used to spy on people (Scientific American: October 12, 2020).
Those skeptical of the COVID-19 threat and the necessity of measures 
taken to fight it do not only express their concerns through social surveys 
but also engage in many communication activities, from Facebook groups 
6 Andrzej Nowosad et al. 
dedicated to different COVID-19-related conspiracy theories to public gath-
erings organized to protest against the restrictions. For example, on August 
29, 2020, over 10,000 unmasked people gathered in Trafalgar Square to 
protests about the so-called “new normal” order (The Guardian: September 
4, 2020) while a protest against the government restrictions in Germany 
took place the same day in Berlin, including over 38,000 participants (RBB: 
August 29, 2020). Similar protests raised in many cities around the United 
States (BBC: April 19, 2020), together with the political implications of the 
presidential election campaign, kept the US federal government from intro-
ducing more severe restrictions similar to those implemented in Europe.
Another problem the world faced during the pandemic was that in many 
countries the statistics about the cases and deaths were forged. This problem 
has been emphasized by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and WHO which repeatedly expressed a lack of reliability 
of the data provided. Many countries did not provide real statistics on the 
spread of the disease and deaths due to COVID-19 for political reasons. 
Moreover, more than a dozen countries in Africa, Asia, and Eurasia were 
not connected to the “global COVID-19 disease and death rate” because 
they did not have access to electronic instrumentation to record data – 
required to be a part of the global database (The Guardian: June 4, 2020).
It should be noted that only the number of deaths in 2019 and 
2020 compared to other years can give reliable data on mortality due 
to COVID-19. For example, in the case of Poland, according to Gazeta 
Wyborcza article from December 28, 2020 that was based on a comparative 
big data analysis, in 51 weeks of 2020, 60,000 more people died than in the 
whole of 2019 – although official statistics show that in 2019 and 2020, 
a little over 27,000 people died in Poland because of COVID-19. Gazeta 
Wyborcza’s analysis was conducted on the data obtained from the Registers 
of Civil Status in Poland from 1945 to 2020 and concluded that the pan-
demic caused the highest mortality rate in Poland in the last 70 years. The 
mortality rate was similar only in 1951, just six years after the end of the 
Second World War, and at that time was caused by disability and chronic 
diseases such as malnutrition, yellow fever, tuberculosis, diphtheria, whoop-
ing cough, tetanus, or epidemic typhus (Gazeta Wyborcza: December 28, 
2020). In Poland, vaccination against these diseases began only in the late 
1950s. Similar research conducted on the data from other countries around 
the world may offer interesting results.
1.5  Coping with the pandemic
Data published by the Bloomberg Covid Resilience Ranking on December 
21, 2020 (‘The Best and Worst Places to Be in Covid: U.S. Sinks in Ranking’ 
by Rachel Chang, Jinshan Hong and Kevin Varley, published: November 
24, 2020, updated: December 21, 2020) shows that many countries around 
the world are not coping well enough with the pandemic, either in terms of 
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healthcare security or economics. Bloomberg’s ranking took into account 
economies whose gross domestic product (GDP) was above $200 billion in 
2019. The list included 53 countries, including Poland, and the assessment 
was based on 10 indicators:
 • daily increase in infections,
 • mortality rate of COVID-19,
 • percentage of positive results among all virus tests,
 • possibilities of the health care system,
 • strengthening of the functioning of enterprises,
 • blockade of the functioning of enterprises,
 • restrictions on social and political freedoms,
 • restrictions on movement,
 • quality of pandemic strategy,
 • quality of vaccination strategies.
(Bloomberg: December 21, 2020)
These key metrics cover the increase in virus cases to the overall mortality 
rate and testing capabilities. The capacity of the local healthcare system, 
the impact of virus-related restrictions like lockdowns on the economy, and 
freedom of movement are also taken into account.
It should be noted that only data officially provided by national govern-
ments were taken into account and that the last two factors included in the 
ranking reflect the number of doses of vaccine, the number of contracts 
signed for the supply of vaccine, and the percentage of the population that 
can be vaccinated with the doses ordered. The percentage of the population 
that does not want to be vaccinated due to a lack of trust in the vaccine or 
political power was not taken into account.
According to Bloomberg’s ranking, countries such as New Zealand (1st 
place in the ranking), Taiwan (2), Australia (3), Norway (4), Singapore 
(5), Finland (6), Japan (7), Korea (8), China (9), and Denmark (10) are 
best at dealing with the pandemic. The worst include Mexico (53rd; last 
place in the ranking), Argentina (52), Peru (51), Greece (50), and Italy (49) 
(Bloomberg: December 21, 2020).
When it comes to the regions of the world, Asia-Pacific countries have 
the best achievements in the fight against COVID-19, while the worst are 
noticed in Africa, both Americas and Europe. This is not surprising because 
the virus first attacked in Asia, while both Europe and the Americas were 
skeptical of Chinese “revelations” about the “deadly” virus.
In Bloomberg’s ranking, Poland, a member of the European Union, was 
ranked in the low 47th place, one place lower than Iran. What is more, other 
economies and countries significantly less developed than Poland, includ-
ing India (39th place), Brazil (36), Nigeria (31), Pakistan (29), Egypt (24), 
Russia (18), and Vietnam (12), are dealing with COVID-19 much better 
than Poland. A similar situation is also visible in some other EU countries, 
8 Andrzej Nowosad et al. 
including Romania (48), Greece (49), and Italy (49), which rank the lowest 
among European and EU countries (Bloomberg: December 21, 2020).
Difficulties in coping with COVID-19 result in economic decline and 
healthcare security. Most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America will 
be unable to return to pre-pandemic growth levels until 2023 and to the 
previous level of per capita income until 2025, later than anywhere else, 
according to Bloomberg: Covid Resilience Ranking published (Bloomberg: 
December 21, 2020). Many countries also faced the difficult choice between 
limiting mortality by announcing a lockdown and trying to maintain the 
economy by keeping it open.
Still, the countries that have responded most successfully were able to 
avoid choosing between the two: they avoided the trade-off between high 
mortality and a high socioeconomic impact of the pandemic. New Zealand 
and Israel has been able to bring infections down and open up their coun-
try internally. Other island nations were also able to almost entirely pre-
vent an outbreak (like Taiwan, Australia, and Iceland). What is more, not 
only islands were able to bend the curve of infections and prevent large 
outbreaks – Norway, Uruguay, Thailand, Finland, and South Korea are 
examples of countries which dealt with the pandemic successfully. These 
countries not only suffered a smaller direct impact but they also limited the 
indirect impact because they were able to release lockdown measures earlier 
(see Our World in Data: January 11, 2021). Unfortunately, the fourth wave 
of the COVID-19 Pandemic, again shuts down societies and economies in 
late 2021.
1.6  Vaccination problems
Introducing lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions was only a half-meas-
ure. The main goal of the year 2020 was to invent a cure or a vaccine 
that could successfully deal with the disease and help to end the pandemic. 
The end of 2020 brought such an invention – several companies worldwide 
managed to produce a vaccine against the deadly virus, including Pfizer and 
BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Johnson & Johnson as well as Russian 
(Sputnik V), and Chinese (Sinovac, Sinopharm) vaccines (Pharmaceutical 
Processing World: February 5, 2021). In December 2020, the first countries 
started their vaccination programs. However, with the invention of vac-
cines, new problems also arose.
The first problem is the reluctance of people to get vaccinated. Many peo-
ple in the world still downplay the virus. According to a survey conducted by 
several agencies, institutions, and newspaper editors, it is clear that nearly 
50% of people do not want to get vaccinated. They claim: “99.7% recovery 
from COVID-19 – why do we need vaccine” (demonstrator holding an anti-
vaccine placard in east London December 5, 2020).
According to a survey conducted by the Polish Institute for Market 
and Social Research (IBRiS, Instytut Badań Rynkowych i Społecznych) in 
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Poland, only 47% of the adult population wants to be vaccinated, while 
44% does not want the vaccine and 9% are not sure. The largest group 
of those opposing vaccination (42%) believe that vaccines were not tested 
enough because they were created too quickly and thus are dangerous 
(IBRiS: December 28, 2020).
In the United Kingdom, one in five say they are unlikely to take the 
vaccine, according to YouGov research published in November 2020, 
citing a variety of different reasons. Around half of this group (47%, or 
10% of all Britons) say they simply want to wait and see if the vaccine 
is safe first. An additional 15% of this group (equivalent to 3% of all 
Britons) currently say they would not get vaccinated because they see 
themselves as low risk and therefore, do not need the vaccine (YouGov: 
November 16, 2020).
When it comes to the United States, in December 2020, 42% of US adults 
say they would not get a vaccine. This shows a decrease since September 
2020, when 50% did not want to get a vaccine, according to Gallup Panel 
19, but it still poses significant challenges for public health and government 
officials in achieving mass public compliance with vaccine recommenda-
tions (Gallup 2020).
Another current problem is the insufficient number of vaccines connected 
with the low pace of vaccine production and the international quest for 
vaccines among the governments. Although AstraZeneca is planning to pro-
duce up to 3 billion doses of the vaccine, Pfizer and BioNTech 1.3 billion, 
and Johnson & Johnson, Sinovac, Sinopharm, and Moderna 1 billion doses 
each (Pharmaceutical Processing World: February 5, 2021), there are still 
important issues to arise, such as who will be vaccinated first. Since whole 
populations are to be vaccinated and there are not enough doses produced 
yet, governments began the vaccination process with different social groups 
that were considered the most vulnerable: doctors, teachers, critical work-
ers, the elderly, or chronic patients. However, such a vaccination process 
design also encourages malpractice – the vaccines as well as fake vaccination 
certificates are already available on the darknet (BBC: March 23, 2021).
Differences in the pace of vaccination are also clearly visible between 
countries. Israel intends to be the first country to vaccine the whole popula-
tion with 50% Israelis fully vaccinated and 60% having had the first dose as 
of March 15, 2021. At the same time in the United States, 12% of the popu-
lation had been fully vaccinated and 21% had received the first dose (Health 
Affairs: March 18, 2021). But while some countries increase the pace of 
vaccination, other face unexpected delays in the supplies delivered. The 
European Union had to deal with this problem when Pfizer, AstraZeneca, 
and Moderna delayed or lowered the numbers of vaccines delivered to the 
member states at the beginning of 2021 (Reuters: February 17, 2021).
Finally, some experts raise doubts about the effectiveness of the vaccina-
tion process itself. With some new mutations in the virus causing the current 
fourth wave of the pandemic, there are concerns about whether the already 
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existing vaccines can successfully prevent this new mutation as well (CNBC: 
March 5, 2021).
1.7  New challenges
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy has slowed down sig-
nificantly. All over the world, apart from New Zealand, people welcomed 
the New Year 2021 in total or partial lockdown: banned from leaving 
homes, traveling, with closed hotels and restaurants, and restrictions on 
the public gatherings for New Year’s Eve (depending on the region of the 
world, up to 5–10 people). Although many people believed that the year 
2021 would turn the situation around and allow the world to come back to 
the pre-pandemic state, new challenges connected with COVID-19 arose in 
the first quarter of 2021.
In December 2020, a new virus mutation (B.1.1.7) was detected in South 
Africa and the United Kingdom. Several countries in Europe and the Middle 
East banned air travel from the United Kingdom because of concerns over a 
mutant strain of the coronavirus that had been spreading rapidly in England 
in December 2020. The borders were kept closed also in January 2021; this 
was particularly difficult for the United Kingdom, which left the European 
Union on January 1, 2021. The B.1.1.7 mutation is believed to be more 
adept at human-to-human transmission, causing a much quicker spread 
of the virus within populations (Science: January 10, 2021). In January, 
in Japan, another new variant of COVID-19 was also detected – one that 
appears to have arrived with four passengers who came to Tokyo from 
Brazil. The newest variant of the virus appears to differ from the highly 
contagious strains in Britain and South Africa (CNBC: January 11, 2021). 
The new mutations of the virus shattered the hopes for a quick comeback to 
the pre-pandemic world and caused the current third wave of the pandemic.
2021 is to become a year of global vaccination. Vaccinations started to 
be introduced worldwide at the end of December 2020 – firstly, in the medi-
cal services and then, depending on the country, targeted at politicians, the 
elderly or different professional groups. As of December 31, 2020, the first 
dose of the vaccine had been taken by 2.1 million people worldwide. Most 
people were vaccinated with the vaccines produced by Pfizer/BioNTech and 
from January 2020, by Moderna (Our World in Data: January 1, 2021). On 
the one hand, the vaccines offer hope for a quick return to normality, but on 
the other hand, some problems with vaccine production and distribution as 
well as new virus mutations rapidly spreading infections leave people with 
the question “how will it all end?”
Since the pandemic has proven to be a long-lasting problem for human-
ity, not just a one-quarter-long anomaly in world development, one of the 
most pressing current problems is how to adjust to the new situation in the 
long term. Although we are already facing the fourth wave of the pandemic, 
many governmental solutions and the state of public healthcare have still 
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not been developed enough in many countries to face the ongoing situation. 
What is more, citizens are not as understanding and mobilized as they were 
at the beginning of 2020, knowing now that their savings have disappeared, 
job opportunities have dropped, and hopes for normality are once again 
delayed. And even if humanity is to successfully combat the COVID-19 pan-
demic in the near future, there still will be a likely scenario of a big economic 
crisis for years to come.
1.8  The costs of the pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a lot of implications for almost every 
aspect of people’s lives. It certainly brought social distance and distrust of 
others as well as the erosion of public trust in researchers, politicians, and 
all sorts of “specialists in everything”, and above all, the erosion of trust in 
governments and public institutions. It also has led to a dispersion of trust-
based social capital, which money value no one has yet estimated.
What is more, the end of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 brought 
numerous restrictions on civil and economic freedoms. In some regions, 
national governments closed country borders, some of them introducing a 
total lockdown. On January 5, 2021 a total lockdown was introduced by 
the United Kingdom, due to the discovery of a new virus mutation.
The first lockdown was introduced in China on November 17, 2019, and 
on March 1, 2020 the World Health Organization stated that the world 
was dealing with a pandemic of infectious disease with COVID-19 and 
suggested that countries “social distance”. In the second half of February 
2020, big outbreaks of infections with hundreds of patients started in South 
Korea, Italy, and Iran. Due to the pandemic, travel has been reduced world-
wide, quarantine and curfew have been introduced, and a number of sport-
ing, religious, and cultural events have been postponed or cancelled. Many 
countries have closed their borders or introduced severe restrictions on for-
eign travel, including restrictions on people crossing borders such as enforc-
ing complete isolation for a period of 10 to 14 days – depending on the 
country – called “quarantine”. Schools and universities went into remote 
online learning mode, which has affected nearly 1.27 billion students glob-
ally (72.4% of all students) (UNESCO: May 8, 2020). Soon after, enter-
prises stopped operations and started online work, especially after April 5, 
2020, when the threshold of 2 million registered cases was crossed – most 
of them in the USA, Spain, Italy, and Brazil. Infections in South America 
have grown rapidly, causing a humanitarian crisis with significant socioeco-
nomic implications. The fear of the virus has caused a decrease in consumer 
spending and thus, the collapse of traditional trade, transport, tourism and 
gastronomy around the world.
According to the World Bank, the costs of the pandemic can be divided 
into three main categories: about 12% of the total cost comes from increased 
mortality, 28% is due to high absenteeism, and as much as 60% comes from 
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behavioral changes – that is because a person tries to avoid another people 
for fear of being infected. The estimated loss to the world economy as of 
October 24, 2020 is $30 billion, according to the World Bank.
As of February 24, 2020, there have been significant declines in stock 
markets around the world (Nikkei – 5.3%, Dow Jones – 13.3%, FTSE 
100 – 19.3%). What is more, oil prices fell sharply, reaching their lowest 
price in 30 years on March 9, 2020. Many regions of the world faced a lack 
of food, and a few faced hunger. Even before COVID-19 reduced incomes 
and disrupted supply chains, chronic and acute hunger were on the rise due 
to various factors including conflicts, socioeconomic conditions, natural dis-
asters, climate change, and pests. But 2020 marks the most severe increase 
in global food insecurity, impacting vulnerable households in almost every 
country. These phenomena may intensify in the following years because of 
the economic and agricultural losses, particularly in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia.
In the first year of the pandemic, transport and tourism industries suf-
fered the most, while trade (especially online) and online games increased 
their profits. There was a high increase in house prices, caused by a stag-
nation in the construction industry, which, however, has later fallen due 
to massive asset sales and the bankruptcy of individuals and businesses 
(Williams 2020). Currently, the crisis is engulfing the insurance and banking 
spheres (46% decrease in profits). In most sectors of the economy, strategies 
have been put in place to survive and stock up during these uncertain times.
With many economic sectors closed, including tourism, entertainment, 
restaurants, and shopping malls, and companies unsure how to react in 
extremely unstable economic and legal conditions, many people lost their 
jobs and were unable to find a new one, had to do a job they are overquali-
fied for or had their income cut. According to the International Monetary 
Fund, in 2020 compared with 2019, the unemployment rate rose from 
2.4% to 3.3% in Japan, from 3.1% to 4.3% in Germany, from 3.8% to 
5.4% in the United Kingdom, from 9.9% to 11% in Italy, from 11.9% to 
13.4% in Brazil, from 3.7% to as much as 8.9% in the United States and 
from 5.7% to 9.7% in Canada (BBC: January 24, 2021). This generated 
significant costs for governments in a form of unemployment allowance and 
support for companies to prevent further redundancies. The coronavirus 
pandemic has affected all sectors of the economy, triggering one of the big-
gest economic crises in the last 100 years. According to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the COVID-19 
pandemic has generated the worst health, economic, and social crisis in 
our lifetime. No country, no economy, no society has been spared. And 
no country, no economy, or no society can face it alone. Over 1.1 million 
people have lost their lives and more than 42 million infections have been 
recorded so far. In the 2022, we are expected to witness the worst recession 
since the Second World War, with a projected fall in global GDP of 4.5%. 
Many economies will not recover their 2019 output levels until 2022 at the 
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earliest. The crisis has already wiped out all the jobs created since the global 
financial crisis of 2008 (OECD: October 10, 2020).
Although it is said that the coronavirus has plunged the world into a “crisis 
like no other”, global growth is expected to rise to 5.8% in 2022 if the pan-
demic fades in the second half of 2021. This forecast is driven primarily by the 
predicted growth in countries such as India and China. Recovery in big, ser-
vices-reliant economies that have been hit hard by the COVID-19 outbreak, 
such as the United Kingdom or Italy, is expected to be a much slower process.
1.9  Critical mental health services
Fear, worry and stress are normal responses to perceived or real threats 
and when people face uncertainty or the unknown. Therefore, it is normal 
and understandable that people are experiencing fear in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The fear of contracting the virus in a pandemic such 
as COVID-19 is accompanied by the significant changes to our daily lives 
caused by the restrictions introduced to slow down the spread of the virus. 
When facing the new realities of working from home, temporary unem-
ployment, home-schooling, and a lack of physical contact with other family 
members, friends, and colleagues, we need to look after both our mental 
and physical health.
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted or halted critical mental health 
services in 93% of countries worldwide while the demand for mental health 
care is increasing, according to a new WHO survey. The survey of 130 
countries provides the first global data showing the devastating impact of 
COVID-19 on access to mental health services. According to WHO, the 
pandemic is increasing demand for mental health services. Bereavement, iso-
lation, loss of income, and fear are triggering mental health conditions or 
exacerbating existing ones. Many people may be facing increased levels of 
alcohol and drug use, insomnia, and anxiety.
What is more, COVID-19 itself can lead to neurological and mental com-
plications, such as delirium, agitation, and stroke. People with pre-existing 
mental, neurological or substance use disorders are also more vulnerable to 
SARS-CoV-2 infection – they may stand a higher risk of severe outcomes and 
even death. While many countries (70%) have adopted telemedicine or teleth-
erapy to overcome disruptions to in-person services, there are significant dis-
parities in the uptake of these interventions. More than 80% of high-income 
countries reported deploying telemedicine and teletherapy to bridge gaps in 
mental health, compared with less than 50% of low-income countries.
According to the WHO survey, countries reported widespread disruption 
of many kinds of critical mental health services, including:
 • over 60% reported disruptions to mental health services for vulnerable 
people, including children and adolescents (72%); older adults (70%); 
and women requiring antenatal or postnatal services (61%);
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 • disruptions to counseling and psychotherapy were reported by 67%; 
65% reported disruptions to critical harm reduction services; and 45% 
to opioid agonist maintenance treatment for opioid dependence;
 • more than a third (35%) reported disruptions to emergency interven-
tions, including those for people experiencing prolonged seizures; severe 
substance use withdrawal syndromes; and delirium, often a sign of a 
serious underlying medical condition;
 • disruptions to access to medications for mental, neurological and sub-
stance use disorders were reported by 30%;
 • around three-quarters reported at least partial disruptions to school and 
workplace mental health services (78% and 75% respectively).
(WHO: October 5, 2020)
1.10  COVID-19 databases
Thanks to the Internet, it is possible to check the status of the pandemic 
daily. The most popular databases of active cases of COVID-19 include:
 • Worldometers (https://www .worldometers .info /coronavirus/), based on 
Geoshemie UN public statistics (https://unstats .un .org /unsd /methodol-
ogy /m49/),
 • WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard (https://covid19 . 
who .int/),
 • Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata .org /coronavirus -data),
 • OCHA – Asia Pacific COVID-19: Humanitarian Data Portal (https://
interactive .unocha .org /data /ap -covid19 -portal/),
 • The Coronavirus in Asia and ASEAN – Live Updates by Country (https://
www .aseanbriefing .com /news /coronavirus -asia -asean -live -updates -by - 
country/),
 • COVID-19 Research Response. The Global Health Network (https://
coronavirus .tghn .org /regional -response /asia -ncov/),
 • The Lancet – Regional Health (https://www .thelancet .com /journals /lan-
inf /article /PIIS1473 -3099(20)30708-8/fulltext),
 • The South African Resource Portal (https://sacoronavirus .co .za/),
 • CDC – Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Federal 
Government Agency, Part of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (https://www .cdc .gov /coronavirus /2019 -ncov /covid -data /cov-
idview /index .html),
 • Europe: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, An 
Agency of the European Union (https://www .ecdc .europa .eu /en /covid - 
19 /data),
 • Eurostat – COVID-19: Statistics Serving Europe (https://ec .europa .eu /
eurostat /web /covid -19 /overview).
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1.11  Conclusions
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken the world and world leaders by sur-
prise, significantly changing all aspects of our lives. The virus and the dis-
ease spread so quickly and took so many lives around the world that it has 
become the most important topic of 2020 and 2021, influencing all aspects 
of the economy, society, politics, and culture. No part of humanity was 
spared – many people are dying, healthcare systems are collapsing, econo-
mies are suffering because of lockdown, governments are facing distrust and 
in some countries are even facing uprisings of people who are dissatisfied 
with the way the COVID-19 crisis has been handled.
In the face of the crisis, it is no wonder that COVID-19 has immediately 
become the main topic of research conducted around the world in a wide 
range of disciplines – from medicine and virology to social sciences trying 
to explain its impact on society and its members. Large amounts of funds 
targeted at all types of COVID-19 research projects led to a lot of important 
discoveries, including different types of tests, medical procedures to treat 
COVID-19 patients, statistics allowing for study of the development of the 
pandemic, and finally vaccines against the deadly virus. However, despite 
all these applied studies and recent discoveries, humanity still faces a lot of 
problems connected with the virus’s impact.
One of the most important problems is denial of the virus’s existence and 
miscalculated statistics on its spread. Not every government and politician 
took the disease seriously and many of them tried to use the situation for 
their own political gain. As a consequence, in some countries governments 
did not act upon the virus as quickly and forcefully as they could have done, 
causing severe implications not only for these countries but also for their 
neighbors.
What is more, the lack of knowledge about the origins or initial spread 
of the virus combined with miscalculated data on the scope of pandemic 
has led to many misunderstandings, mistakes, and even conspiracy theories, 
which unfortunately have been spread through the media and the Internet, 
affecting numerous people. Politicians and different kinds of ‘experts’ did 
not stop these revelations which only fueled them and led to social and 
political distrust to the extent that when the vaccine for the COVID-19 was 
finally introduced, huge parts of society did not want to take it for fear of 
the possible side effects or mistrust for the government.
There is also huge economic loss connected with the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The global economy, which became a highly interconnected network 
during the last 30 years, started to split and collapse. Many branches which 
were based on international exchange and social contacts, especially ser-
vices, have suffered a lot since the very beginning of the pandemic. Others 
have been hit hard later, when initial lockdowns led to unemployment, 
withdrawal of assets, and general pessimism when it comes to investments. 
16 Andrzej Nowosad et al. 
All these factors combined allow experts to predict the occurrence of a big 
economic crisis connected with the pandemic in the near future.
Economic pressures are also closely connected with social loss. Although 
globalization in the last 30 years allowed for the quick development of ideas 
and improvement of life conditions, the virus caused a lot of personal and 
social damage. Problems such as the deaths of people who may otherwise 
have lived for much longer time, unemployment, healthcare, and mental 
health problems, home-schooling, lack of contact with others, and decrease 
of trust will probably be the long-lasting effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
References
Andersen, K., Rambaut, A., Lipkin, W., Holmes, E., Garry, R. (2020) 
Correspondence: The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. Nature Medicine. No. 
26 (4), 450–452.
Baltimore, D. (1971). Expression of animal virus genomes. Bacteriological Reviews. 
No. 35 (3), 235–241.
BBC (February 11, 2020). Coronavirus disease named Covid-19. Archived from the 
original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved January 15, 2021.
BBC (April 19, 2020). Coronavirus: US protests against and for lockdown 
restrictions. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .bbc .com /news /av /world -us - 
canada -52344540.
BBC (January 24, 2021). Coronavirus: How the pandemic has changed the world 
economy. Retrieved March 30, 2021. https://www .bbc .com /news /business - 
51706225.
BBC (March 23, 2021). Covid-19: Vaccines and vaccine passports being sold on 
darknet. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .bbc .com /news /technology - 
56489574.
Bloomberg (December 21, 2020). Rachel Chang, Jinshan Hong, Kevin Varley, 
The Covid resilience ranking. The best and worst places to be in covid: U.S. 
sinks in ranking. Bloomberg. November 24, 2020, Updated: December 21, 
2020, Retrieved 15 January 2021. https://www .bloomberg .com /graphics /covid - 
resilience -ranking/.
CDC (February 11, 2020). About novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). Archived from 
the original on February 11, 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2020. https://www . 
who .int /docs /default -source /coronaviruse /situation -reports /20200130 -sitrep -10 - 
ncov .pdf ?sfvrsn =d0b2e480 _2.
CDC-Led Collaboration (2012). First global estimates of 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
mortality released. cdc .gov . June 25, 2012. Access: January 10, 2021. https://
www .cdc .gov /flu /spotlights /pandemic -global -estimates .htm; https://www . 
thelancet .com /journals /laninf /article /PIIS1473 -3099(12)70121-4/fulltext.
Chan, J., Yuan, S., Kok, K., To, K., Chu, H., Yang, J., et al. (2020). A familial cluster 
of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-
person transmission: A study of a family cluster. The Lancet. No. 395 (10223), 
514–523.
 The coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and its impact 17
CNBC (March 5, 2021). How the different Covid vaccines will handle new variants 
of the virus. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .cnbc .com /2021 /03 /05 / 
how -the -different -covid -vaccines -will -handle -variants .html.
CNBC TV (January 11, 2021). Japan has found a new Covid variant. Here’s how it 
compares to virus strains in the UK. South Africa. Retrieved January 11, 2021. 
https://www .cnbc .com /2021 /01 /11 /japan -covid -variant -how -it -compares -to - 
strains -in -uk -south -africa .html.
CSSE – Center for Systems Science and Engineering (January 11, 2021). COVID-
19 dashboard by the center for systems science and engineering (CSSE) at Johns 
Hopkins University (JHU). ArcGIS, Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus 
Resource Center. Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://coronavirus .jhu .edu /map 
.html.
Gallup (November 17, 2020). More Americans now willing to get COVID-19 
vaccine. Archived from the Retrieved original on January 10, 2021. https://news 
.gallup .com /poll /325208 /americans -willing -covid -vaccine .aspx.
Gazeta Wyborcza (December 28, 2020). Zgony. Niestety, 2020 r. zapisze się w 
naszej powojennej historii jako rekordowy, edited by Pawłowska, D. “Gazeta 
Wyborcza BiQ DATA.pl” BiG DATA .p l, Retrieved December 28, 2020. https://
biqdata .wyborcza .pl /biqdata /7 ,1591 16 ,26 64280 8 ,zgo ny -ni estet y -202 0 -r -z apisz e 
-sie -w -na szej- powoj ennej -hist ori .h tml.
Gorbalenya, A. E., Baker, S. C., Baric, R. S., de Groot, R. J, Drosten, C., Gulyaeva, 
A. A., et al. (2020). The species Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related 
coronavirus: Classifying 2019-nCoV and naming it SARS-CoV-2. Nature 
Microbiology. No. 5 (4), 536–544.
Health Affairs (March 18, 2021). Lessons In COVID-19 vaccination from 
Israel. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .healthaffairs .org /do /10 .1377 /
hblog20210315 .476220 /full/.
IBRIS (December 28, 2020). Polish institute for market and social research. Survey: 
Wciąż sporo osób nie chce się zaszczepić. Dominuje jeden argument przeciw. 
‘Rzeczpospolita’. Retrieved December 28, 2020. https://wiadomosci .onet .pl /kraj /
koronawirus -sondaz -ile -osob -w -polsce -chce -sie -zaszczepic /9m6pr2k.
Johns Hopkins University (March 25, 2021). COVID-19 dashboard. Retrieved 
March 25, 2021. https://coronavirus .jhu .edu /map .html.
Lim, B. H., Mahmood, T. A. (2011). Influenza A H1N1 2009 (Swine Flu) and 
pregnancy. Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology. No. 61 (4), 386–393.
Machhi, J., Herskovitz, J., Senan, A. M., Dutta, D., Nath, B., Oleynikov, M. D., 
et al. (2020). The natural history, pathobiology, and clinical manifestations of 
SARS-CoV-2 infections. Journal of Neuroimmune Pharmacology. The Official 
Journal of the Society on Neuroimmune Pharmacology. No. 15 (3), 359–386.
NIH – National Institutes of Health (March 17, 2020). New coronavirus stable 
for hours on surfaces. NIH .gov . Archived from the original on March 23, 
2020. Retrieved May 4, 2020. https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/
new-coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces.
OECD (October 10, 2020). Ministerial council meeting opening remarks by Angel 
Gurría. OECD Secretary-General. Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://www .oecd . 
org /coronavirus /en/.
Our World in Data (January 1, 2021). How many people have received a 
coronavirus vaccine? Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://ourworldindata .org /
covid -vaccinations.
18 Andrzej Nowosad et al. 
Pharmaceutical Processing World (February 5, 2021). Which companies will likely 
produce the most COVID-19 vaccine in 2021? Retrieved March 25, 2021. 
https://www .pha rmac euti calp roce ssin gworld .com /which -companies -will -likely 
-produce -the -most -covid -19 -vaccine -in -2021/.
RBB (August 29, 2020). Fast 40.000 Menschen bei Corona-Demos – Sperren 
am Reichstag durchbrochen. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .rbb24 . 
de /politik /thema /2020 /coronavirus /beitraege _neu /2020 /08 /demonstrationen - 
samstag -corona -querdenken -gegendemos .html.
Reuters (June 26, 2020). Coronavirus traces found in March 2019 sewage sample, 
Spanish study shows. Archived from the original on June 26, 2020 7:22 PM. 
Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://www .reuters .com /article /us -health - 
coronavirus -spain -science -idUSKBN23X2HQ.
Reuters (February 17, 2021). Exclusive: Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine supply to the 
EU about 10 million doses short of plan -sources. Retrieved March 25, 2021. 
https://www .reuters .com /article /us -health -coronavirus -eu -pfizer -exclusiv - 
idUSKBN2AH1E3.
Sanche, S., Lin, Y. T., Xu, C., Romero-Severson, E., Hengartner, N., Ke, R. (2020). 
High contagiousness and rapid spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2. Emerging Infectious Diseases. No. 26 (7), 1470–1477.
Science (January 10, 2021). Kupferschmidt Kai, Mutant coronavirus in the United 
Kingdom sets off alarms, but its importance remains unclear, Science’s COVID-19 
reporting. Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://www .sciencemag .org /news /2020 /12 / 
mutant -coronavirus -united -kingdom -sets -alarms -its -importance -remains -unclear.
Scientific American (October 12, 2020). Eight persistent COVID-19 myths and why 
people believe them. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .scientificamerican 
.com /article /eight -persistent -covid -19 -myths -and -why -people -believe -them/.
Shou-Jiang, G. (ed.) Journal of Medical Virology. Three special issues on the Novel 
Coronavirus (COVID-19), monthly editions for years 2019–2020. Retrieved 
January 10, 2021. https://onlinelibrary .wiley .com /journal /10969071; https://
papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers .cfm ?abstract _id =3557504.
The Guardian (May 1, 2020). Trump claims to have evidence coronavirus started 
in Chinese lab but offers no details. Support the Guardian. Retrieved January 
10, 2020. https://www .theguardian .com /us -news /2020 /apr /30 /donald -trump 
-coronavirus -chinese -lab -claim.
The Guardian (June 4, 2020). Covid-19 investigations unreliable data: How doubt 
snowballed over Covid-19 drug research that swept the world. The Guardian. 
Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://www .theguardian .com /world /2020 /jun / 
04 /unreliable -data -doubt -snowballed -covid -19 -drug -research -surgisphere - 
coronavirus -hydroxychloroquine; https://papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers .cfm 
?abstract _id =3557504.
The Guardian (September 4, 2020). How coronavirus has brought together 
conspiracy theorists and the far right. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www . 
theguardian .com /commentisfree /2020 /sep /04 /coronavirus -conspiracy -theorists - 
far -right -protests.
The Guardian (October 26, 2020). Survey uncovers widespread belief in ‘dangerous’ 
Covid conspiracy theories. Retrieved March 25, 2021. https://www .theguardian . 
com /world /2020 /oct /26 /survey -uncovers -widespread -belief -dangerous -covid - 
conspiracy -theories.
 The coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and its impact 19
UNESCO (May 8, 2020). COVID-19 educational disruption and response. Retrieved 
January 10, 2021. https://en .unesco .org /news /covid -19 -educational -disruption 
-and -response; https://papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers .cfm ?abstract _id =3557504.
WHO – World Health Organization (January 2020). Surveillance case definitions for 
human infection with novel coronavirus (nCoV): Interim guidance v1, January 
2020 (report). Retrieved January 10, 2021. https://papers .ssrn .com /sol3 /papers 
.cfm ?abstract _id =3557504;hdl:1 0665/ 33037 6.WHO /2019 -nCoV /Surv eilla nce/v 
2020. 1.=
WHO – World Health Organization (January 30, 2020). Statement on the second 
meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee 
regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV). (Press release). 
Archived from the original on January 31, 2020. Retrieved January 10, 2021. 
https://www .who .int /news /item /30 -01 -2020 -statement -on -the -second -meeting - 
of -the -international -health -regulations-(2005 )-eme rgenc y-com mitte e-reg ardin 
g-the -outb reak- of-no vel-c orona virus -(201 9-nco v).
WHO – World Health Organization (March 11, 2020). WHO Director-General’s 
opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020. (Press 
release). Archived from the original on March 11, 2020. Retrieved March 12, 2020. 
https://www .who .int /director -general /speeches /detail /who -director -general - 
s -opening -remarks -at -the -media -briefing -on -covid -19-- -11 -march -2020.
WHO – World Health Organization (October 5, 2020). COVID-19 disrupting 
mental health services in most countries, WHO survey. World Mental Health 
Day on 10 October to highlight urgent need to increase investment in chronically 
underfunded sector, October 5, 2020. https://www .who .int /news /item /05 - 
10 -2020 -covid -19 -disrupting -mental -health -services -in -most -countries -who - 
survey.
Williams, C. Ch. (2020). Impacts of the coronavirus pandemic on Europe’s tourism 
industry: Addressing tourism enterprises and workers in the undeclared economy. 
International Journal of Tourism Research. No. 23 (1): 79–88. Retrieved July 27, 
2020. https://doi .org /10 .1002 /jtr .2395.
WMD – Worldometer Data. Archived from the original on January 31, 2020. 
Retrieved September 9, 2021. https://www .worldometers .info /coronavirus/.
2
2.1  Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic cast a long shadow over the world’s economies 
in 2020 and the economic outlook in 2021 is very uncertain (OECD, 2020). 
The scale and dynamics of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, caused 
by a coronavirus, entailed serious disturbances in social and economic life. 
The 2020+ pandemic is not only the most serious global health crisis since 
the Spanish flu of 1918 but also one of the most economically expensive 
pandemics on a global scale. The World Bank stated that the COVID-19 
pandemic has plunged the global economy into its deepest recession since 
World War II. Per capita incomes are expected to decline in about 90% of 
countries in 2020, the largest fraction since 1870 (Dieppe, 2020).
Looking at the four quarters of 2020, it is clear that the restrictions on 
social and economic life, imposed in line with various rules, had a stronger 
effect on the value of aggregate demand (and due to the Keynesian mul-
tiplier effect, on the volume of production) than on the supply aspect of 
the economy. Consumer expenditures in the household sector represent 
the most important component of domestic demand and account for about 
55% of the situation of European economies (the dynamics of changes in 
the gross domestic product (GDP) and its structure, labor market condition, 
and indirectly the condition of public finance and international competi-
tive advantage, etc.). Considering an additional decrease in the volume of 
exports and gross fixed capital formation (that is aimed to strengthen the 
economy’s manufacturing potential), a grim picture of the European econo-
mies in 2020 emerges.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues that most economies will 
suffer a durable loss in their manufacturing potential due to the 2020+ pan-
demic, and this will decelerate growth in the following years. It will take 
time for the labor market to recover to its pre-2020 condition, as invest-
ments will be postponed due to uncertainty, and unemployment and loss 
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of schooling will cause erosion in human and social capital (Dieppe, 2020). 
The crisis caused by the pandemic would be more severe if it were not for 
rapid counteraction by governments and central banks that supported 
enterprises in maintaining their financial liquidity and to a significant extent 
upheld employment and household income (IMF, 2020). The European 
Union has responded to the outbreak of COVID-19 and its consequences 
by adopting a wide range of measures in many areas: public health, society, 
economy, etc.1
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated a very large volume of research 
related to the basic biology of coronavirus infection, its detection, treatment 
and evolution,2 but also related to its economic consequences.3 In terms of 
economics, most of the research is focused on aggregate macroeconomic 
effects (Atkeson, 2020; Baumeister, Guérin, 2020; Ludvigson, Ma & Ng, 
2020), labor markets (Forsythe, Kahn, Lange & Wiczer, 2020), costs of the 
pandemic and its containment (Brock, Xepapadeas, 2020; Lik Ng, 2020).
This chapter aims to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
differentiation of selected macroeconomic variables in the European Union 
(EU) economies. The study examined 27 European countries that were 
members of the European Union at the time of the announcement of the 
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020. 
The analysis did not include the United Kingdom, which left the European 
Union on January 31, 2020. The following macro-indicators were analyzed 
and assessed: gross domestic product per capita, the unemployment rate, 
gross fixed capital formation per capita, exports of goods and services per 
capita, and imports of goods and services per capita. The research project 
included both a long (2006–2020) and a short (Q2 of 2020 vs. Q2 of 2019)4 
period.
The macro-indicators are discussed in this analysis using a dynamic 
approach (in time) and a spatial approach (the level of countries). The econ-
omies of the EU member states are classified in quintile groups with the low-
est (five countries), low (five), average (six), high (five) and the highest (five) 
values of the analyzed variables. The groups have different compositions in 
the analysis of unemployment because the changes in unemployment rates 
in those countries were insignificant between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020.
Short-term comparative analyses cover the second quarters of 2019 and 
2020, the period of the sharpest decreases in the discussed macroeconomic 
1  European Parliament’s EU response (https://www .europarl .europa .eu /news /en /headlines /pri-
orities /eu -response -to -coronavirus); European Commission (https://ec .europa .eu /info /live - 
work -travel -eu /coronavirus -response _en). 
2  See, for example, the websites at https://www .nature .com /collections /hajgidghjb.
3  See: https://www .nber .org /wp _covid19 .html or https://covid -19 .iza .org /publications/.
4  Both the analyzed period and the selected macroeconomic variables were determined by 
the availability of statistics on the EUROSTAT website: https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data / 
database.
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aggregates. Slovakia is classified in a separate group with a 0 value on 
the maps due to the absence of statistics for that country (except the 
unemployment map). This chapter contains a cluster analysis employing 
Ward’s method with Euclidean distance, and a study into variations of 
selected macroeconomic characteristics in quarterly periods in the years 
2006–2020.
2.2  Gross domestic product per capita
If we assume that GDP per capita gives a synthetic, general, albeit imperfect 
image of the level of wealth of an average citizen of a country and build 
a tree of clusters of similarities and differences in this macro-indicator in 
the group of 27 member states of the European Union (Figure 2.1), the 
general conclusions discussed below can be drawn. The highest similari-
ties in this macroeconomic variable in the period 2006–2020 (considering 
quarterly values) were characteristic of the following country pairs: Belgium 
and Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, Cyprus and Slovenia, Greece 
and Latvia, Latvia and Lithuania, Croatia and Poland, and Germany and 
France. An analysis of clusters of EU countries also led to the distinction 
Figure 2.1  A dendrogram of GDP per capita in the member states of the EU (2006–
2020, Euclidean distance). Source: own calculation based on https://ec . 
europa .eu /eurostat /data /database.
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of three main similarity clusters. The first cluster is formed by Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. The second clus-
ter includes the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, Portugal, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Spain. The last cluster is formed by Croatia, Poland, 
Romania, Estonia, Hungary and Italy. Luxembourg and Ireland with their 
high values of GDP per capita clearly stand out from the other countries.
Between the years 2006 and 2020, the lowest values of GDP per cap-
ita were recorded in Bulgaria (EUR 1,338.78), Croatia (EUR 3,995.16), 
Poland (EUR 4,131.15), Romania (EUR 4,398.21) and Lithuania (EUR 
5,643.06). The highest values of the analyzed variable were recorded in 
Luxembourg (EUR 35,117.87), one of the largest global financial centers. 
The group of countries with the highest values of GDP per capita included: 
the Netherlands (EUR 15,571.39), Denmark (EUR 15,606.95), Sweden 
(EUR 16,052.14) and Austria (EUR 16,316.64).
The analysis of long-term similarities and differences is juxtaposed below 
with an analysis of a very short period of the sharpest decrease in the values 
of discussed macroeconomic aggregates since the end of World War II, i.e. 
in Q2 of 2020.
Maps 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) show the value of GDP per capita in Q2 of 2019 
and Q2 of 2020. Over the analyzed period, the greatest falls in GDP per cap-
ita occurred in the economies of Luxembourg (a decrease by EUR 3,048.36 
in Q2 of 2020 vs. Q2 of 2019), Austria (EUR 2,271.61), the Netherlands 
(EUR 2,027.30), Belgium (EUR 1,902.88), France (EUR 1,869.73), Spain 
(EUR 1,589.29), Sweden (EUR 1,556. 00) and Malta (EUR 1,504.74). 
These countries are classified in the groups with average, high and the high-
est values of the discussed variable.
The slightest falls of GDP per capita were recorded in Bulgaria (a decrease 
by EUR 367.08 in Q2 of 2020 vs. Q2 of 2019), Lithuania (EUR 627.21), 
Croatia (EUR 677.73), Portugal (EUR 700.33), Romania (EUR 710.99), 
Poland (EUR 711.31), Latvia (EUR 771.12), Greece (EUR 815.90) and 
Estonia (EUR 905.01). These states constituted the groups with the lowest, 
low and average values of GDP per capita.
Eight countries changed their positions in the ranking of average wealth 
between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020. Austria, Hungary, Spain, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland and Poland changed their positions by one within the 
quintile groups they belong to until the end of 2019. The Czech Republic 
dropped to the quintile group with lower values of GDP per capita. Estonia 
entered in the second quarter of 2020 the group with higher values of the 
analyzed variable, compared to the corresponding period in the preceding 
year.
The depth of decreases in GDP (and consequently GDP per capita) in 
the second quarter of 2020 was unprecedented in the post-war history 
of the member states of the former European Communities and the cur-
rent European Union. The greatest falls in GDP were recorded in Spain 
(−21.5% in Q2 of 2020 vs. Q2 of 2019), France (−18.9%), Italy (−18.0%), 
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Malta, Portugal, Croatia, Greece, Austria, Belgium, Hungary (decreases 
by −16.7% to −13.5%); relatively slighter decreases were recorded in 
Lithuania (−4.6%) and Ireland (−3.5%). The third quarter of 2020 still 
saw a downward trend in GDP values, except Ireland (8.1% growth in Q3 
of 2020 vs. Q3 of 2019). Despite a decrease in GDP by 1.8% in the third 
quarter, Poland increased its proportion of EU GDP from 3.82 to 3.94 
percent, i.e. by 0.12 percentage points. Proportions of EU GDP increased 
by higher percentages only in the case of Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden.
Map 2.1a  Spatial differentiation of GDP per capita in the second quarters of 2019 
in the member states of the European Union (in EUR, constant prices 
from Q2 of 2020). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu / 
eurostat /data /database.
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2.3  Unemployment
The unemployment rate is correlated with the curve of the economic situa-
tion, both at the level of member states and that of the entire EU economy.
Figure 2.2 shows the changes in the unemployment rate in the European 
Union countries, from this figure we can conclude the following statements. 
A decrease in the unemployment rate was observed between the first quarter 
of 2006 and the corresponding quarter of 2008 due to a favorable economic 
situation in the European Union. The decrease in the unemployment rate 
Map 2.1b  Spatial differentiation of GDP per capita in the second quarters of 2020 
in the member states of the European Union (in EUR, constant prices 
from Q2 of 2020). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu / 
eurostat /data /database.
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in that time interval amounted to more than 1%. The unemployment rate 
grew in the following quarters (from the second quarter of 2008 to the third 
quarter of 2013). This unfavorable trend was caused by a global shock (the 
crisis of 2008+), exogenous in its nature to the EU economy. The greatest 
increase in the unemployment rate was recorded between the last quarter 
of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. The average increase in the rate of 
unemployment between Q2 of 2008 and Q3 of 2013 amounted to 2.4%. In 
the following periods, the unemployment rate dropped, by 0.1% on aver-
age period-over-period, until the second quarter of 2020, when unemploy-
ment grew by 0.1 percentage points compared to the first quarter of that 
year. The increase in the unemployment rate resulted from the economic 
restrictions imposed by European economies in response to the spread of 
the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Figure 2.3 represents a clustering tree of similarities 
and differences in unemployment rates in the member states of the EU in the 
years 2006–2020 (including the second quarter of 2020).
The dendrogram identifies the following pairs of similar countries: 
Belgium and Finland, Malta and Romania, Luxembourg and Austria, 
Hungary and Poland, Ireland and Lithuania, Croatia and Portugal, and 
Greece and Spain. An analysis of the clustering tree demonstrates the follow-
ing similarity clusters. The first cluster is formed by Croatia, Slovakia and 
Figure 2.3  A dendrogram of unemployment rates in the EU (2006–2020, Euclidean 
distance). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat / 
data /database.
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Portugal, where the average unemployment rate amounted to about 11% in 
the analyzed time interval. Another cluster is formed by three states located 
in the north-eastern part of Europe: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, plus 
Ireland. The third cluster includes Belgium, Finland, Sweden and France, 
where the average unemployment rate amounted to about 8%. The last and 
largest cluster is formed by the Czech Republic, Malta, Denmark, Romania, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the Netherlands.
The highest average unemployment rates in the years 2006–2020 
occurred in Greece (17.85%), Spain (17.81%), Croatia (12.00%), Slovakia 
(11.06%) and Latvia (10.86%). The lowest average unemployment rates 
were recorded in Iceland (4.43%), Austria (5.12%), the Netherlands 
(5.13%), the Czech Republic (5.16%) and Luxembourg (5.38%).
The analysis of long-term similarities and differences is juxtaposed below 
with an analysis of short-term responses of unemployment rates to the cir-
cumstances between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020. Maps 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) 
represent spatially differentiated rates of registered unemployment in the 27 
member states of the EU in the second quarters of 2019 and 2020.
The lowest unemployment rates both in 2019 and in 2020 were recorded 
in the central area of the European Union. Twenty-one states changed 
their positions in the ranking between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020: 11 
states dropped in the ranking and 10 were ranked higher. The largest fall 
affected Lithuania; the country dropped by eight positions in the ranking 
of registered unemployment rates. Also, Estonia dropped by six positions; 
the countries that dropped by five positions in the ranking were Latvia, 
Bulgaria and Sweden. The group of states that went down also includes 
Romania (down four positions), Austria (down two positions), and Finland, 
Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands (down one position).
In contrast, Portugal advanced by seven positions, Belgium advanced by 
six positions, and Croatia, Ireland and Cyprus each advanced by five posi-
tions. The group of states that reached higher positions also included France 
(by four positions), Italy (by three positions), Poland (by two positions), and 
Malta and Denmark (by one position).
Both a decrease and an increase in the unemployment rate was observed 
between the discussed quarters. The unemployment rate fell only in seven 
countries. Between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020, the unemployment rate 
fell in Italy (2.1 percentage points), France (1.3 percentage points), Portugal 
(0.7 percentage points), Belgium (0.5 percentage points), Greece (0.3 per-
centage points) and Poland and Ireland (0.2 percentage points each). The 
unemployment rate grew in 20 states in the analyzed time interval. The larg-
est increases (exceeding 1.5 percentage points) were recorded in Bulgaria 
(1.5 percentage points), Romania (1.6 percentage points), Latvia (1.7 per-
centage points), Estonia (1.9 percentage points), Sweden (1.9 percentage 
points) and Lithuania (2.4 percentage points).
This variety of responses of labor markets to the supply and demand 
shock in Q2 of 2020 can be interpreted from various perspectives. The 
causes of such diversity should be sought in the varying scenarios of the 
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implementation of lockdown measures. First, a rapid introduction of lock-
down measures has a stronger effect on accumulated social and economic 
activity than continual increases and decreases in the severity of restrictions 
on that activity. Second, a scenario of strong rapid lockdown has the most 
serious adverse consequences for the economy, both in terms of the sharp-
ness of decrease in production, the time of staying on the relatively lowest 
growth path, and the expected accumulated decrease in production. Similar 
conclusions concern the changes in social utility and labor market.
The unemployment rate in Poland amounted in October 2020 to 3.5%, 
as per the EU standard methods, while in the Czech Republic it reached 
2.9% – the best result in this category in the European Union. The num-
ber of unemployed in the European Union by the end of October 2020 
amounted to 13.8 million. This was 1.7 million (13.9%) more than in 
Map 2.2a  Unemployment in the second quarter of 2019 in the EU countries (in %). 
Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /
database.
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2019. The largest increases in the numbers of unemployed were recorded in 
Germany and Spain.
Employment rose in Q3 of 2020 in Poland (by 0.5%) and Malta (by 2.4%). 
In the remaining countries of the European Union (except Luxembourg), a 
continued decrease in the employment rate was observed. Employment in the 
EU economy dropped by 2% year-over-year, by 4.3 million people in total.
2.4  Gross fixed capital formation per capita
Investing activities of business entities have a direct effect on global demand, 
production volume, employment and capital accumulation.
Map 2.2b  Unemployment in the second quarter of 2020 in the EU countries (in %). 
Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /
database.
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On the basis of Figure 2.4 we can conclude that the gross fixed capital 
formation in the EU economy as a whole, considered in quarterly periods 
in the years 2006–2020, underwent three distinct processes. The gross fixed 
capital formation rose in the European Union until the first quarter of 2008 
but began to dramatically drop in the advent of a financial crisis that in 
the following years evolved into an economic crisis. The EU member states 
reduced the value of gross fixed capital formation by 0.65% per annum in 
the years 2008–2015.
The highest gross fixed capital formation was recorded in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 (23.6%) and that value was not reached until the second 
quarter of 2020. The lowest value was recorded in the first quarter of 2015 
(19.6%). The value of expenditures on gross fixed capital formation bought 
or produced in the EU economy has significantly fluctuated since 2015. The 
greatest fall (by 1.1 percentage points) of gross fixed capital formation was 
recorded both between the second and third quarters of 2019 and between 
the first and second quarters of 2020. The average decrease of the ana-
lyzed variable between the first quarter of 2006 and the last quarter of 2020 
amounted to 0.09% per annum.
The above general picture of fluctuations in the gross fixed capital for-
mation is supplemented by an analysis of clusters shown in Figure 2.5. In 
the clustering tree, six pairs of national economies similar in their gross 
fixed capital formation can be distinguished. The pairs of similar countries 
comprise Belgium and Finland, Germany and France, Croatia and Poland, 
Greece and Romania, the Czech Republic and Italy, and Hungary and 
Slovenia. Four clusters can be distinguished in the 26 analyzed economies 
(excluding Slovakia). The first includes Belgium, Finland, Austria, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Sweden – the analyzed variable assumed on average the 
highest values in those states. Another cluster is formed by the states with 
the lowest average value of gross expenditures on gross fixed capital forma-
tion in the EU: Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Portugal. The third, smallest 
cluster is formed by Greece, Romania and Lithuania.
The last cluster is formed by the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Cyprus; these economies (except Cyprus) displayed the same 
trend in the value of capital expenditures in the analyzed period. Luxembourg 
is characterized by significantly greater values of the discussed macroeco-
nomic variable (like in the case of GDP). This country clearly stands out 
from the other member states. The highest average values of per-capita gross 
expenditures on property and plant equipment in the years 2006–2020 were 
observed in Luxembourg (EUR 6,486.09), Ireland (EUR 3,904.46), Sweden 
(EUR 3,793.09), Austria (EUR 3,738.34), Belgium (EUR 3,410.30) and 
Finland (EUR 3,298.32). The lowest average values of the discussed variable 
occurred in Bulgaria (EUR 544.91), Poland (EUR 825.60), Croatia (EUR 
907.67), Greece (EUR 1,030.93) and Portugal (EUR 1,114.27).
Maps 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) depict the spatial differentiation of gross fixed 
capital formation in Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020. Sixteen states changed 
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their positions in the ranking of quintile groups in the analyzed period, due 
to their reductions in expenditures on gross fixed capital formation bought 
or produced. The group of countries that reduced their gross fixed capital 
formation between the analyzed periods included Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Poland and Sweden. The greatest fall, by six positions, affected 
Cyprus. Additionally, Cyprus and Austria fell to lower quintile groups. 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain rose in the ranking but remained in their quin-
tile groups. A significant rise was experienced by Portugal (by 3 positions). 
In the group of ten countries that rose in the ranking, two (Finland and 
Slovenia) were reclassified in higher quintile groups.
All of the 26 analyzed economies (excluding Slovakia) recorded a general 
reduction in the per-capita expenditures on gross fixed capital formation.
The greatest decreases took place in Ireland (a reduction by EUR 9,150.12 
in Q2 of 2020 compared to Q2 of 2019), and Luxembourg (EUR 1,074.45). 
Significant declines were observed in Cyprus (EUR 663.18), Belgium (EUR 
631.57) and France (EUR 566.94). The slightest falls (below EUR 100) were 
observed in Denmark (EUR 96.50), Romania (EUR 90.07), Portugal (EUR 
79.65), Bulgaria (EUR 61.42) and Greece (EUR 40.04).
Figure 2.5  A dendrogram of gross fixed capital formation in the EU (2006–2020, 
Euclidean distance). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa 
.eu /eurostat /data /database.
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2.5  Exports of goods and services
Figure 2.6 represents the dynamics of changes in the proportion of exports of 
goods and services in GDP. The proportion of exports in GDP rose by 0.9% 
p.a. on average in 2006–2008 (Q1). The value of exports suddenly collapsed 
in Q3 of 2008 for the subsequent three quarters (by more than 5 percentage 
points) due to a severe downturn in international trade caused by the loss of 
trust in the global financial system. The proportion of exports in GDP in the 
European Union fell to the lowest value of 35.6% in the second quarter of 
2009. Thereafter, the proportion of exports began to rise and was free from 
significant fluctuations until the outbreak of the pandemic. The value of 
Map 2.3a  Gross fixed capital formation in the second quarters of 2019 in the 
member states of the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 
of 2020). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat / 
data /database.
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exports of goods and services dramatically fell between the first and second 
quarter of 2020 – by more than 5 percentage points. The average annual rate 
of increase in the value of exports between the second quarter of 2009 (the 
lowest value of exports) and the first quarter of 2020 amounted to 0.72%.
An analysis of differences and similarities shown on the Figure 2.7 in the 
volumes of exports per capita in the EU member states leads to the follow-
ing generalizations. The strongest similarities in the values of the discussed 
variable were characteristic of 8 pairs of states: Malta and the Netherlands, 
Greece and Croatia, Poland and Portugal, Spain and Italy, France and 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, Estonia and Finland, and 
Denmark and Austria. Luxembourg is characterized by a value of exports 
Map 2.3b  Gross fixed capital formation in the second quarters of 2020 in the 
member states of the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 
of 2020). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat / 
data /database.
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per capita significantly exceeding those achieved by the other states, and as 
such clearly stands out. In the clustering tree, similarity clusters can also 
be distinguished. The first cluster includes Denmark, Austria and Sweden, 
countries that achieved an average value of exports per capita of about EUR 
8,000. Another cluster is formed by Estonia, Finland and Hungary with an 
average value of exports of goods and services amounting in the analyzed 
period to about EUR 5,000. The third cluster includes the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Germany; the fourth Belgium, Malta and the Netherlands, 
which achieved high average values of per-capita exports (excluding the 
outstanding economies of Luxembourg and Ireland). The last and largest 
cluster includes Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Romania, Poland and Portugal.
The states classified in the largest cluster were characterized in the ana-
lyzed period by the lowest average values of exports per capita. The lowest 
values of the analyzed variable, not exceeding EUR 2,000 per capita, were 
recorded in Bulgaria (EUR 1,348.55), Romania (EUR 1,441.82), Greece 
(EUR 1,555.14), Croatia (EUR 1,639.16) and Poland (EUR 1,861.38); 
those countries also recorded, in the first two quarters of 2020, the slightest 
falls of exports resulting from the restrictions imposed by governments and 
aimed to control the spread of the SARS-CoV-2.
Figure 2.7  A dendrogram of similarities in exports (2006–2020, Euclidean distance). 
Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /
database.
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The highest values of exports per capita (exceeding EUR 10,000) 
were recorded in the Benelux countries: Belgium (EUR 11,644.97), the 
Netherlands (EUR 11,723.06) and Luxembourg (EUR 67,531.70); also in 
Malta (EUR 11,033.99) and Ireland (EUR 15,077.92).
Maps 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) represent the spatial differentiation of exports of 
goods and services in the 26 European economies in the second quarter of 
2019 and in the second quarter of 2020. 15 states changed their positions 
in the general ranking of quintile groups; seven of them rose and eight fell 
in the ranking. The group of countries that achieved rises: Poland, by three 
positions; Bulgaria, by two positions; Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Latvia 
and Malta by one position. Poland was the only country to change its quin-
tile group from that with the lowest values into that characterized by low 
Map 2.4a  Exports per capita in the second quarters of 2019 in the member states of 
the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 of 2020). Source: 
own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database.
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values. Croatia and the Czech Republic fell in the ranking by two positions 
while France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain fell by 
one position. Also, Portugal changed its quintile group.
All member states of the European Union recorded reductions in exports 
of goods and services in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the cor-
responding period in 2019 due to the imposed restrictions. The greatest 
decrease in exports was recorded in Luxembourg (by EUR 5,281.44 per 
capita between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020). A significant fall also affected 
the other Benelux countries: the Netherlands (by EUR 2,403.19) and 
Belgium (by EUR 1,803.15). The value of exports also significantly dropped 
(by EUR 1,942.67) in Malta, with foreign trade and financial services as 
its main economic sectors. Only a few among the EU economies recorded 
Map 2.4b  Exports per capita in the second quarters of 2020 in the member states of 
the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 of 2020). Source: 
own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database.
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slight decreases in exports: Latvia (by EUR 574.10), Poland (EUR 544.42), 
Romania (EUR 516.95) and Bulgaria (EUR 461.23).
2.6  Imports of goods and services
Figure 2.8 represents the dynamics of changes in the proportion of imports 
of goods and services in GDP. The proportion of imports in GDP rose by 
0.8% per annum on average between 2006 and Q3 of 2008. The variable 
sharply dropped thereafter (by 6.4 percentage points over the three subse-
quent quarters). The value of imports and its proportion in GDP continually 
grew since H2 of 2009. The proportion amounted to 46.6% in the second 
quarter of 2019. The average annual rate of growth in the discussed period 
amounted to 0.8%. The second quarter of 2020 saw a severe reduction in 
the value of imports in the EU economy (5 percentage points compared to 
the corresponding quarter of 2019).
An analysis of differences and similarities in the volumes of imports per 
capita in the EU member states leads to the following generalizations. The 
strongest similarities in imports were observed between the following pairs 
of countries: Malta and the Netherlands, Greece and Romania, Spain and 
Italy, the Czech Republic and Germany, Latvia and Lithuania, Denmark 
and Austria, and Estonia and Hungary. In the dendrogram depicted in 
Figure 2.9, two smaller and two larger clusters of similarities can be distin-
guished. The first of the smaller clusters is formed by Belgium, Malta and 
the Netherlands. The second includes Denmark, Austria and Sweden, with 
an average value of imports of about EUR 7,000. A larger cluster is formed 
by Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Croatia, Poland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Another larger cluster includes the Czech Republic, Germany, Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, with an average value of imports in 
the years 2006–2020 amounting to about EUR 4,000 per capita.
The largest average values of imports per capita were recorded in the years 
2006–2020 in Luxembourg (EUR 55,866.08), Ireland (EUR 12,648.66), 
Belgium (EUR 11,413.74), Malta (EUR 10,639.52), and the Netherlands 
(EUR 10,311.61). The lowest values of imports of goods and services were 
recorded in the same states that achieved the lowest values of exports. The 
lowest average values were recorded in the years 2006–2020 in Bulgaria 
(EUR 1,470.65), Romania (EUR 1,768.95), Croatia (EUR 1,797.33), 
Poland (EUR 1,851.14) and Greece (EUR 1,940.68); those economies also 
recorded the slightest decrease in imports, resulting from the restrictions 
imposed to control the spread of the SARS-CoV-2.
Maps 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) represent the spatial differentiation of imports of 
goods and services in the 26 European economies – in the second quarter 
of 2019 and in the second quarter of 2020. Eight economies changed their 
positions in the general ranking between the analyzed periods. Cyprus rose 
by three positions, and Slovenia fell by three positions, so that the two coun-
tries “swapped” their groups. Bulgaria, Malta and Poland each rose in the 
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general ranking by one position. A drop in the ranking of imports of goods 
and services in the EU states was recorded in the case of the Netherlands, 
Romania and Spain (by one position). Spain was reclassified from the group 
characterized by low values to the group with the lowest values of imports 
of goods and services per capita and was replaced by Poland.
All member states of the European Union recorded reductions in imports 
of goods and services in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the cor-
responding period in 2019 due to the imposed restrictions. The sharpest 
decreases affected Ireland (by EUR 10,278.69 per capita), Luxembourg (EUR 
5,425.82), the Netherlands (EUR 2,152.84) and Belgium (EUR 2,076.84). 
The group of states that recorded the slightest decreases in imports includes 
Croatia (EUR 578.74), Greece (EUR 521.06), Romania (EUR 509.50) and 
Bulgaria (EUR 462.43).
2.7  Conclusions
An analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the differentiation 
of selected macroeconomic variables characterizing the EU economies over 
a short period leads to the following generalizations.
Figure 2.9  A dendrogram of similarities in imports (the years 2006–2020, Euclidean 
distance). Source: own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat / 
data /database.
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First, the sharpest decrease in the absolute value of GDP per capita 
between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020 was recorded in the countries that in 
the years 2006–2019 belonged to the group with medium, high and high-
est values of average citizen’s wealth. The depth of decreases in GDP (and 
consequently GDP per capita) in the second quarter of 2020 was unprece-
dented in the post-war history of the member states of the former European 
Communities and the current European Union.
Second, this variety of responses of labor markets to the supply and 
demand shock in Q2 of 2020 can be interpreted from various perspectives. 
The causes of such diversity should be sought in the varying scenarios of the 
implementation of lockdown measures.
Map 2.5a  Imports per capita in the second quarters of 2019 in the member states of 
the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 of 2020). Source: 
own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database.
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Third, all analyzed EU economies recorded a clear reduction in the per-
capita expenditures on property and plant equipment bought or produced. 
The highest absolute values of decrease were characteristic of Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus, Belgium and France. The slightest decrease affected 
Denmark, Romania, Portugal, Bulgaria and Greece.
Fourth, all member states of the EU recorded a sharp decrease in 
both exports and imports of goods and services in the second quarter of 
2020 compared to the corresponding period in 2019 due to the imposed 
restrictions.
Map 2.5b  Imports per capita in the second quarters of 2020 in the member states of 
the European Union (in EUR, constant prices from Q2 of 2020) Source: 
own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database.
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More than a decade after the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, the world econ-
omy faced again the risk of global instability. The lockdowns, restrictions 
on spatial mobility of workers and interrupted supply chains resulted in 
the sharpest drop in the gross domestic product (GDP) since World War II 
(Kose, Naotaka, 2020).
Like in 2008, some governments intensified their interventionism, 
increasing again money supply, budget deficits and public debt. The differ-
ence between 2008 and 2020 lies in the capability of maintaining long-term 
macroeconomic stability. The ratio of public debt to GDP in the eurozone 
amounted to 64.9% in 2008. By the end of 2009, it had risen to 75.7%. The 
government debt of the eurozone rose until 2014, to reach 86.6% of GDP. 
Thereafter, that debt dropped over five years to 77.6% in 2019 (Trading 
Economics, 2020).
By the end of Q2 in 2020, the government debt of the eurozone had risen 
to 95.1%, and in the entire European Union to 87.8% (Eurostat 2020). 
That growth was driven principally by extensive fiscal stimulus packages 
implemented over the period surveyed.
Demertzis et al. (2020) were among the first to assess plans adopted by 
the European Commission in the spring of 2020 to support the economies of 
member states: the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative1 (CRII; EUR 
25 billion) and EU Solidarity Fund.2 Klose and Tillmann (2020) observed, 
in their panel survey into fiscal responses of the EU member states, a short-
term phenomenon of a rise in return on treasury securities in the states 
characterized by a high incidence of COVID-19. The return rate rose on the 
dates of the announcement of subsequent fiscal assistance packages.
In the eurozone, Germany was best prepared for a large unplanned fis-
cal intervention, as a country that reduced its public debt by 20 percentage 
1  https://ec .europa .eu /commission /presscorner /detail /en /IP _20 _440.
2  https:/ /ec .europa .eu /regional _policy /en /funding /solidari ty -fund/.
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points in the years 2013–2019 by implementing a balanced budget policy. 
This made fiscal interventions on a large scale possible in Germany (Busetto, 
Dufour & Varotto, 2020). The countries from the High Indebted Euro 
Countries (HIDC) group, with debts exceeding 100% of GDP, face the risk 
of serious macroeconomic instability. The group includes, among others, 
Italy and Spain (Briceno, Perote, 2020). Italy, despite implementing its fis-
cal stimulus package, experienced in H1 of 2020 the sharpest drop in GDP 
in the entire European Union. The concept of government assistance was 
criticized by experts. They argued that more attention should have been 
paid to society than to reductions in taxes. A major role was played by the 
lobby of entrepreneurs who are heavily taxed in Italy (Pietro, Marattin & 
Minetti 2020).
Post-pandemic recovery financed by governments will accelerate the 
pace of growth of the green economy in the European Union. The fiscal 
stimulus packages reveal that emphasis is put on research and develop-
ment (R&D) in advanced power generation sectors, on buildings’ energy 
upgrades and on the prevention of climate change (Hepburn et al., 2020). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced that between June and 
December 2020 the G20 countries implemented fiscal stimulus packages 
worth USD 9 trillion. This facilitated goal-oriented actions and cooperation 
(McKibbin, Vines, 2020).
The context outlined in the first and second chapters determines the 
objective of this chapter, which aims to make a comparative analysis of 
fiscal responses of the EU member states and of the United Kingdom to the 
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020. This study cov-
ers the period between January and November 2020. One lockdown or two 
lockdowns took place in that period in most of the discussed 28 economies. 
The lockdown measures caused liquidity problems in businesses and 
entailed insolvency procedures, interruptions in supply chains, suspension 
of business activity and increases in unemployment. To contain the conse-
quences of the downturn, governments put together subsequent fiscal stimu-
lus packages that were expanded and modified as the pandemic evolved. 
Separate assistance packages for the eurozone and the member states of the 
European Union were announced by the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission. This chapter discusses fiscal packages launched in 
the 27 member states of the European Union and in the United Kingdom in 
2020. The European Union is divided into the eurozone and the group of 
other states in the below analyses.
3.2  Eurozone states
The European Council announced on 21 July 2020 that a special EU recov-
ery fund was established, branded Next Generation EU, with a budget of 
EUR 750 billion. The fund is financed using debt issue, a digital levy, a car-
bon border adjustment mechanism and tax on plastics. The funds distributed 
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among the member states are divided into subsidies (EUR 390 billion) and 
loans (EUR 360 billion). All funds will be distributed by the end of 2023, 
and 70% of them by the end of 2022. Next Generation EU, together with 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027, represents the principal 
instrument of public intervention aimed to reconstruct the EU economies, 
with total funds amounting to EUR 1.8 trillion (IMF 2020). More than 50% 
of funds from the EU budget will be allocated to research and innovation, 
via Horizon Europe, to energy transition (via the Just Transition Fund) and 
digitalization (Digital Europe). Thirty percent of funds will be allocated to 
fighting climate change. Initiatives planned include REACT-EU (supporting 
employment; EUR 47.5 billion), RescEU (supporting the Civil Protection 
Mechanism; EUR 1.9 billion) and InvestEU (filling a gap in investments; 
EUR 5.6 billion) (see Table 3.1 in the appendix).
The Coronavirus Response Investment Initiatives (CRII and CRII+) aim 
to simplify and make flexible the procedures of using EU funds. They focus 
on public investments aimed to fight the pandemic, worth EUR 54 billion 
(European Commission, 2020a).
The Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) 
instrument, announced on 24 August 2020, is aimed to protect employees 
and their jobs. The amount of assistance was increased on 16 November 
from EUR 87.9 billion to EUR 90.3 billion. The funds were raised by issuing 
social bonds (EUR 17 billion). The money will be made available as loans 
to 18 EU countries that are particularly affected by the pandemic (European 
Commission, 2020b) (see Table 3.2 in the appendix).
Table 3.1  Objectives of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 and 









EUR 132.8 billion EUR 10.6 billion EUR 143.4 billion
Cohesion, resilience 
and values
EUR 377.8 billion EUR 721.9 billion EUR 1,099.7 billion
Natural resources and 
environment
EUR 356.4 billion EUR 17.5 billion EUR 373.9 billion
Migration and border 
management
EUR 22.7 billion - EUR 22.7 billion
Security and defence EUR 13.2 billion - EUR 13.2 billion
Neighborhood and 
the world
EUR 98.4 billion - EUR 98.4 billion
European public 
administration
EUR 73.1 billion - EUR 73.1 billion
Total EUR 1,074.3 billion EUR 750 billion EUR 1,824.3 billion
Source: European Commission, Recovery plan for Europe, https://ec .europa .eu /info /strategy /
recovery -plan -europe _en (accessed 14 December 2020).
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Considering the currency union, the member states of the European Union 
will be divided into one group comprising the 19 members of the eurozone, 
and the second group of other states (including the United Kingdom). The 
European Stability Mechanism (via Enhanced Conditions Credit Line) will 
provide the eurozone states with assistance amounting up to 2% of their GDP 
(EUR 240 billion in total allocated to expenses on health). The European 
Investment Bank received a capital injection of EUR 25 billion, allocated to 
provide small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with assistance in the 
form of government guarantees (up to EUR 200 billion) (IMF, 2020).
The European Central Bank modified the monetary policy for the euro-
zone by liquidity injection (improving the liquidity of banks and businesses). 
Assets worth EUR 120 billion were purchased. The Temporary Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) was developed, wherein the ECB 
will purchase securities worth EUR 750 billion in 2020. The requirements 
for collaterals requested by banks were relaxed and periods for refinancing 
were extended (ILO, 2020).
3.2.1  Austria
The economy of Austria was first locked down between 16 March and 13 
April 2020. (The lockdown was introduced again on 3 November.) The 
Austrian fiscal package, with the value of funds amounting to EUR 38 bil-
lion (9.5% of GDP), was announced on 15 March 2020. The sum of EUR 
4 billion was allocated to entities in the healthcare sector, to the preserva-
tion of jobs and to supporting companies in which employees contracted 
COVID-19. The tourism industry and exporters were provided with govern-
ment guarantees amounting to EUR 9 billion. Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 
payments were postponed by three months (a cost of EUR 10 billion) and the 
tax rate was reduced from 25% to 20%. Hours of work could be reduced by 
10% and pay to 80–90% of the former level. Households and SMEs were 
offered a three-month moratorium on loan repayment (IMF, 2020).C
The assistance package was increased to EUR 50 billion in mid-June 
(13% of GDP). The package was aimed to support non-profit organizations 
(EUR 700 million) and research projects (EUR 22 million) and to intro-
duce fiscal relief in the hospitality industry (EUR 500 million). Companies 
received EUR 2,000 per apprentice to preserve employment. The unem-
ployed received EUR 450 as a one-off allowance, and a children’s bonus of 
EUR 360 per child (also a one-off benefit) (ILO, 2020).
3.2.2  Belgium
The lockdown in Belgium was in force between 18 March and 4 May. (The 
lockdown was introduced again on 2 November.) The value of assistance 
provided to the economy was set to EUR 17.5 billion (3.9% of GDP). The 
value of the total fiscal package, including loans for businesses, amounted 
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to EUR 52 billion (12% of GDP). The funds were allocated to support-
ing healthcare, people fired due to the pandemic, the self-employed and to 
postponing the payment of corporate taxes. Employees who lost their jobs 
received 70% of their wages (up to EUR 1,450). The assistance measures 
were targeted at the industries severely affected by the pandemic: taxi com-
panies, cultural, entertainment, hospitality and tourist businesses (KPMG, 
2020). Payments of VAT for December 2020 were suspended to improve 
the liquidity of businesses. The value of donations and gifts made by com-
panies and deductible from income tax was increased. Non-government 
and volunteer organizations were also supported. A temporary allowance 
of EUR 126.94 per month for teleworking was introduced. The allowance 
covered additional costs of heating and electricity (IMF, 2020).
A package of EUR 4.3 billion was allocated to the Flemish Region for 
investments in digitalization, sustainable growth, education, healthcare, 
R&D and 5G. Allowances were granted for house reconstruction and repair. 
Investment deductions were increased for projects implemented between 
March and December 2020. Deductions of costs incurred on events and 
catering were increased from 50% to 100%, to prevent the mass postpone-
ment of events until 2021 (ILO, 2020).
3.2.3  Cyprus
The economy was locked down between 24 March and 13 April. The value 
of the fiscal support package amounted to EUR 899 million (4.5% of GDP), 
including EUR 100 million allocated to the healthcare sector. Households 
were provided with assistance, people who lost their jobs received subsidies 
(up to 70%) and the tourism industry was supported (IMF, 2020). The VAT 
rate was reduced, and its payment was postponed by up to two months. 
State guarantees were introduced as a measure of domestic assistance pro-
vided to businesses and the self-employed, worth in total EUR 2 billion 
(70% of which was covered by the government and 30% by banks). SMEs 
were provided with guarantees or credit financing (EUR 1.7 billion) from 
the Pan-European Guarantee Fund. Parents employed in the private sector 
could obtain an allowance for the care of children (aged up to 15 years). 
Employees who could not work due to contracting the disease received a 
benefit of EUR 800 monthly (KPMG, 2020).
The central bank provided liquidity injection (EUR 100 million). It also 
simplified documentation requirements for new short-term loans with 
favorable interest rates. A moratorium on loan repayment was introduced 
until the end of December 2020 (ILO, 2020).
3.2.4  Estonia
The lockdown in Estonia was in force between 13 March and 1 May. Its fis-
cal package, worth EUR 2 billion (7% of GDP), included support provided 
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to businesses and employees, and purchases of materials supplied to hospi-
tals. As part of the fiscal package, assistance was provided to the unemployed 
(EUR 250 million), health insurance premiums were paid (EUR 200 million), 
liquidity of companies was ensured (EUR 500 million in loans), loans and 
guarantees were granted (EUR 1 billion), rural areas were given loans (EUR 
200 million), the local government received support (EUR 130 million) and 
investment loans were granted to companies (EUR 50 million). Payments to 
the pillar II pension funds were suspended and compensation was paid for 
cancelled cultural and sporting events (EUR 3 million) (ILO, 2020).
The value of short-term treasury notes issued rose by EUR 600 million 
compared to 2019 (EUR 1 billion in total). A loan amounting to EUR 750 
million was obtained from Nordic Investment (repayable over 15 years).
Eesti Pank (the central bank) reduced the systemic risk buffer for the 
commercial banks from 1% to 0%. This freed up resources (EUR 110 bil-
lion) for loan losses or new loans. Of the central bank’s 2019 profits, 75% 
(EUR 18.9 million) were allocated to supporting the state budget in the 
wake of COVID-19 (IMF, 2020).
3.2.5  Finland
The government of Finland introduced the lockdown between 16 March and 
4 May. An amount of almost EUR 15 billion was allocated to healthcare, 
public security and border controls. A grant of EUR 1 billion was allocated to 
research into a vaccine for COVID-19, the development of methods for rapid 
diagnostics and an expanded knowledge base of the disease. Pension premi-
ums were reduced until the end of 2020 (EUR 1.05 billion) and tax payments 
were postponed (EUR 4.5 billion). Parental allowance, social assistance and 
unemployment insurance were expanded (EUR 3 billion). SMEs and the self-
employed obtained access to subsidies (EUR 650 million), and the Finnair 
airlines received a capital injection (EUR 500 million) (ILO, 2020).
In May 2020, the assistance program was extended by allocating an 
additional EUR 700 million (0.3% of GDP) to share acquisitions in state 
ownership steering, support provided to restaurant and catering businesses 
(EUR 123 million) and purchases of vaccines (EUR 16 million). The total 
increase in government guarantees amounted to EUR 1.68 billion (0.7% of 
GDP). The employment fund received EUR 880 million (from SURE and 
the European Investment Bank). In June 2020, the assistance package was 
expanded by adding EUR 1.2 billion (for households and businesses), public 
investments (EUR 1 billion) and relief in the form of adjusted VAT pay-
ments (EUR 750 million) (KPMG, 2020).
The Bank of Finland supported liquidity on the bank market by pur-
chasing short-term corporate securities (EUR 1 billion). This increased 
Finnish banks’ lending capacity by an estimated sum of EUR 52 billion. 
Maritime transport companies were granted guarantees (EUR 600 million) 
and exporters were given loans (EUR 14.2 billion) (IMF, 2020).
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3.2.6  France
Restrictions were imposed on the French economy between 17 March and 
11 May (the second lockdown began on 30 October). A fiscal assistance 
package, with funds amounting to EUR 135 billion (6% of GDP), and 
a package of public guarantees of EUR 327 billion (15% of GDP) were 
announced in the spring of 2020. The funds were allocated to health insur-
ance for the sick, an increase in expenses on healthcare and capital injec-
tions or nationalizations of companies in difficulty (IMG, 2020). SMEs, 
micro-enterprises and the self-employed received assistance in the form of 
suspended rents, social insurance and facility bill payments. Refund of tax 
credits was accelerated; payment of CIT and VAT was postponed. The gov-
ernment co-financed 60% of gross wages received by employees. The hard-
est-hit sectors (automotive and aerospace industries) were provided with 
green investment support (KPMG, 2020).
In September 2020, the government announced a new fiscal package 
aimed to support the recovery of the economy (Plan de Relance) with funds 
amounting to EUR 100 billion. The plan focused on the ecological transfor-
mation of the economy, increasing the competitiveness of French firms, and 
supporting social and territorial cohesion (ILO, 2020).
3.2.7  Germany
The lockdown was introduced between 23 March and 20 April (and again 
as of 2 November). Two fiscal assistance packages were announced, one in 
March with funds amounting to EUR 156 billion (4.9% of GDP), and one 
in June with funds amounting to EUR 130 billion (4% of GDP). The pack-
ages included spending on medical equipment, investments in hospitals, 
research into a vaccine for COVID-19 and support for green energy and 
digitalization. SMEs and the self-employed obtained access to grants (EUR 
50 billion), short-term subsidies were paid to maintain employment, dura-
tion of unemployment insurance and parental leave benefits was expanded 
and taxes were postponed until the end of 2020. The cultural sector was 
supported by way of investments projects implemented by cultural institu-
tions (EUR 250 million), protection of SMEs (EUR 480 million), protection 
of the music, festival and theater sector (EUR 300 million) and digitization 
of museum collections (Museum 4.0) (EUR 150 million) (ILO, 2020).
VAT rates were reduced (from 19% to 16% and from 7% to 
5%). The government established Economic Stabilisation Funds 
(Wirtschaftsstabilisierungsfonds (WSF)) amounting in total to EUR 757 bil-
lion (24% of GDP). Funds support bigger companies and supplement the 
German development bank’s (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) special 
programme.
Local governments supported their economies directly (EUR 141 billion) 
and by state-level loan guarantees (EUR 70 billion). Exporters were offered 
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credit guarantees and subcontractors of German companies received credit 
collaterals (EUR 30 billion). The self-employed could obtain a one-off sup-
port of EUR 5,000 plus EUR 1,000 for employees in geriatric care. A reduc-
tion in hours of work by 10% was made possible, and employee wages 
continued to be co-financed by the government (70–75%, depending on the 
company size). SMEs were offered assistance in employee training (EUR 
500 million) (KPMG, 2020).
The Bundesbank supported short-term liquidity (EUR 100 billion), pur-
chased equity in large companies by way of capital contributions (EUR 
100 billion) and introduced a three-month moratorium on consumer loans 
repayable by people affected by the COVID-19 crisis (IMF, 2020).
3.2.8  Greece
The first lockdown in Greece was introduced between 24 March and 4 
April, and the second began on 3 November. Its fiscal assistance package of 
EUR 24 billion (14% of GDP) was financed using domestic and EU funds. 
Expenditures on healthcare were increased by EUR 88 million (hiring of 
3,300 doctors and nurses, procurement of medical supplies, and bonuses to 
health sector workers) (ILO, 2020).
Suspended employees received EUR 535 monthly. Businesses were sup-
ported in the tourism, transport, construction and power generation and 
distribution industries (EUR 450 million). Businesses that reduced hours of 
work down to 50% were offered short-term support amounting to up to 
60% of net pay (through the SYN-ERGASIA program). Businesses affected 
by the pandemic were offered credit guarantees, interest payment subsidies, 
a reduction in rents, deferred payment of taxes and of social insurance pre-
miums. The VAT rates on critical products needed for COVID-19 protec-
tion, and transport and hospitality services were reduced (KPMG, 2020).
Banks launched a loan moratorium for household and corporate borrow-
ers until the end of 2020. Greece is eligible for the liquidity facility Pandemic 
Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTRO) (IMF, 2020).
3.2.9  Ireland
The lockdown was introduced between 12 March and 18 May, and announced 
again as of 21 October. The Irish fiscal package of EUR 24.5 billion (7% of 
GDP) consisted of direct support (EUR 20.5 billion) and credit guarantees, 
a stabilization and recovery fund and taxation measures, i.e., warehousing 
and deferrals. The health sector capacity was enhanced (EUR 2 billion), and 
the labor market was supported (EUR 11.4 billion). If revenues of a business 
dropped by more than 30%, the business was offered a subsidy of EUR 203 
per employee. Workers who lost their jobs due to the pandemic received EUR 
350 per week (until April 2020). Employee wages were subsidized in a maxi-
mum proportion of 70% (up to EUR 410 per week) (ILO, 2020).
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The Restart Fund (EUR 250 million) made capital contributions in micro 
and small businesses. SMEs received EUR 2 billion in six-year loans. The 
government offered guarantees, financed employee training (EUR 200 mil-
lion) and financed new businesses (EUR 550 million). VAT was reduced 
from 23 to 21% for six months. E-commerce received co-financing amount-
ing to EUR 7.6 million (KPMG, 2020).
The Bank of Ireland introduced a moratorium on repayment of mortgage 
loans (six months) and a moratorium on eviction (six months) and released 
the countercyclical capital buffer (IMF, 2020).
3.2.10  Italy
The first lockdown was introduced between 9 March and 4 April, and the 
second began on 4 November. The value of the “Cura Italia” emergency 
package adopted in March amounted to EUR 25 billion (1.6% of GDP). 
The funds were allocated to strengthening the healthcare system (EUR 3.2 
billion), preserving jobs (EUR 10.3 billion), deferrals of tax and fee payment 
by businesses affected by the pandemic (EUR 6.4 billion), subsidizing 80% 
of wages (up to EUR 1200 monthly paid to people working under contracts 
of employment and EUR 600 EUR paid to the self-employed). Loan supply 
was supported (EUR 5.1 billion) and the poor without income received EUR 
300 from municipalities (KPMG, 2020).
Additional state guarantees were granted in April (EUR 400 billion; 25% 
of GDP). The total value of assistance backed by government guarantees 
increased to EUR 750 billion, allocated to improve the liquidity of busi-
nesses and households. The package was expanded in May by an additional 
EUR 55 billion (3.5% of GDP) allocated to support for families (14.5 bil-
lion), healthcare (3.3 billion), SMEs (EUR 16 billion). The sum of EUR 25 
billion (1.6% of GDP) was allocated in August to support for employees 
(EUR 12 billion), income support for families, a suspension of social secu-
rity contributions and a moratorium on SMEs’ debt repayment. Another 
package of EUR 5.4 billion (0.3% of GDP) was adopted in October to pro-
vide relief to the sectors affected by the pandemic and award grants to 460 
thousand SMEs and the self-employed (ILO, 2020).
As part of “Cura Italia”, the Bank of Italy supported bank lending aimed 
to provide SMEs with new loans (via Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) and allowed 
banks to operate with selected ratios below the capital and liquidity require-
ments. IVASS (the insurance supervision authority) recommended that 
insurance companies exercise caution in dividend payment (IMF, 2020).
3.2.11  Latvia
The economy of Latvia was shut down between 13 March and 12 May. 
The value of the fiscal package amounted to EUR 3.4 billion (12% of 
GDP). The package included loans and guarantees for businesses affected 
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by the pandemic (EUR 1.2 billion) (KPMG, 2020). Support is targeted at 
the air and transport industry, healthcare, education and infrastructure sec-
tors (EUR 875 million). About 4,500 health care workers received a bonus 
(20%). A wage subsidy of 75% (up to EUR 700) for employees suffering 
from COVID-19 was introduced. The sum of EUR 50 million was allocated 
to support large companies (ILO, 2020).
The interest rate on loans obtained by SMEs in the tourism sector was 
reduced by 50%. The supplementary capital of Finance Development 
Institution Altum was increased by EUR 100 million to raise its capacity 
to provide companies with support through loans and guarantees. Altum 
issued bonds worth EUR 20 million (IMF, 2020).
3.2.12  Lithuania
The lockdown was introduced between 16 March and 18 June and again 
as of 7 November. A fiscal package of EUR 2.5 billion (5% of GDP) was 
adopted in March to assist the healthcare system (EUR 500 million), to 
ensure care for the sick (EUR 250 million), pay wage subsidies for employees 
(EUR 250 million) and to co-finance climate change investment projects. The 
government expanded guarantee schemes to EUR 1.3 billion (2.6% of GDP). 
A business support fund was established to preserve the liquidity of SMEs 
with resources amounting to EUR 1 billion (2.1% of GDP) (IMF, 2020).
The assistance program was expanded in May by EUR 1 billion (2% 
of GDP). Wage subsidies for people returning from unemployment were 
granted (EUR 380 million), job search allowances paid (EUR 200 million), 
vocational training financed (EUR 15.6 million).
An investment plan was approved in June, comprising EUR 6.3 billion 
(13% of GDP). The sum of EUR 2.2 billion was allocated to new projects 
and the remaining funds to accelerating the existing ones. The plan included 
investments in human capital, digital economy, innovation, research, 
infrastructure, projects addressing climate changes and power generation. 
Subsidies to wages were increased (to a maximum of 90% of pay, not more 
than EUR 607) in SMEs that retained at least 50% of jobs. Subsidies in large 
companies could reach a maximum of 70% (and not more than EUR 910) 
(ILO, 2020).
3.2.13  Luxembourg
The lockdown was in force between 15 March and 4 May, and then mass tests 
were performed in the population for COVID-19. The EUR 2.3 billion (3.6% 
of GDP) fiscal package was adopted and liquidity support was provided to 
businesses and the self-employed in the amount of EUR 8.1 billion (12.8% 
of GDP). The funds were allocated to purchases of medical equipment (EUR 
194 million), sick leave benefits (EUR 106 million), parental leave benefits 
(EUR 226 million) and unemployment benefits (EUR 1 billion) (ILO, 2020).
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Micro-enterprises and the self-employed received non-refundable 
financial assistance in the form of a one-off transfer of EUR 5,000 (EUR 
250 million) and guarantees for start-ups (EUR 2.5 billion). The gov-
ernment subsidized up to 80% of wages. A moratorium on payment of 
taxes and social insurance premiums was introduced (EUR 4.6 billion) 
(IMF, 2020).
The fiscal assistance program was expanded in May by EUR 800 million 
(1.3% of GDP). The funds were allocated to affected businesses in the hos-
pitality, tourism and sales sectors. The government introduced fiscal incen-
tives to support investments in green recovery (KPMG, 2020).
3.2.14  Malta
The partial lockdown was in force between 28 March and 4 May. A fis-
cal package was adopted, with funds amounting to EUR 520 million (4% 
of GDP), to support the healthcare sector (EUR 130 million), businesses 
and households (subsidies to rents, benefits, a moratorium on loan repay-
ment). Subsidies to employee wages amounted to a maximum of EUR 800 
monthly. A direct grants scheme was approved to support investment in 
research and development related to the coronavirus outbreak (EUR 5.3 
million) (KPMG, 2020).
The assistance program was expanded in June by EUR 900 million (7% 
of GDP). The funds were allocated to infrastructure investments (EUR 400 
million), a moratorium on tax payments (200 million), tourist cash vouch-
ers, reduced fuel prices and a tax refund for workers. Teleworkers received 
a one-off benefit (EUR 400) (ILO, 2020).
The Malta Development Bank established a guarantee fund of EUR 350 
million (2.7% of GDP) available to businesses affected by the pandemic. 
The value of guaranteed loans reached EUR 780 million (6% of GDP). A 
six-month moratorium for borrowers was introduced (IMF, 2020).
3.2.15  The Netherlands
The lockdown was introduced between 15 March and 11 May and 
announced again as of 14 October. Two fiscal packages were approved 
(in March and in May) with funds amounting to EUR 33 billion (4.2% 
of GDP). The government compensated up to 90% of labor costs in busi-
nesses that lost more than 20% of income, and also paid compensations 
in affected sectors (hospitality, travel, agriculture, culture). Unemployment 
benefits were raised and subsidies for SMEs, the self-employed and start-ups 
were introduced (ILO, 2020).
Deferred taxes payable by businesses amounted to EUR 16.6 billion 
(2.1% of GDP). A program of public guarantees for SMEs to the sum 
of EUR 61 billion (7.8% of GDP) was adopted. Expanding sectors were 
offered support of labor mobility and training programmes (IMF, 2020).
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3.2.16  Portugal
Portugal introduced the lockdown between 19 March and 17 April. A fis-
cal package was adopted to support the economy (EUR 5.2 billion); the 
government granted credit guarantees (EUR 3 billion) and deferred pay-
ment of taxes and social insurance premiums (EUR 1 billion). The assis-
tance program included additional expenses on healthcare, digitalization of 
education (EUR 538 million), digitalization of public finance (EUR 1.65 bil-
lion), incentives for people resuming business activity (EUR 1.3 billion) and 
benefits for people forced to stay home to care for children. Government 
subsidies to wages amounted to a maximum of 70% (KPMG, 2020).
The government offered SMEs credit guarantees worth EUR 13 billion 
(6.8% of GDP) and loans (EUR 200 million). The support package targeted 
at small and micro-enterprises was expanded in November by subsidies 
(EUR 0.8 billion) and credit guarantees (EUR 0.8 billion), to strengthen 
businesses affected by the pandemic (ILO, 2020).
Banco de Portugal relaxed its macroprudential measures for consumer 
credit and postponed loan repayment (owed by businesses and households) 
until September 2020, rescheduled on-site inspections and the stress test 
exercise. Lines of credit were granted to restaurants (EUR 600 million), 
tourist agencies (EUR 200 million), the hospitality industry (EUR 900 mil-
lion), and the garment industry (EUR 1.3 billion) (IMF, 2020).
3.2.17  Slovakia
The economy was shut down between 16 March and 22 April. The gov-
ernment performed national tests for COVID-19. Unemployment benefits, 
sickness and nursing benefits were raised, the labor market was supported 
with EUR 197 million, the government introduced subsidies to rents and 
compensations for businesses and the self-employed (including deferrals of 
social insurance premiums). Businesses were offered subsidies amounting 
to a maximum of 80% of employee wages, depending on the decrease in 
their revenues (EUR 180 to 540) (KPMG, 2020). The poor without income 
were offered a one-off benefit of EUR 210 during the state of emergency. 
Quarantined people were eligible for 55% of their wages paid by the gov-
ernment. SMEs and large companies were offered government guarantees 
amounting to EUR 4 billion (4.3% of GDP) (ILO, 2020).
The Bank of Slovakia permitted banks to temporarily operate below the 
defined level of capital, temporarily exempted banks from full compliance 
with the LCR (liquidity coverage ratio) (IMF, 2020).
3.2.18  Slovenia
The lockdown was introduced between 20 March and 15 May and 
announced again as of 16 October. The authorities adopted a fiscal package 
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of EUR 1 billion (2.2% of GDP) in March; the package included support 
for entrepreneurs, subsidies for suspended workers (EUR 50 million), a one-
off transfer to pensioners and students, a reduction in prices for electricity 
by one-third, deferrals of tax and social insurance premium payments. The 
government also made available its guarantees amounting to EUR 600 mil-
lion (ILO, 2020).
The assistance program was expanded in April by EUR 5 billion of credit 
lines, guarantees and subsidies to wages. The additional sum of EUR 1 
billion was allocated in May to vouchers for tourism (EUR 200 per adult 
and EUR 50 per child) and liquidity loans for businesses. The government 
assistance program was expanded in November by EUR 1 billion used to 
subsidize wages (up to 80%), exempt renters from rent payment and pay 
compensation to businesses that were losing revenue (KPMG, 2020).
The Bank of Slovenia reduced the maximum level of permitted bank 
account fees and allowed banks to temporarily exclude income declines 
caused by the pandemic when calculating creditworthiness and to defer 
bank loan repayments for up to 12 months (IMF, 2020).
3.2.19  Spain
The lockdown was in force between 14 March and 9 May. The adopted fis-
cal package of EUR 42 billion (3.8% of GDP) was used to assist healthcare 
(EUR 1.4 billion), medical services (EUR 2.9 billion), pay unemployment 
benefits (EUR 18 billion), sick benefits (EUR 1.4 billion), support indus-
try (EUR 375 million) and education (EUR 40 million). The government 
subsidized up to 70% of wages received by people affected by COVID-19. 
Capital contributions were made to the State Housing Plan 2018–21 (EUR 
450 million). People in need had access to funds (EUR 300 million) and 
children were offered meals (EUR 25 million). A minimum income scheme 
was implemented (EUR 3 billion). The scheme included 850,000 families 
(2.3 million people). The extent of poverty was to be reduced by that meas-
ure by 80%. The lowest rate amounted to EUR 462 per adult and EUR 
139 per child. A family could receive a maximum of EUR 1,015 monthly 
(ILO, 2020).
The self-employed who suspended their business activity received assis-
tance (EUR 5.5 billion). A group was exempted from payment of social 
insurance premiums (EUR 2.7 billion). Businesses were offered a morato-
rium on tax and social insurance premium payments (EUR 533 million). 
Tax on digital publications was reduced from 21% to 4% (EUR 5 million). 
Transitioning to low-emission vehicles was subsidized (MOVE II; EUR 250 
million) (KPMG, 2020).
The Bank of Spain announced a moratorium for mortgage borrowers 
for three months, guarantees for exporters (EUR 2 billion), guarantees and 
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loans for businesses (EUR 100 billion) and a rescue fund to support strate-
gic business (EUR 10 billion). Instituto de Crédito Oficial launched credit 
guarantees to support investments in digitalization and sustainable growth 
(EUR 40 billion) (IMF, 2020).
3.3  States with separate currencies
3.3.1  Bulgaria
The lockdown in Bulgaria was in force between 13 March and 15 June. 
An assistance package was adopted in that country (BGN 4.5 billion). The 
value of government guarantees was increased, the VAT rate was reduced 
(from 20% to 9%), the government introduced subsidies to wages in 
the industries affected by the pandemic (up to 60% of pay), paid doc-
tors and nurses a bonus of BGN 1,000 and distributed vouchers for tour-
ism (BGN 210 per person). The operational program “Human Resources 
Development” was launched to assist people over 65 (BGN 45 million) 
(ILO, 2020).
The government provided assistance to SMEs and large companies that 
lost more than 20% of their revenues. Businesses in the tourism, health-
care and transport sectors received BGN 290 monthly per job retained 
(KPMG, 2020).
The central bank of Bulgaria implemented liquidity support measures for 
banks to the value of BGN 13.7 billion (6% of GDP), cancelled the increase 
in the countercyclical capital buffer and reduced foreign exposures of com-
mercial banks (IMF, 2020).
3.3.2  Croatia
The lockdown was in force between 18 March and 27 April. An assistance 
package was adopted, with the value of HRK 30 billion. Subsidies to wages 
were introduced to preserve jobs. Croatian micro-businesses could obtain 
support for 20% of their employees. Up to 10% of employees were sup-
ported in medium-sized enterprises. Grants amounted to HRK 2,000 to 
4,000 monthly per employee, depending on the extent of income lost. Local 
governments were given low-interest loans. EU funds have been partly real-
located to micro-loans (ILO, 2020).
The Bank of Croatia supported liquidity of domestic banks. Short-term 
notes were issued for HRK 3.8 billion, the reserve requirement ratio was 
reduced (from 12% to 9%), a three-month moratorium on obligations 
to banks was introduced and securities were purchased in the secondary 
market (HRK 17.9 billion). The Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development launched export guarantees and liquidity loans. In October 
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2020, the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved a financial package 
(EUR 200 billion) for faster recovery of Croatian SMEs (IMF, 2020).
3.3.3  Czech Republic
The lockdown was introduced between 13 March and 12 April, and 
announced again as of 3 November. A fiscal package was adopted with funds 
amounting to CZK 273 billion (EUR 10.4 billion; 4.9% of GDP). The gov-
ernment subsidized 80% of wages paid to quarantined employees until the 
end of 2020 (up to CZK 39,000), 60% of wages paid to people with reduced 
hours of work (up to CZK 29,000) and 100% of wages paid to people who 
lost their jobs due to the lockdown. The VAT rate was reduced (from 15 to 
10%) in hotels, in the cultural and sports sector, and subsidies were paid 
(CZK 2 billion). One-off support for pensioners (CZK 5000) and support 
for welfare workers (CZK 16.6 billion) were announced (ILO, 2020).
During the second phase of lockdown, affected sectors received assis-
tance (CZK 7.7 billion), SMEs and the self-employed obtained grants (CZK 
500 daily), and state subsidies were introduced (CZK 500 billion; 9% of 
GDP). Rural areas were supported (CZK 3.3 billion) to stimulate food pro-
duction (KPMG, 2020).
The Czech National Bank reduced the policy rate (down to 0.25%), 
decreased the countercyclical capital buffer rate (down to 0.5%) and 
announced a moratorium on loan repayment (for six months) (IMF, 2020).
3.3.4  Denmark
The lockdown was in force between 13 March and 13 April. The fiscal assis-
tance package (DKK 131 billion; 5.7% of GDP) was allocated to supporting 
businesses, the medical sector and the self-employed. Payment of taxes was 
deferred and government guarantees were announced. The value of another 
package amounted to 5.1% of GDP (KPMG, 2020).
Businesses affected by the pandemic were reimbursed for 25–80% of 
their fixed costs. The self-employed who lost more than 30% of their rev-
enues were reimbursed for up to 90% of lost revenues. The government 
introduced subsidies to employee wages (up to 75%; not more than DKK 
30,000 monthly per employee). Monthly support per person in start-ups 
amounted to a maximum of DKK 23,000. The Scandinavian airlines were 
subsidized (DKK 6 billion) (ILO, 2020).
The Bank of Denmark raised the policy rate to −0.6% (from −0.75%), 
opened a line of credit for banks and announced government guarantees 
covering 70% of corporate debt caused by the pandemic. Standing swap 
lines with ECB (EUR 24 billion) and FED (USD 30 billion) were activated 
(IMF, 2020).
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3.3.5  Hungary
The lockdown was in force between 28 March and 16 June. The adopted 
assistance package of HUF 1.34 billion (3.2% of GDP) was used to alleviate 
the fiscal burden on businesses (800,000 SMEs), support the tourism sector 
(HUF 600 billion) and employees of the healthcare sector (HUF 500,000) 
and introduce subsidies to wages of fired and suspended workers (up to 
70% of average pay). An Anti-Epidemic Protection Fund and an econ-
omy protection fund were established to protect jobs (HUF 450 billion). 
Exporters received subsidies from the Eximbank state bank (HUF 800,000). 
The MFB bank offered a package of financial support instruments for com-
panies (HUF 1.49 billion): three loan products, two guarantee products and 
four capital products.
The purchase of bank bonds issued during the crisis (HUF 150 billion) 
was announced in May when also government guarantees and low-interest 
loans for SMEs were expanded (ILO, 2020).
The central bank (MNB) supported the liquidity of businesses by regular 
swaps, the expansion of eligible collateral, long-term lines of credit. The 
base rate was reduced to 0.6%. The MNB purchased government bonds 
(50% of the issued value) and corporate bonds (purchases for HUF 793 bil-
lion out of 2 trillion planned) (IMF, 2020).
3.3.6  Poland
The lockdown was in force between 13 March and 20 April. The initial 
assistance program consisted of a fiscal package of PLN 116 billion (5.2% 
of GDP), credit guarantees and micro-loans for businesses amounting to 
PLN 74 billion (3.3% of GDP). The assistance program was expanded in 
May by PLN 212 billion (9% of GDP). The healthcare sector was supported 
(PLN 7.5 billion), the unemployment benefit was raised by 39%, a solidar-
ity benefit was paid to people fired due to the pandemic and a voucher for 
tourism was introduced (PLN 500 per child). The government subsidized 
40% of employee wages (50–90% of the minimum wage) in enterprises that 
recognized a drop in revenues exceeding 30% (ILO, 2020).
The Polish Development Fund gave loans (PLN 100 billion) to sup-
port liquidity of SMEs that were exempted from repaying 70% of their 
resultant debt. Also, a three-month moratorium on payment of taxes, 
loan instalments and social insurance premiums was announced. The 
Governmental Fund for Local Investments was established (PLN 12 bil-
lion) to support investments with a value exceeding PLN 400 thousand. 
Companies managing airports received support amounting to PLN 1 
billion. Measures of protection against hostile takeovers were adopted 
(to protect businesses that achieved revenues exceeding EUR 10 million) 
(KPMG, 2020).
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The central bank (NBP) reduced the policy rate (to 0.1%) and required 
reserve ratio (from 3.5 to 0.5%) and repealed the systemic risk buffer (3%). 
The NBP also purchased treasury securities for PLN 105.5 billion (4.6% of 
GDP) (IMF, 2020).
3.3.7  Romania
The lockdown was in force between 25 March and 15 May. The state 
assistance program consisted of a fiscal package (RON 20 billion), grants 
provided to SMEs for digitalization (RON 15 billion) and government 
guarantees (RON 15 billion). The government paid people fired due to 
the pandemic up to 75% of average wage. The expenses on pensions were 
increased by 14% while the hours of work were reduced to 4 days a week 
(ILO, 2020).
The businesses affected by the lockdown could receive support for pro-
curement of work equipment (RON 1.5 billion), discounts in paying corpo-
rate income tax, deferral in payment of tax on real property and suspension 
of enforced debt collection (KPMG, 2020).
The central bank reduced the policy rate (to 1.5%) and requested com-
mercial banks to announce a moratorium on loan repayment by businesses 
and households. Treasury notes were purchased for RON 39.5 billion 
(IMF, 2020).
3.3.8  Sweden
Sweden is the only EU country that did not implement any lockdown meas-
ures. Merely some restrictions were imposed and recommendations given. 
Fiscal assistance of SEK 803 billion (16% of GDP) included subsidies paid 
to the affected sectors (sport, education, culture, media), raised unemploy-
ment benefits and grants received by municipalities (SEK 5.5 billion). The 
government financed up to 75% of wages while employers added 15% 
(employees received in total up to 90% of their wages). People from the risk 
group received compensations (SEK 257 billion) (ILO, 2020).
SMEs were offered loans, deferred tax payments (SEK 13 billion) and 
capital injections (SEK 3 billion). The self-employed also received support 
(SEK 5 billion). Export credits (SEK 200 billion) and government guaran-
tees (SEK 500 billion; 9.6% of GDP) were made available. Infrastructure 
investments were announced, regional public transport companies and 
regional airports were provided with support. The state also provided the 
SAS airlines with capital injections. The European Investment Bank allo-
cated an additional SEK 250 billion to Swedish businesses. Subsequent fis-
cal packages were planned (SEK 105 billion in 2021 and SEK 85 billion in 
2022) (KPMG, 2020).
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The Bank of Sweden (Riksbank) reduced interest rates on loans and 
facilitated lending to businesses (up to SEK 500 billion). The Bank eased 
countercyclical capital buffer and purchased securities (SEK 500 billion). 
A swap facility was established between the Riksbank and Federal Reserve 
(FED)(IMF, 2020).
3.3.9  United Kingdom
The lockdown was introduced between 23 March and 13 May, and 
announced again as of 5 November. The assistance package included addi-
tional funding for the National Health Service and public services (GBP 
48.5 billion), protection of jobs (GBP 1,000 per retained job), a quaran-
tine allowance (GBP 130) and expenditures on improved energy efficiency. 
Government subsidies to wages dropped from 80% (GBP 2,500) to 60% 
(GBP 1,875) of the original wage. Employers financed at least 20% (up to 
80% of the initial wage) (ILO, 2020).
Businesses obtained support amounting in total to GBP 29 billion, a six-
month deferral of the payment of income tax, VAT and social insurance 
contributions, subsidies to innovation (GBP 1 billion) and credit guarantees 
(up to GBP 5 million). The VAT rate on tourist services and accommodation 
was temporarily reduced (from 20% to 5%) (KPMG, 2020).
The Bank of England reduced the bank rate (to 0.1%), offered loans and 
guarantees (GBP 330 billion; 15% of GDP) and reduced the countercycli-
cal buffer rate (to 0%). Treasury securities (GBP 450 billion) and corporate 
securities (GBP 200 billion) were purchased (IMF, 2020).
3.4  Conclusions
An analysis of the fiscal and monetary responses of the European Union 
member states and the United Kingdom to the COVID-19 pandemic (until 
December 2020) leads to the following conclusions.
First, all countries covered by this study (except Sweden) implemented 
certain lockdown measures (a state of emergency with limited mobility of 
employees, closed border checkpoints, a ban on certain business activi-
ties). Those lockdown measures were in force for periods between 20 and 
94 days. Restrictions imposed on social functions and economic activities 
caused a reduction in GDP of the analyzed economies by a total of EUR 
188.7 billion, i.e. −4.5% of EU GDP (between Q4 of 2019 and Q3 of 2020). 
The sharpest drops were observed in Croatia (−12%) and Greece (−11%). 
The most dramatic nominal falls were observed in Great Britain (EUR 53 
billion) and Germany (EUR 33.6 billion). The “freeze” of the economy 
caused an increase in unemployment rates in the countries surveyed from 
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5.8% to 7.2% on average. The most dramatic increase was observed in 
Lithuania (by 4.4 percentage points) and in Estonia (by 3.4 percentage 
points.)
Second, emergency programs were launched and a record-breaking 
fund dubbed Next Generation EU (EUR 1.8 trillion) was established at the 
European Union level. A series of programmes were developed, aimed to 
stimulate growth in the member states, promote employment and innova-
tion, and support implementation of the European Green Deal. The SURE 
instrument, designed for the preservation of employment, will disburse to 
the most affected EU countries the amount of EUR 90.3 billion. Special 
lending, guarantee and subsidy schemes for businesses were launched in 
the eurozone (up to EUR 200 billion), and the ECB purchased assets worth 
EUR 750 billion in 2020.
Third, the methods employed to support various European economies 
were consistent. Subsidies to employee wages and training were paid, tax 
rates reduced, and temporary moratoriums introduced (on taxes, loan repay-
ment, social insurance contributions) with the aim of preserving employ-
ment. Businesses were supported by subsidies, allowances, co-financing of 
rents and credit guarantees (the measures were focused on SMEs in the sec-
tors most affected by the pandemic, such as tourist, hospitality, cultural 
and transport businesses). In the area of monetary instruments, interest 
rates were reduced and treasury and corporate securities purchased which 
resulted in an increase in money supply.
Fourth, all support packages imposed heavy financial burdens on 
the budgets of the states covered by the survey. The total budget deficits 
amounted in Q2 of 2020 to EUR 473.98 billion. Consequently, govern-
ment debt rose in the surveyed economies from 80% to 90.6% of GDP 
on average. The most dramatic increase was observed in Cyprus (by 19.2 
percentage points), Belgium (by 16.6 percentage points) and France (by 16 
percentage points). The states that recognized the greatest values of debt 
in the European Union (government debt exceeding 100% of GDP) were 
Greece (187.4%), Italy (149.4%), Portugal (126.1%), Belgium (115.3%), 
France (114.1%), Cyprus (113.2%) and Spain (110%).
Fifth, proportions of package values in GDP significantly vary. Fiscal 
packages (excluding guarantees) that exceeded 10% of GDP were adopted 
in Sweden (16%), Greece (14%), Austria (13%), Latvia (12%), Belgium 
(12%), France (10.4%). Fiscal packages with values below 4% of GDP were 
announced in Bulgaria (1.9%), Slovakia (2.7%), Portugal (2.7%), Hungary 
(3.2%) and Spain (3.8%).
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The depth of fall in aggregate flow values (gross domestic product (GDP), 
investment, exports) in Q2 of 2020 in all analyzed economies of the EU was 
unprecedented in the post-war history of the current member states of the 
European Union. The pandemic also had an adverse effect on other devel-
oped economies of the world (World Bank, 2020). The 2020+ pandemic 
posed a much more serious challenge for the countries located in Eastern 
Europe. The most severe effects of the 2020+ pandemic were reported in 
the tourist and transport sectors and in the healthcare system. Initial assess-
ments of the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
countries located in Eastern Europe were carried out already in 2020 among 
others by: Kulyts’kyy (2020a, 2020b), Drobot, Makarov, Nazarenko and 
Manasyan (2020), Zhalilo, Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka and Kolomiyets’ (2020) 
or the World Bank (2020).
Kulyts’kyy (2020a) assessed the effect of the pandemic on the Ukrainian 
economy, by analyzing existing and forecast fluctuations in basic macro-
economic indicators in a short- and a long-time horizon in the context of 
general instability of the global economy caused by the 2020+ pandemic. 
He additionally (2020b) analyzed the impact of the 2020+ pandemic on the 
Ukrainian labor market. He observed the most severe short-term effect of 
the pandemic in the Ukrainian service sector.
The World Bank (2020) in its description of macroeconomic effects 
of the pandemic on Russia indicates a massive drop in economic activity 
in Q2 of 2020. Surveys conducted by the World Bank demonstrate that 
the crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic severely affected small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are more sensitive to supply and 
demand shocks than larger companies. The 2020+ pandemic has deepened 
the economic crisis in Russia, caused among other factors by dramatic falls 
in prices for petroleum. The average price for Russian Urals oil brand was 
USD 41.73 per barrel in 2020. The value amounted in 2019 to USD 63.59, 
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i.e. it was 34% lower on average in 2020, exerting an adverse effect on both 
the state budget and trade balance.
Drobot, Makarov, Nazarenko and Manasyan (2020) assessed the effect 
of coronavirus spread on the condition of selected Russian industries. Their 
research demonstrates that, in the context of general adverse effects of the 
2020+ pandemic on the Russian economy, selected industries reported 
growths in sales – of foodstuffs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and medical 
instruments and equipment. Drobot, Makarov, Nazarenko and Manasyan 
(2020) construct two scenarios of overcoming the crisis of the Russian econ-
omy. Under an optimistic scenario (assuming a substantial rise in oil prices), 
Russia will reach the pre-crisis level of 2019 by mid-2021. Under a pessimis-
tic scenario, the crisis in Russia caused by the pandemic and fall in prices for 
fossil fuels will not be overcome until 2023.
Zhalilo, Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka and Kolomiyets’ (2020) carried out an in-
depth analysis of the impact of the 2020+ pandemic on the Ukrainian econ-
omy, adopting macroeconomic, sectoral, social and spatial perspectives. 
The authors emphasize that the final containment of the COVID-19 virus 
spread will not mark the end of the recession in Ukraine. They observed a 
particularly strong effect of the 2020+ pandemic on the condition of unsta-
ble national economic systems. The effect of the coronavirus spread on an 
institutionally unstable economic system was also analyzed by the National 
Bank of Ukraine (2020). Attention was directed to an increased risk of 
short- and long-term internal (inflation) and external (strongly negative bal-
ance of payments) instability.
That synthetic review of pandemic effects on social and economic life 
demonstrates a varying impact of the 2020 health issue on relatively imma-
ture social and economic systems. As we focus in this book on European 
economies, and a sufficient set of statistical data (quarter-over-quarter) on 
institutionally unstable economic systems is not available, we limit our anal-
ysis and assessment of the effects of the 2020+ pandemic to two countries 
located in Eastern Europe.
This chapter aims to analyze and assess the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the economies of Russia and Ukraine in comparison to EU 
economies. The first section of this chapter contains an analysis of the 
GDP (per capita) index. The analysis covers a long (2006–2020) and a 
short period (Q2 of 2019 vs. Q2 of 2020). The second section of this 
chapter discusses spatial interactions between the European Union, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine taking place in labor and product mar-
kets. The third section describes selected forms of fiscal intervention used 
by the governments of Ukraine and Russia in 2020. This chapter sup-
plements the macro-analyses conducted in Chapter 2 by describing two 
countries from outside the European Union, but also builds a connec-
tion with Chapter 3 that discusses fiscal interventions in the EU member 
states.
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4.2  Changes in GDP of Ukraine and Russia vs. 
the EU economy
The 1990s saw a deep economic recession in Ukraine. GDP per capita (at 
purchasing power parity (PPP), and fixed prices from 2017) fell from USD 
15,700 in 1990 to USD 6,700 in 1999. By 2019, it had not yet returned to 
its 1990 level (World Bank, 2021). The situation in Ukraine was indirectly 
worsened by the Russian financial crisis of 1998. The social and economic 
situation in the first decade of Ukrainian independence was influenced not 
only by a revolutionary shock but also by a complete absence of market 
economy institutions.
The scenario of economic development in the last decade of the 20th cen-
tury was almost the same in Russia and in Ukraine. A difference lay in the 
levels and not in the depth of the recession. Russian GDP per capita (at PPP, 
and fixed prices from 2017) fell from USD 21,500 in 1990 to USD 13,200 
in 1999. But by 2019 it had reached USD 27,000 per capita (World Bank, 
2021). Against that background, the economies of European Communities 
and then the European Union can be described as a space of stable economic 
growth. GDP per capita in the European Union (at PPP, and fixed prices 
from 2017) in 1990 amounted to USD 28,600 and after 30 years to USD 
44,400 per capita.
Ukrainian real GDP per capita grew in 2000–2008 by almost 100%. 
The Russian financial crisis combined with the gas disputes with Russia led 
to a deep recession in Ukraine in 2009 (a fall by almost 15%), followed 
by the return of the Ukrainian economy in 2011/2012 to the growth path 
that continued until 2014. The accumulated real growth in GDP per capita 
amounted to 11.2% in that period. The growth trend discontinued after the 
Euromaidan movement (2013–2014), the annexation of Crimea by Russia, 
and fighting with pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian real 
GDP per capita fell in 2014–2015 by almost 10%. In 2020, Ukrainian GDP 
per capita was similar to small post-Soviet states such as Moldova, Georgia 
or Armenia.
Like in the 1990s, the curve of Russian economic development took 
on a similar shape to Ukraine in the first two decades of the 21st century. 
However, the levels are significantly higher. Considering the institutional 
aspect, Russia is capable of using resources and solutions that are una-
vailable in Ukraine. These include for example Russia’s participation in a 
regional integration group (the Eurasian Customs Union) and its political 
stability (considerable power resting with the president).
Figures 4.1 (a), (b) and (c) offer a slightly different perspective on fluctua-
tions in GDP per capita in Ukraine, Russia and the European Union (at PPP, 
and fixed prices from Q2 of 2020) in the years 2006–2020 quarter-over-
quarter. The economic history of Ukraine, Russia and the European Union 
as a whole over the last 30 years provides evidence of diversified levels of 
institutional, political and economic stability in those three economic areas. 
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The same exogenous shocks produce similar short-term effects (and this is 
not surprising under the conditions of globalization), but their long-term 
consequences vary in form and time. The first decade of the 21st century 
in Ukraine saw economic growth following a decade of deep revolutionary 
recession in the 1990s. The growth wave in this phase of the economic cycle 
was abruptly discontinued in Q1 of 2009, due to an exogenous shock that 
firstly affected the United States in 2008 and then spread across the global 
economy. As a result, the Ukrainian economy slipped into a three-year reces-
sion. The years 2012–2014 saw a return to the growth path characteristic of 
the era preceding the 2008+ crisis. A series of protests in Ukraine provoked 









UA (2006Q1 = 100) UA (2006: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.1a  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2006–2020, 2020 = 100) in (a) Ukraine. Source: own calculation 








RU (2006Q1 = 100) RU (2006: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.1b  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2006–2020, 2020 = 100) in (b) Russia. Source: own calculation 
based on https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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European Union (beginning in November 2013), followed by demonstra-
tions in many towns of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Donetsk, 
Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odessa, and growing separatist trends in Crimea, 
resulted in a repeated sudden reversal of growth trends in the Ukrainian 
economy. This time, it was a short-term recession.
The years 2015–2019 saw spectacular growth, followed by another 
dramatic and deep downturn caused by the global pandemic. Hence, the 
Ukrainian economy experienced three major demand and supply shocks. 
The Russian economy recorded a fall of 7.8% in 2009, when the oil prices 
dropped to the level of USD 40–50 per barrel. At that time of crisis, Russia 
possessed considerable foreign exchange reserves amassed in the years 
2000–2008 due to high and rising prices for raw materials, including espe-
cially petroleum (2008/2009: about USD 140 per barrel).
The year 2009 marked the end of the longest era of uninterrupted 
dynamic economic growth in modern Russia, lasting from 2000 and reach-
ing about 7% annually on average. Despite unfavorable macroeconomic 
and microeconomic indicators, Russians’ real income continued to grow 
during the 2008+ crisis, due to considerable funds from foreign exchange 
reserves redirected to the domestic market (Łobuszewska, Kazimierska & 
Mańkowski, 2015: 20).
When the Russian financial market was affected by a crisis in mid-
December 2014, the authorities of the Federation no longer possessed huge 
reserves that would enable them to promptly respond to falls; in addition, the 
Russian economy was to a large extent denied access to financing by foreign 
loans and investments (Menkiszak, Fischer, 2014). The sanctions imposed 
on Russia by the European Union and the United States following Russia’s 










EU (2006Q1 = 100) EU (2006: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.1c  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2006–2020, 2020 = 100) in (c) the European Union. Source: 
own calculation based on https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database 
(accessed: 2021-01-30).
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implemented by Russia, seriously affected the inflow of foreign investment 
and consequently the entire Russian economy in 2014–2017. Structural 
reforms, the emergence of a more dynamic private sector, a reduced role 
of the state in economic processes and changes in taxation of the oil sector 
exercised a favorable influence on the Russian economy in 2018–2019.
The global financial and economic crisis led to a deep recession in the 
EU-27 in 2009, followed by a recovery in 2010. The real GDP growth 
rate in the EU was considerably diversified, both in time and between the 
member states. Following the economic recession that in 2009 affected all 
member states of the EU except Poland, 2010 saw a repeated economic 
growth trend in 23 member states and the situation continued in those 23 
member states also in 2011. However, the trend was reversed in 2012 when 
only slightly more than half (14) of the member states reported economic 
growth, while the remaining member states saw a reduction in production. 
Eventually, a substantial majority of the member states recorded growth 
again. The group included 16 states in 2013, 23 states in 2014 and 26 states 
in 2015 and 2016. All 27 member states of the EU reported growth in 2017 
for the first time since 2007. The trend continued in 2018 and 2019. The 
sole member state to record a drop in 2015 and 2016 was Greece (by 0.4% 
and 0.2% respectively), following a slight growth by 0.7% in 2014 and 
five successive reductions in economic output during the years 2009–2013 
(Statistics Explained, 2020: 2).
In early 2020, the global economy, including the economies of Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation and the European Union, were exposed to a new and 
completely unforeseeable biological hazard that led to a severe downturn in 
economic growth and undermined the institutionally weak economic sys-
tems of Eastern European states. The enforced lockdown adversely affected 
the efficiency and effectiveness of social and economic systems (Zhalilo, 
Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka & Kolomiyets’, 2020).
Figure 4.2 (a, b, c) presents quarter-to-quarter changes in Gross Domestic 
Product in Russia, Ukraine and in European Countries. The lockdown meas-
ures implemented in Ukraine in the spring of 2020 continued for almost 
two months; the government introduced a “weekend quarantine” in the 
autumn, meaning almost complete lockdown on public holidays. On the 
basis of figures 4.2 (a) we can state that GDP per capita in Q2 of 2020 
dropped by 8% compared to Q2 of 2019. Another lockdown was imposed 
in January 2021 for almost three weeks. An assessment of the effects of 
those measures on the economy is ambiguous. The Ukrainian ministry of 
economy announced that inflation in 2020 reached 5%, principally due to a 
dynamic increase in revenues from retail sales and a rise in prices for energy 
sources on the global market that affected local expenses on public utility 
services, finally reducing the consumer demand.
The volume of cargo transport dropped in 2020 by 15% compared to the 
same period of 2019 while the passenger transport sector reached in 2020 
only 46% of its revenues in the same period of 2019.
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Russia faced an extremely high mortality rate caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic in 2020; the Russian population decreased by almost 700,000 
people. It was the deepest annual decrease of the last 15 years. Non-residents 
invested three times less in the business enterprise sector in H1 of 2020 than 
in the same period of 2019.
The result was five times less in the entire year 2020 than in 2019. Hence, 
the 2020+ pandemic seems to be only one of the factors causing problems in the 
Russian economy. Low oil prices, structural problems (labor market, a shallow 
financial market) and geopolitical risk affect the current situation and will have 
a decisive effect on the condition of the Russian economy in the future.
Maps 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) represent spatial differentiation of GDP per cap-
ita subsequently in Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020 in the EU economies, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine. A detailed description of changes in the 
member states of the European Union is contained in Chapter 2, hence we 
focus here on the differences in changes that take place between the EU 










UA (2018Q1 = 100)
UA (Previous Q = 100)
UA (2018: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.2a  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2019–2020) in (a) Ukraine. Source: own calculation based on 
http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua/; https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru; https://ec .europa . 
eu /eurostat /data /database (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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The analyzed economies were divided into quintile groups character-
ized by the lowest (five), low (six), average (five), high (six) and the high-
est (five) values; Slovakia was classified in an additional group due to the 
absence of available statistics. Both in Q2 of 2019 and in Q2 of 2020, 
Ukraine recorded the lowest values of the analyzed variable among all 
countries – this confirmed its status as the poorest state in the group cov-
ered by our analysis. The difference between Ukraine and the state with 
the lowest values of GDP per capita in Europe, i.e. Bulgaria, amounted in 
Q2 of 2019 to USD 291.83 while that difference fell to USD 31.61 in the 
same period of the following year. This indicates that the fall in economic 
output flow was deeper in Bulgaria than in Ukraine. However, the value 
of GDP per capita fell in Ukraine by USD 272.27 between the analyzed 
quarters; it was the lowest value of decrease among all the countries. 
The Russian Federation retained its rank between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 









RUS (2018Q1 = 100)
RUS (Previous Q = 100)
RUS (2018: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.2b  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2019–2020) in (b) Russia. Source: own calculation based on 
http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua/; https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru; https://ec .europa . 
eu /eurostat /data /database (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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4.3  Spatial interactions taking place on labor and product 
markets between the European Union, Russian Federation 
and Ukraine
To identify the determinants of differences in labor productivity, we assume 
as our starting point the neoclassical Cobb-Douglas power production func-
tion (Cobb-Douglas, 1928):
 Y f K L Ae K Lgt= ( ) = -, a a1  (4.1)
where:
Y – production,
K – capital input,
L – labor input,
g – Hicks technical progress rate,
A – total productivity of capital and labor input,








EU (2018Q1 = 100)
EU (Previous Q = 100)
EU (2018: (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4) = 100)
Figure 4.2c  Changes in Gross Domestic Product per capita, at PPP, quarter-over-
quarter (2019–2020) in (c) the European Union. Source: own calculation 
based on http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua/; https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru; https://
ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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After log transformation of both sides, we obtain the equation:
 ln ln ln lnY A gt K L( ) = ( ) + + ( ) + -( ) ( )a a1  (4.2)
that facilitates transition from a power to a quasi-linear relation. Then the 
natural logarithm of the number of the employed is subtracted on both sides 
of equation (4.2) to obtain equation (4.3) that defines the natural logarithm 
of labor productivity.

















Equation (4.3) shows that labor productivity is determined by the technical 
progress rate, total productivity of inputs and capital–labor ratio. Based on 
equation (4.3), the parameters of equation (4.4) were estimated using data 






















÷a a a0 1 2  (4.4)
Map 4.1a  Spatial differentiation of GDP per capita in Q2 of 2019 in the member 
states of the European Union, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (in 
USD, fixed prices from Q2 of 2020) Source: own calculations. based on 
https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database, http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua 
and https://rosstat .gov .ru.
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where:
Yit – GDP in object i (i = 1, 2, 3) in the year t (t = 1996, 1997…, 2019),
Lit – number of the employed in object i in the year t,
Kit – gross value of property, plant, equipment in enterprises in object i 
in the year t,
α0 – the logarithm of total productivity of inputs,
α1 – a parameter that defines the effect of technical progress rate on labor 
productivity,
α2 – elasticity of labor productivity relative to the capital–labor ratio.
A definition of the unemployment rate is now used to statistically analyze 
an increase in unemployment rates. Based on a definition of the unemploy-
ment rate, its increase can be made conditional on the unemployment rate 
in the preceding period and the output growth rate. We adopt the following 
definition for this purpose (Tokarski, 2005):
 u t
U t
U t L t
L t
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u(t) – unemployment rate,
Map 4.1b  Spatial differentiation of GDP per capita in Q2 of 2020 in the member 
states of the European Union, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (in 
USD, fixed prices from Q2 of 2020) Source: own calculations. based on 
https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database, http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua 
and https://rosstat .gov .ru.
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U(t) – number of the unemployed,
L(t) – number of the employed,
N(t) – labor supply.
By differentiating equation (4.5) in time t, we obtain an increase in the 
unemployment rate expressed by the derivative:
 
   
u t


























The above relation and equation (4.5) indicate that an increase in the unem-
ployment rate can be transformed into:
 
 














An analysis of equation (4.6) leads to the conclusion that the rate of growth 





 is an increasing function of the output 
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An analysis of relation (4.7) leads to the conclusion that an increase in 
the unemployment rate is determined by the output growth rate (g), labor 










÷ and unemployment rate (u(t)). Additionally, an 
increase in the unemployment rate is a decreasing function of the output 










÷. If the labor supply growth rate is greater (less) than the employed 
number growth rate, a rise in the unemployment rate is a decreasing (an 
increasing) function of the unemployment rate.
Based on the above theoretical discussion of the factors determining 
increases in unemployment rates (equation 4.7), the parameters of the fol-
lowing equation are estimated:1
 D DDu u d u Yit it u it it= - + - ( )- -a a a a0 1 1 2 1 3 ln  (4.8)
1  Equation (4.8) ignores the labor supply growth rate because fluctuations in labor supply 
were relatively insignificant compared to changes in unemployment in the years 1996–2019.










 – registered unemployment rate in economy i (i = 1, 2, 3) in 
the year t (t = 1996, 1997…, 2019);
ΔIn(Yit) – labor productivity growth rate in object i in the year t,
α0 – a constant defining an increase in the unemployment rate that would 
be observed at a zero unemployment rate in the preceding period and zero 
labor productivity rate,
α1 a variable defining the strength of effect exerted by the unemployment 
rate from the preceding period on the increase in the unemployment rate 
where that variable does not grow,
α2 – a measure of the strength of effect exerted by the unemployment rate 
from the preceding period on the increase of that variable where the rate 
grows,
α3 – describes the relation between the increase in the unemployment rate 
and the labor productivity growth rate,
dΔu – a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the unemployment 
rate grows, and otherwise equals 0.
An interpretation of the parameters α1 and α2 is dictated by a dichoto-
mous variable dΔu. This is because that variable, in the equation describing 
an increase in unemployment rates, plays the role of a switching variable 
that adjusts the effect of the unemployment rate from the preceding period 
on a change in the current unemployment rate by including its growth or 
drop.
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method as developed by 
Zellner (Zellner, 1962) was used in estimations of equations (4.4) and (4.8); 
the parameters of all equations were estimated simultaneously so that the 
parameters of each equation incorporate information about the other equa-
tions. This method leads to an improved efficiency of parameters estimated, 
by using additional information. With an increase in correlation between 
error vectors of the analyzed equations, in the number of observations 
and with a greater linear relationship between explanatory variables the 
efficiency of estimated parameters grows (Yahya et al., 2008). The SUR 
method is used to simultaneously estimate the parameters of all analyzed 
equations, considering correlations between them.
In equation (4.4), the logarithm of labor productivity is adopted as an 
endogenous variable in the models while the logarithm of capital–labor 
ratio and the technical progress growth rate represent exogenous variables. 
In equation (4.8), independent variables such as the unemployment rate 
from the preceding year and the logarithm of labor productivity explain an 
increase in the unemployment rate. The analysis covers the longest period 
for which sufficient data can be obtained: the years 1996–2019. Cash vari-
ables are converted into fixed prices from 2010. Statistical significance is 
indicated next to values using the following markings: confidence level < 
0.01 as ***, confidence level < 0.05 as ** and confidence level < 0.1 as *; 
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also estimation errors are given in brackets. The tables also contain the coef-
ficient of determination R2, here understood as a percentage of variance of 
the dependent variable explained by variability of the dependent variables, 
and included for purely descriptive purposes, not as a coefficient of determi-
nation used in traditional econometrics.
Estimations of equations (4.4) and (4.8) using the SUR method are 
accompanied by a table of results containing the values of correlation coef-
ficient of random components eit. The correlation coefficient of random 
components is calculated for each pair of equations that are subsequently 
represented in a matrix of correlations of random variables. Additionally, 
the value of the statistic obtained in the Breusch-Pagan2 test is given below 
the matrix to show whether there are correlations between random interfer-
ences in individual equations.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain results of estimations of the parameters of 
equations (4.4) and (4.8). The estimates of structural parameters of regres-
sion equations that describe labor productivity in the analyzed economies 
proved to be statistically significant. The elasticity of labor productivity 
relative to the capital–labor ratio in the European Union and in Ukraine 
were similar while in the Russian Federation it was clearly higher. However, 
the estimated parameters defining technical progress rates are significantly 
different: in the European Union, the value of that rate is three times lower 
than in Ukraine and almost two times lower than in the Russian Federation.
2  The test statistic is based on chi-squared distribution. The number of degrees of freedom in 
the test is given in brackets and equals 
M M( )-1
2
, where M represents the number of equa-
tions in the model, estimated using the SURE method.
Table 4.1  Estimates of the parameters of equation (4.4) for the European Union, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine








































Russian Federation 0.3821 1.0000
Ukraine 0.4948 −0.1795 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(3) = 10.154 Pr = 0.0173
Source: own calculation based on http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua/; https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru; 
https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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The coefficient of correlation between the random components of the 
equations describing labor productivity in the European Union and Russian 
Federation and the European Union and Ukraine is positive. Only the equa-
tion for the Russian Federation and Ukraine responds otherwise to random 
interferences. The value p of the Breusch-Pagan test statistic clearly dem-
onstrates that the relations between random components of equation pairs 
are statistically significant. Additionally, the estimated equations of the SUR 
model convincingly explain the variability of labor productivity in the dis-
cussed economies.
The estimates of structural parameters of the equations describing 
increases in unemployment rates in the SUR model for the European Union, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine are statistically significant but their signs 
are not always consistent with economic theory. The estimates of param-
eters for the Russian Federation seem to be inconsistent with economic 
theory (an exception is provided by the parameter defining the effect of 
unemployment from the preceding period under conditions of increase in 
that variable). Additionally, fluctuations in the unemployment rate in prior 
periods had a much stronger effect on the current increase in that variable 
in Ukraine than in the European Union. A similar, although slightly weaker 
relation, is observed in the value of elasticity of increase in current unem-
ployment relative to labor productivity; the response of unemployment rates 
to changes in the labor productivity growth rate is about 50% weaker in the 
European Union.
The goodness of fit of the equations to empirical data, as measured by a 
quasi-coefficient “R2”, is lower than in the case of the equation describing 
Table 4.2  Estimates of the parameters of equation (4.8) for the European Union, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine



































Russian Federation 0.0727 1.0000
Ukraine 0.2771 0.0143 1.0000
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(3) = 1.975 0.5776
Source: own calculation based on http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua/; https://eng .rosstat .gov .ru; 
https://ec .europa .eu /eurostat /data /database (accessed: 2021-01-30).
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labor productivity; it can also be concluded that the SUR model quite satisfac-
torily explains variability in the increase in the unemployment rate. However, 
the result of the Breusch-Pagan test did not confirm that there are statisti-
cally significant spatial interrelations between the European Union, Russian 
Federation and Ukraine.
Correlations between simultaneous random components are weak, 
and it can be concluded that objects constituting the aggregate are gener-
ally independent. That independence is understood as varying responses 
(meaning directions of development) of an increase in the unemployment 
rate to external factors. The result of Breusch-Pagan test did not confirm 
that there are statistically significant spatial interrelations between the 
European Union, Russian Federation and Ukraine. Correlations between 
simultaneous random components are weak, and it can be concluded 
that objects constituting the aggregate are generally independent. That 
independence is understood as varying responses (meaning directions 
of development) of an increase in the unemployment rate to external 
factors.
4.4  Fiscal interventions in Ukraine and Russia in 2020
The COVID-19 pandemic posed a considerable challenge to the global econ-
omy, principally because it did not represent a “classical” economic crisis 
or a local epidemic crisis (Zhalilo, Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka and Kolomiyets’, 
2020). Governments had to choose between protecting societies against the 
virus and maintaining the existing level of welfare. The principal method 
used to protect society was the implementation of lockdown measures with 
varying severity combined with public transfers, such as subsidies directed 
to selected economic sectors, co-financing of small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, reductions in (or partial exemption from) taxes, etc.
4.4.1  Ukraine
The decisions made by the Ukrainian government, aimed to limit the adverse 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Ukrainian economy, were not 
exceptional compared to measures taken in many other countries. Public aid 
included (KMU, 2020):
 • loan moratoriums,
 • tax allowances,
 • support provided to small and medium-sized businesses,
 • separate, dedicated support provided to agriculture,
 • information assistance provided to businesses.
The Ukrainian central bank recommended that Ukrainian commercial banks 
offer borrowers debt restructuring plans (Decree no. 39 of 26 March 2020 
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(Постанова НБУ №39 від 26 березня 2020 року)) (NBU, 2020a). The central 
bank proposed two principal versions of debt restructuring:
 • complete or partial exemption from repayment of principal loan amount 
for the quarantine duration with an extension of financing term,
 • capitalization of interest.
Additionally, a ban was imposed on rises in interest rates on loans between 1 
March and 30 November 2020. Also, a ban on fines and penalties for delays 
in loan repayment was imposed in that period. A long-term bank refinanc-
ing mechanism was launched and the algorithm for recognition of required 
reserves was changed (Zhalilo, Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka & Kolomiyets’, 
2020). The government adopted a series of fiscal measures:
 • exemption from charges for land use for business purposes and from 
tax on real property (residential spaces) in March 2020,
 • limitation of most fines imposed for tax offences,
 • a moratorium on tax inspections (except inspection of refunded VAT),
 • exemption from VAT of importers and suppliers of medications, med-
ical devices, medical apparatus and other goods used to contain the 
spread of COVID-19 in the territory of Ukraine,
 • increased annual income limits for groups 1, 2 and 3 of entrepreneurs,
 • zero rate of excise tax for state enterprises manufacturing alcohol-based 
disinfectants,
 • power to set tax rates for small businesses delegated to local govern-
ment (Єдиний податок) (KMU, 2020).
Support provided to small and medium-sized businesses included principally 
subsidies to employee pay. Act no. 3275 (Закон України “Про внесення змін 
до деяких законодавчих актів, спрямованих на забезпечення додаткових 
соціальних та економічних гарантій у зв’язку з поширенням коронавірусної 
хвороби (COVID-2019)” (VRU, 2020)) introduced the concept of “partial 
unemployment” for the time of quarantine. The Act lays down the con-
ditions for assistance provided to small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the form of benefits payable to partially unemployed personnel of those 
enterprises.
The agricultural sector is of key importance for the Ukrainian economy; 
almost 20% of the employed in Ukraine work in agriculture. The propor-
tion of income from the agricultural sector in Ukrainian GDP is the largest 
in Europe (about 10%) (Bosak & Mustafaieva, 2019; SSSU, 2020). Ukraine 
allocated EUR 131 million to its farmer support programme. The govern-
ment allocated an additional EUR 39 million to a reduction in debt of the 
agricultural sector. It is expected that the programme will contribute to the 
establishment of 100 new farms and agricultural-industrial complexes that 
will create 1,700 new jobs (KMU, 2020).
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To assist entrepreneurs in their business activity during the quarantine, 
the government created several information platforms, providing data and 
enabling people to register a business and obtain online tax advice.
Due to a series of tax allowances granted, tax income of public sector insti-
tutions significantly dropped, e.g. receipts from social insurance premiums 
decreased (Єдиний соціальний внесок). An estimated reduction in tax receipts 
due to exemptions from payment of insurance premiums amounts to EUR 66 
monthly (Zhalilo, Bazylyuk, Kovalivs’ka & Kolomiyets’, 2020). Consequently, 
the budget deficit in 2020 was the largest in the 20 years of independent Ukraine. 
The budget deficit was compensated using new sovereign loans which trans-
lated into an increase in public debt as of the end of 2020 (Kulyts’kyy, 2020a).
4.4.2  Russia
The principal state intervention measures implemented in Russia in 2020 
can be divided into general, social and economic. The set of general meas-
ures includes:
 • restrictions imposed on spatial mobility of people (including adminis-
trative and criminal liability for failure to meet those conditions),
 • various simplified regulations adopted to maintain continuity of social 
and economic functions, such as licences for the manufacture and sales of 
alcoholic drinks, provision of telecommunication services, detective and 
security guard activity extended until the end of 2020, simplified doctoral 
examinations, extended deadlines for payment of patent fees, etc.
Principal methods employed to support continued social functions include:
 • medications and medical devices, including personal protective equip-
ment, and materials for their manufacture and disinfectants used to con-
tain the spread of coronavirus in the territory of Russia are exempted 
from customs duties,
 • simplified registration procedure of medications and medical devices,
 • exemption from VAT of imported medical goods transferred to health-
care centers treating patients with the coronavirus,
 • simplified application for and granting of social benefits; parents of 
children aged below 16 and people who lost their jobs during the pan-
demic, and employees of the healthcare sector received additional sup-
port during the quarantine.
Tax holidays were granted in the sectors adversely affected by the COVID-
19 pandemic, like in Ukraine:
 • social insurance premiums payable by small and medium-sized enter-
prises were reduced,
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 • a moratorium on state (including customs and tax) inspections was 
declared,
 • entrepreneurs from selected sectors were exempted from certain taxes, 
enterprises of key importance for the Russian economy were granted 
the option to defer payment of their tax liabilities,
 • electricity producers, banks, and car manufacturers obtained subsidies 
amounting to EUR 281 million in total, and airports received about 
EUR 122 million,
 • interest rates on loans taken out by enterprises adversely affected by the 
pandemic were reduced, or interest on loans was cancelled to enable 
enterprises to give pays,
 • a simplified procedure for agricultural enterprises requesting low-inter-
est loans; a loan moratorium for small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the form of loan fees deferred for 6 months (RFG, 2020).
Russian state interventions affected the condition of the public finance sec-
tor, like in Ukraine. Adverse trends were also recorded in the Russian bal-
ance of payments, due to a reduced volume of exports from the energy 
sector (World Bank, 2020).
4.5  Conclusions
Russia possessed in 2008–2010 considerable foreign currency reserves, 
amassed in the years 2000–2008 due to high and rising prices for raw mate-
rials. Despite unfavorable macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators, 
Russians’ real income continued to grow in that period, due to considerable 
funds from foreign exchange reserves redirected to the domestic market. 
The sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union and the United 
States following Russia’s involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, 
and the counter-measures implemented by Russia, seriously affected the 
inflow of foreign investment and consequently the entire Russian economy 
in 2014–2017.
The Ukrainian economy was exposed to three major demand and sup-
ply shocks in 2008–2020 that increased institutional, economic and social 
instability in Ukraine. Generally, the 2020+ pandemic increased instability 
of the institutional and economic systems in Ukraine and Russia.
The global financial and economic crisis led to a deep recession in the 
EU-27 in 2009, followed by a recovery in 2010. Only 14 member states 
recorded economic growth in 2012, the remaining reported a decrease in 
production. All 27 member states of the EU recognized economic growth in 
2017 for the first time since 2007.
In early 2020, the global economy, including the economies of Ukraine, 
Russia and the European Union, were exposed to a new and completely 
unforeseeable biological hazard that led to a severe downturn in economic 
growth. The Ukrainian ministry of economy announced that inflation in 
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2020 reached 5%, principally due to a dynamic increase in revenues from 
retail sales and a rise in prices for energy sources on the global market that 
affected local expenses on public utility services, finally reducing the con-
sumer demand. The passenger transport sector achieved in 2020 only 46% 
of its revenues earned in the same period of 2019. Russia faced an extremely 
high mortality rate caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020; the Russian 
population decreased by almost 700,000 people. It was the deepest annual 
decrease of the last 15 years. Non-residents invested in the business enter-
prise sector in 2020 5 times less capital than in 2019. The 2020+ pandemic 
seems to be only one of the factors causing problems in the Russian economy.
Estimates of the structural parameters of equations describing increases 
in unemployment rates in the SURE model for the European Union, Russian 
Federation and Ukraine lead to ambiguous results. Generally, fluctuations 
in the unemployment rate in prior periods had a much stronger effect on the 
current increase in that variable in Ukraine than in the European Union. A 
similar, although slightly weaker relation, is observed in the value of elas-
ticity of increase in current unemployment relative to labor productivity; 
the response of unemployment rates to changes in the labor productivity 
growth rate is about 50% weaker in the European Union (exogenous shocks 
in 2008–2020).
References
Bosak, A., Mustafaieva, L. (2019). Current status and prospects for agricultural 
development: Search of new markets of acquisition, Naukovyy visnyk UzhNU. 
Seriya: Mizhnarodni ekonomichni vidnosyny ta svitove hospodarstvo, 24, 48–54.
Cobb C. W., Douglas P. H. (1928). A theory of production. American Economic 
Review, 18, 139–165.
Drobot, Y., Makarov, I., Nazarenko, V., Manasyan, S. (2020). Vliyaniye pandemii 
COVID-19 na real’nyy sektor ekonomiki. Ekonomika, predprinimatel’stvo i 
prawo, 8, 2135–2150.
KMU (2020). Prohramy pidtrymky biznesu. https://COVID19 .gov .ua /prohramy - 
pidtrymky -biznesu (accessed January 30, 2021).
Kulyts’kyy, S. (2020a). Problemy rozvytku ekonomiky Ukrayiny, obumovleni 
pandemiyeyu koronavirusu COVID-19 u sviti, ta poshuk shlyakhiv yikh 
rozv’yazannya. Ukrayina: podiyi, fakty, komentari, 9, 47–53.
Kulyts’kyy, S. (2020b). Ukrayins’kyy rynok pratsi pid vplyvom pandemiyi COVID-
19: Stan ta otsinka perspektyv rozvytku. Ukrayina: podiyi, fakty, komentari, 12, 
43–57.
Łobuszewska, A. (ed.), Kazimierska,  K., Mańkowski, W. (2015). Kryzys 
gospodarczo-finansowy w Rosji. Uwarunkowania, przejawy, perspektywy. 
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warszawa.
Menkiszak, M., Fischer E. (2014, 17 December). Kryzys putinowskiego modelu 
gospodarki w Rosji, osw .wa w.pl, http://www .osw .waw .pl /pl /publikacje /analizy 
/2014 -12 -17 /kryzys -putinowskiego -modelu-gospodarki-w-rosji (accessed January 
30, 2021).
88 Olesia Chornenka et al. 
NBU (2020a). Inflyatsiynyy zvit. Zhovtenʹ 2020 roku. https://bank .gov .ua /admin 
_uploads /article /IR _2020 _Q4 .pdf ?v=4 (accessed January 30, 2021)
NBU (2020b). Postanova № 39. https://bank .gov .ua /ua /legislation /Resolution 
_26032020 _39 (accessed January 30, 2021).
RFG (2020). Plan preodoleniya ekonomicheskikh posledstviy novoy koronavirusnoy 
infektsii. http://static .government .ru /media /COVID19 /plans /9Wd z2ED iAKs n7rj 
QWFk g5eR vHYLtDhee /PlanRF .pdf (accessed January 30, 2021).
SSSU (2020). Agriculture of Ukraine. http://www .ukrstat .gov .ua /druk /publicat /kat 
_u /2020 /zb /09 /zb _sg _Ukr _2019 .pdf (accessed January 30, 2021).
Statistics Explained (2020, 30 November). National accounts and GDP. https://ec 
.europa .eu /eurostat /statisticsexplained/ (accessed January 30, 2021).
Tokarski, T. (2005). Statystyczna analiza regionalnego zróżnicowania wydajności 
pracy, zatrudnienia i bezrobocia w Polsce. Wydawnictwo PTE, Warszawa.
Tokarski, T. (2008). Oszacowanie regionalnych funkcji produkcji. Wiadomości 
Statystyczne, 10, 38–53.
VRU (2020). Zakon Ukrainy “Pro vnesennya zmin do deyakykh zakonodavchykh 
aktiv Ukrayiny, spryamovanykh na zabezpechennya dodatkovykh sotsialʹnykh ta 
ekonomichnykh harantiy u zvʺyazku z poshyrennyam koronavirusnoyi khvoroby 
(COVID-19)”. https://zakon .rada .gov .ua /laws /show /540 -20 ?lang =en #Text 
(accessed January 30, 2021).
World Bank (2020). Russia economic report, no. 43, July 2020: Recession and 
growth under the shadow of a pandemic. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://
openknowledge .worldbank .org /handle /10986 /34219License :CCBY3 .0IGO 
(accessed January 30, 2021).
World Bank (2021). International Comparison Program, World Bank. World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank. Eurostat-OECD PPP. https://
data .worldbank .org /indicator /NY .GDP .PCAP .PP .KD ?locations =UA -RU &view = 
chart (accessed June 30, 2021).
Yahya, W. B., Adebayo, S. B., Jolayemi, E. T., Oyejola, B. A., Sanni, O. O. M. 
(2008). Effects of non−orthogonality on the efficiency of seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) models. InterStat Journal, 1, 1–29.
Zellner, A. (1962). An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions 
and tests for aggregation bias. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 
57, 348–368.
Zhalilo, Y., Bazylyuk, Y., Kovalivs’ka, S., Kolomiyets’, O. (2020). Ukrayina 




The methods of analytical description of the spread of contagious dis-
eases have been widely discussed in the scientific literature (see Murray, 
2003; Ruan, 2007; Xiao, Ruan 2007; Fei-Ying, Wan-Tong & Zhi-Cheng, 
2015; Jardón-Kojakhmetov, Kuehn, Pugliese & Sensi, 2021) that adopts 
the epidemiological model known as SIR (Susceptible–Infected/Infectious–
Recovered/Removed), proposed by Kermack and McKendrick in 1927. The 
original SIR model ignores restrictions imposed on social and economic life 
to contain the spread of an epidemic and economic consequences of the 
epidemic and of those restrictions imposed to contain its spread. Bärwolff 
(2020) expanded the SIR model to include analyses of epidemic spread and 
subsidence. According to Bärwolff, the government introduces additional 
restrictions on socio-economic life when the number of people infected in 
the population exceeds the threshold set by the government. It also assumes 
that the introduction of stronger restrictions will slow the spread of the pan-
demic. However, he argues that a lockdown leads only to a displacement 
of the climax of the pandemic, but not really to an efficient flattening of the 
curve representing the number of infected people.
The effects of a rapid spread of a pandemic on economic growth were not 
analyzed in mainstream economic research in the past. The economic effects 
of HIV/AIDS in Asia (Bloom, Lyons, 1993) and in selected countries of 
Europe, Africa, North America and South America (Bloom, Mahal, 1995; 
Kambou, Devarajan, Over, 1992) were analyzed in the last two decades of 
the 20th century. For example, Bloom and Mahal, in their studies published 
in 1995 and 1997, argue that the HIV/AIDS epidemic had no material effect 
on the rate of growth of income per capita in 51 developed and industrial-
ized countries of the world in the years 1980–1992. After two decades, 
Cuesta (2010) came to a similar conclusion about Honduras, the country 
most severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South America.
The current scale and rate of spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, caused 
by a coronavirus, entails serious disturbances in social and economic life. 
The pandemic of 2020 represents the worst global health crisis since the 
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Spanish flu that struck in 1918. In response to the chain of events observed, 
several measures are being presently considered. Alvarez, Argente and 
Lippi (2020) and Atkeson (2020) address the problem of optimization of 
the severity level of a lockdown. They use the SIR model under conditions 
of changing the economic activity of the population and enterprises. The 
importance of social distance is emphasized by Lik Ng (2020) who indi-
cates adverse effects of a lockdown policy treated as the principal method 
preventing the spread of the pandemic. Research into trade-offs in public 
choices was also initiated in 2020. Aum, Lee and Shin (2020) analyze a 
trade-off between gross domestic product (GDP) and public health under 
pandemic conditions. They argue that a lockdown not only limits the spread 
of the pandemic but also mitigates the accumulated GDP loss in the long 
run. If no lockdown measures are taken during a pandemic, mass quaran-
tining is necessary, leading to adverse economic effects. The self-employed 
who achieve relatively low income form the group exposed to the most 
severe consequences of a lockdown. Brock and Xepapadeas (2020) adopt an 
even wider perspective. They argue that continuous growth of consumption 
activities, capital accumulation and climate change could increase the expo-
sure of society to the risk of infection. In their opinion, a policy prevent-
ing the spread of an epidemic should consist of two components. The first 
component includes short-term measures. The second component includes 
economic policies aimed at changing consumption patterns and addressing 
climate change.
Research projects described in the scientific literature also include studies 
into the effects of an epidemic on economic growth, employing neoclassical 
growth models. Cuddington (1993) used the Solow growth model (1956) to 
analyze the growth path of per-capita GDP in the context of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic and its demographic consequences. The model used by him indi-
cated a material risk of reduction in the GDP growth rate in Tanzania by the 
year 2010. Cuddington and Hancock (1994) adopted the same methodolog-
ical approach to assess the effect of HIV/AIDS on the economy of Malawi. 
Delfino and Simmons (2005) identify significant empirical links between the 
health structure of the population and the productive system of an economy 
that is subject to infectious disease, in particular tuberculosis. Another neo-
classical model of economic growth used in research into the effects of the 
spread of HIV on economic growth was proposed by Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992). Lovasz and Schipp (2009) used that model to assess the effects 
of educational and health capital, and of the pace of epidemic spread on 
aggregate macroeconomic indicators. The effect of HIV is not the same in 
all countries, and even within individual countries. The economies char-
acterized by developed healthcare infrastructures are capable of providing 
means that aim to prevent a rapid spread of an epidemic in its early phase. 
Additionally, Lovasz and Schipp, when analyzing the problem of accumula-
tion of human capital under epidemic conditions, argue that a loss of human 
capital due to an epidemic does not always entail the same consequences. 
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The education level and number of skilled workers and their outflow from 
manufacturing processes due to an epidemic affects the GDP growth rate 
to a varying extent. Similarly, the social capital stock is interrelated with 
economic growth under epidemic conditions.
The above outline of main topics of research into the impact of an epi-
demic on economic growth provides foundations to the epidemiological-
economic model proposed in this chapter. The proposed model incorporates 
restrictions imposed by the government on social and economic life in two 
alternative versions: in a gradual, continual manner as a function of the 
proportion of infected people in the population, and as a strict lockdown 
adopted abruptly by the government. The value of aggregate production 
is affected by the capital stocks, the rising percentage of infectious people 
that reduces investment and the rate of capital accumulation, and the scale 
of lockdown restrictions. The model proposed in this chapter is not strictly 
related or limited to the COVID-19 pandemic, as it is useful in analyzing 
the effects of any epidemic that leads to material social damage (a high 
percentage of infected and dead people, limited interpersonal contacts due 
to lockdown measures implemented) and economic losses (a drop in pro-
duction caused by a collapse of aggregate demand and a reduction in the 
supply capacity of the economy, and consequently in the rate of capital 
accumulation).
5.2  An epidemiological-economic model
The epidemiological-economic model described below represents a compila-
tion of the SIR (Susceptible–Infectious/Infected–Removed/Recovered) epi-
demiological model proposed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) and the 
neoclassical model of economic growth proposed by Solow (1956).
The original SIR model does not include restrictions imposed on social 
and economic activity in response to the spread of an epidemic. For this 
reason, an analysis of the process of spread and subsidence of an epidemic 
was made using the SIR model as modified by Bärwolff (2020). Bärwolff 
assumes that governments impose restrictions on social and economic life 
when an epidemic begins to spread out of control (once the percentage of 
infected people exceeds a certain critical level defined in an arbitrary man-
ner by the government). Bärwolff also assumes that the more restrictive the 
lockdown introduced, the slower the pace of epidemic spread.
Bärwolff’s study is based on the assumption that the state introduces 
lockdown measures rapidly in an arbitrary manner (within a period or at 
certain time intervals). In our epidemiological-economic model, we assume 
that the level of lockdown severity is defined using a specific functional rule. 
Namely, we assume that the severity index of a lockdown is an analytical 
function of the percentage of the infected. If the percentage grows, the gov-
ernment does not use arbitrary criteria but follows the rule described by the 
function when imposing restrictions on social and economic life.
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5.2.1  The epidemiological module
We consider two scenarios when analyzing the spread and subsidence of an 
epidemic. Like in the original SIR model, we consider a scenario wherein the 
government has no access to a vaccine (preventing the disease spread) and a 
scenario wherein the government has a vaccine.
In the scenario with the government having no access to a vaccine, we 
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where St∈(0,1) represents the percentage of susceptible people on day t (for 
t = 1, 2, …), It∈(0,1) represents the percentage of the infected, Ht∈(0,1) 
represents the percentage of the recovered (the recovered are not eventually 
included in the group of the susceptible), and Dt∈(0,1) represents the per-
centage of the dead.1 We also assume that β, h∈(0,1), γ∈(0,β) and κt∈[0,1] 
in consecutive days t = 1, 2, …. The parameter β in the system of equations 
(5.1) describes the pace of epidemic spread, γ represents the percentage of 
infected people who either recover or die, and h represents the mortality 
rate among the infected. The parameter κt that can vary in its value in time 
(like in the original study of Bärwolff from 2020) represents an indicator of 
restrictions imposed on social and economic life on consecutive days of epi-
demic duration. If the parameter equals 1, the government does not impose 
any restriction on social and economic life in response to the epidemic. If 
κt = 0, a full lockdown is imposed. The lower the value of the κt indicator, 
the stricter the lockdown imposed. Additionally, the lower the value of that 
indicator, the slower the spread of epidemic.
It follows from the first equation in the system (5.1) that a reduction in 
the percentage of the susceptible (that is −ΔSt) is directly proportional to 
the indicator of restrictions imposed on social and economic life (κt), the 
percentage of the susceptible (−ΔSt − 1) and the percentage of the infected 
(It − 1). The second equation in the system (5.1) is interpreted so that an 
increase in the percentage of the infected (that is ΔIt) equals the difference 
between a reduction in the percentage of the susceptible (that is -ΔSt) and 
the percentage of the infected who recover or die (γIt − 1). Equations three 
and four in the system (5.1) imply that h part of the infected recover and 
1 − h part of them die. Additionally, it follows from the second equation in 
the above system that the percentage of the infected It rises as long as the 
1  Certainly, on each day t the equation is true: S I H Dt t t t+ + + = 1.
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percentage of the susceptible St is greater than the expression 
bk
g
t . Hence, 
restrictions imposed on social and economic life by the government (and 
described by a dropping value of the parameter κt) lead to a postpone-
ment of the initial day of a fall in the percentage of the infected. In the 
vaccination scenario, the SIR model is reduced to the following system of 
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Pt∈(0,1) in the system of equation (5.2) represents the percentage of effec-
tively vaccinated people (that is people who are no longer susceptible to 
infection after their vaccination), τ represents the first day of vaccination, 
ε∈(0,1) represents an indicator of vaccine effectiveness (that is the percent-
age of the vaccinated population that will not contract the disease), ρ∈(0,1) 
represents the percentage of those who wish to receive the vaccine, and 
πt∈(0,1) (for consecutive days t = τ,τ + 1…) represents the percentage of 
those who wish to receive the vaccine and are vaccinated until day t. We 
also assume that people effectively vaccinated develop immunity to the dis-
ease in 21 days after vaccination.
A modification in the system of differential equation (5.2) compared to 
the system of equation (5.1) can be reduced to the conclusion that beginning 
on day 21 after the first day of vaccination, the percentage of the suscepti-
ble is reduced by the percentage of effectively vaccinated people (that is by 
ερπt−21St−21).
When analyzing models without vaccination and with vaccination, we 
adopt two alternative scenarios of changes in the severity indicator of 
restrictions imposed on social and economic life κt. We assume that
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where I IGt i t i= = -Õ 1
14  represents a geometric moving average of the percent-
age of the infected in the most recent two weeks. Regarding the parameters 
θ, σ and ι in the equations (5.3) and (5.4), we assume that: θ,ι∈(0,1), and 
σ > 0.
We assume in equation (5.3) that if the percentage of the infected It rises 
from 0 to 1, the restriction severity indicator κt drops from 1 to 0, and if 
σ∈(0,1)(σ > 1), subsequent falls in the indicator κt, corresponding to identical 
rises in the percentage of the infected It, are increasingly bigger (smaller).
2 
Equation (5.4) implies that we consider a scenario wherein the government 
does not impose any restriction on social and economic life, if the geometric 
moving average of the percentage of the infected over the most recent two 
weeks does not exceed the percentage ι. When that percentage is exceeded, 
the government imposes a lockdown and the indicator κt drops abruptly 
from 1 to θ.








where a, b > 0, and t represents consecutive days of vaccination. That indi-
cator of vaccination coverage (at t increasing from 0 to +∞) rises with a 
decreasing pace from 0 to a.3
5.2.2  The economic module
We adopt the following assumptions about developments of basic macro-
economic variables in our economic module:4
 1) The value of production on day t (that is Yt) is described by a modified 
Cobb-Douglas production function (1928) expressed by the formula:
 Y K Lt t t t= -k a a1  (5.5)
2  This is because we obtain from a continuous function f x x( ) = -1 s : ¢( ) = - -f x xs s 1 
and f x x²( ) = -( ) -1 2s s s , and consequently for σ > 0: " Î( ) ( ) <¢x f x0 1 0, , s sÎ( ) Þ ( ) > Ù > Þ ( ) <0 1 0 1 0, f x f x² ²
s sÎ ( ) Þ ( ) > Ù > Þ ( ) <0 1 0 1 0, f x f x² ² .
3  This is because we obtain from a continuous function f x
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4  Assumptions (1) and (2) refer directly to the model proposed by Solow in 1956, and assump-
tions 3) and 4) extend that model to include basic variables describing the functions of the 
labor market.
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where σ ∈ (0,1) represents output elasticity Yt of capital input Kt. In 
function (5.5), we take into account both supply and demand factors 
affecting the value of production. The supply component (like in the 
original Cobb-Douglas production function) is described by the expres-
sion K Lt t
a a1- , hence if the epidemic did not strike, the value of pro-
duction (like in the Solow model) would amount to5 K Lt t
a a1- . We also 
assume that if the government imposes a lockdown and reduces the 
indicator of social and economic activity from 1 to κt∈(0,1), the value 
of aggregate demand falls and (due to Keynesian multiplier effects) the 
volume of production also falls from a level of K Lt t
a a1-  to k a at t tK L1- . 
Hence, a relative reduction in the volume of production caused by a fall 
in δ. Like in the original model proposed by Solow, capital accumula-
tion (daily, in a discrete time) is described by a differential equation in 
the following form:
 DK s Y Kt t t= -- -1 1
365 365
d  (5.6)
where s∈(0,1) represents the savings-investment rate, and δ∈(0,1) rep-
resents the capital depreciation rate.
 2) The value of demand for labor (and the number of currently employed 
people) is described by:











1 *  (5.7)
where ω,ϕ ∈ (0,1), and Y* > 0 represents the value of production in the 
Solow long-run steady state (that is at ΔKt = 0). The parameter ϕ rep-
resents elasticity of demand for labor relative to the volume of produc-
tion. It and Dt in equation (5.7) represent (like in the epidemiological 
module of the proposed model) percentages of the infected and those 
who died of the epidemic.
It follows from equation (5.7) that in our model, if the epidemic did 
not strike, at production rising from Yt < Y
* to Y*, the percentage of the 











÷  to ω. In the time of epi-
demic, the percentage of the employed represents (1 − It − Dt) part of the 
demand for labor, because the infected and dead (certainly) do not work.





t= -1  (5.8)






a a1- , equals 1. This has no effect on the scope of applicability of the below 
discussion.
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where w∈(0,1) represents the percentage of the professionally active. 
We assume implicitly that on day t = 1 the population amounted to 1, 
and on consecutive days equalled 1 − Dt while the number of profes-
sionally active people amounted to w(1 − Dt).
It follows from equations (5.5–5.8) that in the Solow long-run 
steady state (i.e. at ΔKt=0): L K
s
Y




























, where asterisks next to consecutive variables indicate their 
values in the steady state of the economic growth model analyzed here.





































































where uN and YN represent (respectively) an unemployment rate and a 
production value that would be recorded if the epidemic did not strike 
(that is in a scenario wherein on each day t = 1, 2, … the percentage of 
the susceptible St would equal 1).
The last equation in system (5.9) describes the social utility function U. 
The function represents a geometric average of the indicator of social and 
economic activity κ, the percentage of the susceptible 1 − I, the ratio of the 
unemployment rate under non-epidemic to that rate under epidemic condi-
tions (uN/u) and the ratio of production under non-epidemic conditions to 











= -( )14 k  takes into account both social (described by 
the indicator κt) and health (1 − Itt), and economic (uNt/ut and Yt/YNt) conse-
quences of the epidemic.
Additionally, the social utility function Ut assumes values from the 









= - = = =1 1, 
and hence Ut = 1. The lower values are assumed by function U, the higher 
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are aggregate social, health and economic costs of the epidemic. During a 
full lockdown (that is at κ = 0), the value of social utility function falls to 0.
5.3  Calibrated model parameters
5.3.1  Parameters of the epidemiological module
We assume that the infection lasts for 14 days on average. Hence, the 
parameter γ in the epidemiological module is selected at the level of 
g = »114 0 071429. .
The parameter β is calibrated so that peak incidence, if the government 
does not impose any lockdown, falls on day 365 of the epidemic. Hence the 
parameter equals 0.1066 in consecutive versions of numerical simulations.
We also assume that the mortality rate among the infected amounts to 
2%, hence h = 0.98. We assume that one person per million was infected on 
day one of the epidemic, that is I1 = 10
−6.
When analyzing the equation of social and economic activity indica-
tork st tI= -1 , we assume σ equals 0.5 (if the government imposes severe 
restrictions to contain the epidemic) or 1 (if a liberal approach is adopted). 

















 to describe restrictions 
imposed by the government to contain the epidemic, we assume that the 
government adopts a lockdown when the geometric moving average of the 
percentage of the infected IGt exceeds ι = 0.5‰ and then social and eco-
nomic activity will be reduced by 15% (that is θ = 0.85). If the government 
adopts a liberal approach to the epidemic, we assume ι = 1‰ and θ = 0.95.
When analyzing the models with vaccination, we assume that vaccines 
are administered as of day 300 of the pandemic. We also assume that a 
percentage ρ = 48% of the population wish to receive the vaccine and the 
effectiveness of vaccination ε equals 95%.
We make two alternative assumptions about the dynamics of daily immu-
nization coverage in the population πt:
 • first, we assume that the parameters a and b in the indica-
tor of immunization coverage are such that the indicator equals 













= .  which gives (in line 
with the Cramer’s rule): a =
× ×
× - ×
»93 0 001 0 002
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. . The scenarios are referred to below 
as scenarios with slow progress in immunization coverage of the 
population;
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 • second, we assume that π7 = 0.001 and π100 = 0.006. In this case, the Cramer’s 
formula produces: a≈0.00962 and b≈60.345. The scenarios are referred to 
below as scenarios with rapid progress in immunization coverage.
5.3.2  Parameters of the economic module
The elasticity α of Cobb-Douglas production function (5.5) is calibrated at 
the level of 0.5. We also assume a 20% savings-investment rate s and a 5% 
capital depreciation rate δ. The long-run capital output ratio K*/Y* at the 
values of those parameters set as above equals 4.
We assume the indicator of economic activity of the population w = 
46%, that is similar to the value recorded in the EU states.
The parameter ω in the function of demand for labor (5.7) is calibrated at 
the level of 0.44, and consequently the long-run unemployment rate equals 
about 4.35% at w = 0.46. The parameter ϕ is selected so that under non-
epidemic conditions, in an economy with an initial capital input K1 repre-
senting 40% of capital in the Solow long-run steady state (that is K*), the 
unemployment rate equals 10%. Then, the elasticity of demand for labor Lt 
relative to production Yt equals about 0.106.
5.4  Scenarios and numerical simulation results
The numerical simulations discussed below include 12 scenarios of epidemic 
development. The first four of those scenarios give the government no access 
to a vaccine, and a vaccine is available in the remaining eight scenarios (see 
the statement in Table 5.1).
In the scenarios wherein the government has no access to a vaccine (sce-
narios I–IV), we assume that the government reduces the intensity of social 
and economic activity gradually, in line with a functional formula (5.3) (sce-
narios I and II) or that activity is restricted abruptly (scenarios III and IV). 
In scenarios I and III, the government imposes severe restrictions to contain 
the spread of the epidemic; in scenarios II and IV, the government adopts a 
liberal approach.
The scenarios with vaccination (V–XII) can be divided into those with 
slow progress (scenarios V–VIII) and those with rapid progress (IX–XII) in 
immunization coverage of the population. Scenarios V and IX assume that 
the government adopts a lockdown like in scenario I; scenarios VI and X 
assume a lockdown as in scenario II, etc.
The results of numerical simulations of epidemiological indicators in the 
extended SIR model (systems of equations (5.1–5.2)) in consecutive scenar-
ios are contained in Table 5.2. Figures 5.1–5.4 represent curves of analyzed 
epidemiological variables.6           
6  All epidemiological simulations are carried out for a five-year period while macroeconomic 
simulations for a three-year period. This is because curves of macroeconomic variables sta-
bilize after three years.
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The simulation results contained in Table 5.2 and Figures 5.1–5.4 lead to 
the following conclusions:
 • if the government did not adopt any lockdown measures and had no 
access to a vaccine, the greatest percentage of the infected would be 
recorded (as already indicated) on day 365 of the epidemic. If the gov-
ernment has no access to a vaccine and imposes a severe lockdown, the 
peak will be postponed to day 391 (scenario I) or 456 (scenario II) of 
the epidemic. If a mild lockdown is imposed, the greatest number of the 
infected will be recorded on day 365 (scenario II) or 383 (scenario IV);
Table 5.2  Epidemiological indicators in consecutive scenarios
Scenario Variable
κm Sm IM HM DM PM T
I 0.8347 0.5762 0.0273 0.4153 0.0085 - 391
II 0.9475 0.4566 0.0525 0.5326 0.0109 - 365
III 0.85 0.6043 0.0246 0.3878 0.0079 - 456
IV 0.95 0.4728 0.0490 0.5167 0.0105 - 383
V 0.8380 0.1485 0.0263 0.3374 0.0069 0.5072 381
VI 0.9480 0.1122 0.0520 0.4927 0.0101 0.3850 363
VII 0.85 0.1650 0.0189 0.2650 0.0054 0.5646 428
VIII 0.95 0.1181 0.0473 0.4649 0.0095 0.4075 378
IX 0.8389 0.0014 0.0260 0.2885 0.0059 0.7042 377
X 0.9481 0.0010 0.0519 0.4632 0.0095 0.5264 363
XI 0.85 0.0016 0.0167 0.1939 0.0040 0.8006 408
XII 0.95 0.0011 0.0468 0.4259 0.0087 0.5643 376
The subscript m indicates the minimum value of a variable, M – its maximum value. T – day of 























































































































































Figure 5.1a  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios I, V and IX (at kt tI= - -1 1 ) 
Scenario I. Source: own calculations.
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Figure 5.1b  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios I, V and IX (at kt tI= - -1 1 ) 
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Figure 5.1c  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios I, V and IX (at kt tI= - -1 1 ) 






















































































































































Figure 5.2a  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios II, VI and X (at kt tI= - -1 1) Scenario 
II. Source: own calculations.
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 • at slow progress in immunization coverage of the population (scenar-
ios V–VIII), the greatest number of the infected is recorded between 
days 381 and 428 of the epidemic (if severe restrictions are imposed 
in response to the epidemic) or between days 363 and 378 (if a liberal 
approach to the epidemic is adopted). On the other hand, rapid pro-
gress in immunization coverage results in a postponement of epidemic 
peak to a date between days 377 and 408 of the epidemic (if severe 
restrictions are imposed in response to the epidemic), or between days 
363 and 376 (if a liberal approach to the epidemic is adopted);
 • in the scenarios wherein the government has no access to a vaccine, a 
maximum limitation of social and economic activity (at the peak of the 
epidemic) can reach 15–16.5% under conditions of a severe lockdown 
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Figure 5.2b  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios II, VI and X (at kt tI= - -1 1) Scenario 





















































































































































S I H P
Figure 5.2c  Curves of S, I, H and P in scenarios II, VI and X (at kt tI= - -1 1) Scenario 
X. Source: own calculations.
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the government uses vaccination (i.e. scenarios V–XII) have no signifi-
cant effect on that parameter;
 • if no vaccine is administered, the maximum percentage of infected peo-
ple will reach 2.5–2.7% (severe restrictions in scenarios I and III) or 
4.9–5.3% (liberal scenarios II and IV). In the case of slow progress in 
immunization coverage, that percentage will drop to about 1.9–2.6% 
under conditions of a severe lockdown or to 4.7–5.2% if a liberal 
approach is adopted. In the case of rapid progress in immunization cov-
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 Scenario VII. Source: own calculations.
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 • in the scenarios without vaccination, the percentage of the susceptible 
(uninfected) will reach after the epidemic about 57.6–60.4% under con-
ditions of a severe lockdown or 45.7–47.3% under conditions of a mild 
lockdown;
 • if the government has access to a vaccine but progress in immunization 
coverage is slow, the percentage of uninfected population (understood 
then as Sm + PM) will reach 65.6–73.0% under conditions of a severe 
lockdown or 49.7–52.6% if a liberal approach is adopted;
 • rapid progress in immunization coverage leads to an increase in those 
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 Scenario IV. Source: own calculations.
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 • if no vaccine is administered, 7.9–8.5‰ of the population will die of 
the epidemic under conditions of a severe lockdown imposed by the 
government or 10.5–10.9‰ under conditions of a mild lockdown. 
Slow progress in immunization coverage will reduce those indicators 
to 5.4–6.9‰ (a severe lockdown) or 9.5–10.1‰ (a liberal approach). 
Rapid progress in immunization coverage will reduce the rate of mor-
tality caused by the epidemic to 4.0–5.9‰ of the population (a severe 
lockdown) or 8.7–9.5‰ (a mild lockdown).
An analysis of the epidemic effect on the values of principal macroeconomic 
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 Scenario XII. Source: own calculations.
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above in two versions. We consider values of those indicators in an economy 
conventionally termed “poorly developed” (with capital input K1 represent-
ing 40% of the value of that variable in the Solow long-run steady state) and 
in a strongly developed economy (with K1 = 0.9K
*)7.
Selected results of numerical simulations are contained in Tables 5.3 
(a poorly developed economy) and 5.4 (a strongly developed economy). 
Figures 5.5–5.7 depict curves of the social utility function Ut in consecutive 
scenarios both in a poorly developed and in a strongly developed economy. 
The simulation results contained in Tables 5.3–5.4 lead to the following 
conclusions:
 • in a poorly developed economy that has no access to a vaccine, falls in 













where YNt represents the value of production that could be achieved if 
the epidemic did not strike) will reach 18.6–19.9% under conditions of 
a severe lockdown or 10.7–10.9% if a liberal approach is adopted. In 
a strongly developed economy, the falls are slightly smaller and reach 
(respectively) 18.3–19.7% or 10.4–10.6%;
 • slow progress in immunization coverage of the population combined 
with severe restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic will reduce 
falls in production to 17.9–19.5% in a poor economy or 17.7–19.3% 
in a wealthy economy. If a liberal approach to the epidemic is adopted, 
falls in production will reach (respectively) 10.5–10.6% or 10.2–10.3%;
 • rapid progress in immunization coverage has no material effect on falls 
in production at peak incidence;
 • if severe restrictions are imposed in response to the epidemic, without 
vaccination, accumulated falls in the value of production will reach over 
3 years about 6.8–9.8% in a poorly developed economy or 6.7–9.6% 
in a strongly developed economy. If a liberal approach to the epidemic 
is adopted, the falls will reach 2.3–3.5% in a poor economy and 2.2–
3.3% in a wealthy economy;
 • slow progress in immunization coverage of the population combined 
with severe restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic will lead 
to accumulated falls in production by 5.5–8.1% in a poorly developed 
economy or by 5.4–7.9% in a strongly developed economy. A liberal 
approach to the epidemic will lead to accumulated falls in production 
by 2.1–3.2% in a poor economy or 2.0–3.1% in a wealthy economy;
 • a rapid pace of progress in immunization coverage of the population 
will reduce falls in production in a poor economy to 4.7–6.6% (severe 
7  Those economies are also termed below “poor” and “wealthy”.
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restrictions imposed) or 2.0–2.9% (a liberal approach), and in a wealthy 
economy to 4.6–6.5% or 1.9–2.8%;
 • a more general conclusion can be reached: the introduction and rapid 
administration of a vaccine will have a stronger effect on accumulated 
falls in production than on the depth of the recession. In addition, 
both accumulated falls in production and the depth of recession will 
be slightly greater in a poorly developed economy than in a strongly 
developed economy;
 • both one-off (at the epidemic peak) and accumulated falls in capital 
stock are significantly smaller than falls in production. Whether the 
government has access to a vaccine or not, whether severe restrictions 
are imposed or a liberal approach to the epidemic is adopted, accumu-













































































































































I II III IV
Figure 5.5a  Curves representing social utility in scenarios I–IV. A poorly developed 
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Figure 5.5b  Curves representing social utility in scenarios I–IV. A strongly developed 
economy. Source: own calculations.
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at peak incidence in a poor economy without vaccination will reach 
about 20% if severe restrictions are imposed in response to the epi-
demic, or about 10–11% if a liberal approach is adopted. In a wealthy 
economy the indicators will reach 40–44% or 22–23%;8
8  The parameters of the macroeconomic module of the proposed model are calibrated so that 
the initial unemployment rate in a poorly developed economy amounts to about 5%, and 


















































































































































V VI VII VIII
Figure 5.6a  Curves representing social utility in scenarios V–VIII. A poorly 






































































































































V VI VII VIII
Figure 5.6b  Curves representing social utility in scenarios V–VIII. A strongly 
developed economy. Source: own calculations. 
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 • the indicators only slightly fall with slow or rapid progress in immuni-
zation coverage;
 • the average unemployment rates over a three-year period (and more 





) will be higher in the scenarios of severe 
restrictions imposed by the government in response to the epidemic and 
will decrease with an increase in the pace of immunization coverage of 
the population. Those products will also be higher in a wealthy econ-
omy. However, it must be emphasized that the geometric average of 











































































































































IX X XI XII
Figure 5.7a  Curves representing social utility in scenarios IX–XII. A poorly 






































































































































IX X XI XII
Figure 5.7b  Curves representing social utility in scenarios IX–XII. A strongly 
developed economy. Source: own calculations.
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the unemployment rate uGN  is significantly lower in a wealthy economy 
than in a poor economy due to the model design;
 • Figures 5.5–5.7 (depicting curves of the social utility function in consec-
utive scenarios in a poor and in a wealthy economy) lead to the follow-
ing conclusions. First, falls in social utility U in both types of economy, 
in scenarios of severe restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic 
(the scenarios marked with odd Roman numerals) are significantly 
greater than in scenarios of a liberal approach (the scenarios marked 
with even numbers). Second, the sooner a vaccine is administered, the 
smaller are falls in social utility. Third, falls in social utility are slightly 









are higher in 
that type of economy.     
5.5  Conclusions
Chapter 5 discusses the effect of an epidemic on economic growth. The 
analysis is conducted using a model of economic growth under epidemic 
conditions. The epidemiological module introduces an indicator that shows 
restrictions imposed on social and economic life during the epidemic. The 
indicator is defined in two versions; in the first version, it changes continually 
on consecutive days of the epidemic as a function of the percentage of infec-
tions, and in the second version, it changes discretely when the government 
abruptly imposes a lockdown. The epidemiological section also includes a 
scenario wherein a vaccine (against the spreading disease) is available to 
the government and a population vaccination programme is implemented. 
In the section of the model discussion that is dedicated to the economy, it 
is assumed that the production process is described by a neoclassical Cobb-
Douglas production function; accumulation of fixed capital, like in the orig-
inal Solow model of 1956, is defined as the difference between investment 
and the depreciated value of that capital. Also, a social utility function is 
introduced, defined as a geometrical average of the indicator of social and 
economic activity, the percentage of the uninfected, the ratio of unemploy-
ment rate under non-epidemic conditions to that rate under epidemic condi-
tions and the ratio of production during the epidemic to production under 
non-epidemic conditions.
The chapter also discusses scenarios of epidemic development depending 
on the availability of a vaccine to the government. In the scenarios wherein 
the government has no access to a vaccine, it was assumed that the govern-
ment imposes restrictions on social and economic activity following certain 
functional relations or abruptly. The scenarios with vaccination are divided 
into those with slow and those with rapid progress in immunization cover-
age of the population. Those scenarios also include a lockdown imposed by 
the government, like in the scenarios without vaccination.
Falls in production in an economy without access to a vaccine reach, at 
peak incidence, 18.3% to 19.9% if severe restrictions are imposed in response 
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to the epidemic, or 10.4% to 10.9% if a liberal approach is adopted. Slow 
progress in immunization coverage of the population combined with severe 
restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic will reduce falls in produc-
tion by 17.7% to 19.5%. If a liberal approach to the epidemic is adopted, 
falls in production will reach (respectively) 10.2–10.6%. Additionally, rapid 
progress in immunization coverage has no material effect on falls in produc-
tion at peak incidence.
If the government imposes severe restrictions in response to the pandemic 
and has no access to a vaccine, accumulated falls in the value of produc-
tion will reach, over three years, about 6.7–9.8%, and if a liberal approach 
to the epidemic is adopted, the falls will reach 2.2–3.5%. Slow progress 
in immunization coverage of the population combined with severe restric-
tions imposed in response to the pandemic will lead to accumulated falls in 
production of 5.4–8.1% while a liberal approach to the pandemic will lead 
to accumulated falls in production of 2.0–3.2%. A rapid pace of progress 
in immunization coverage of the population reduces accumulated drops 
in production to about 4.6–6.6%, if severe restrictions are imposed, or to 
1.9–2.9%. Consequently, the introduction of vaccination and rapid pro-
gress in immunization coverage will have a stronger effect on accumulated 
falls in production than on the depth of recession. Additionally, whether 
the government has access to a vaccine or not, falls in the capital stock will 
be significantly smaller than falls in production and will not exceed 1%.
Relative increases in the unemployment rate at peak incidence in a poor 
economy without vaccination will reach about 20–44% if severe restric-
tions are imposed in response to the epidemic, or about 10–23% if a lib-
eral approach is adopted. The introduction and acceleration of vaccination 
entails a minor reduction in relative rises in the unemployment rate at peak 
incidence. Additionally, average unemployment rates over a three-year 
period will be higher in the scenarios of severe restrictions imposed by the 
government in response to the epidemic and will decrease with an increase 
in the pace of immunization coverage of the population.
Falls in social utility will be significantly greater in scenarios of severe 
restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic than in scenarios of a lib-
eral approach. Implementation of a vaccination programme will result in a 
reduced depth of fall in social utility, and the faster is progress in immuni-
zation coverage of the population, the relatively smaller are falls in social 
utility.
References
Alvarez, F., Argente, D., Lippi, F. (2020). A simple planning problem for COVID-
19 lockdown. NBER Working Paper, No. 26981. http://www .nber .org /papers /
w26981 (accessed February 16, 2021).
Atkeson, A. (2020). What will be the economic impact of COVID-19 in the US? 
Rough estimates of disease scenarios. NBER Working Paper, No. 26867. http://
www .nber .org /papers /w26867 (accessed February 16, 2021).
114 Monika Bolińska et al.
Aum, S., Lee, S., Shin, Y. (2020). Inequality of fear and self-quarantine: Is there a 
trade-off between GDP and public health? NBER Working Paper, No. 27100. 
http://www .nber .org /papers /w27100 (accessed February 16, 2021).
Bärwolff, G. (2020). Mathematical modeling and simulation of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Systems, 8(3), 1–12. https://doi .org /10 .3390 /systems8030024 
(accessed February 16, 2021).
Bloom, D., Lyons, J. (Eds.) (1993). Economic implications of AIDS in Asia, United 
Nations Development Programme, New York.
Bloom, D., Mahal, A. (1995). Does the AIDS epidemic really threaten economic 
growth? National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 5148, 
NBER, Cambridge, MA. https://doi .org /10 .1016 /S0304 -4076(96)01808-8 
(accessed February 16, 2021).
Bloom, D., Mahal, A. (1997). Does the AIDS epidemic really threaten economic 
growth? Journal of Econometrics, 77(1), 105–124.
Brock, W., Xepapadeas, A. (2020). The economy, climate change and infectious 
diseases: Links and policy implications. Environmental and Resource Economics, 
76, 811–824. https://doi .org /10 .1007 /s10640 -020 -00442-z (accessed February 
16, 2021).
Cuddington, J. (1993). Modeling the macroeconomic effects of AIDS, with an 
application to Tanzania. The World Bank Economic Review, 7, 173–789.
Cuddington, J., Hancock, J. (1994). Assessing the impact of aids on the growth path 
of the Malawian economy. Journal of Development Economics, 43(2), 363–368.
Cuesta, J. (2010). How much of a threat to economic growth is a mature AIDS 
epidemic? Applied Economics, 42(24), 3077–3089.
Delfino, D., Simmons, P. (2005). Dynamics of tuberculosis and economic growth. 
Environment and Development Economics, 10(6), 719–743. https://doi .org /10 . 
1017 /S1355770X05002500 (accessed February 16, 2021).
Fei-Ying, Y., Wan-Tong, L., Zhi-Cheng, W. (2015). Traveling waves in a nonlocal 
dispersal SIR epidemic model. Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications, 23, 
129–147.
Jardón-Kojakhmetov, H., Kuehn, Ch., Pugliese, A., Sensi, M. (2021). A geometric 
analysis of the SIR, SIRS and SIRWS epidemiological models. Nonlinear Analysis: 
Real World Applications, 58, 103220.
Kambou, G., Devarajan, S., Over, M. (1992). The economic impact of AIDS in an 
African country: Simulations with a computable general equilibrium model of 
Cameroon. Journal of African Economies, 1, 109–130.
Kermack, W. O., McKendrick, A. G. (1927). A contribution to the mathematical 
theory of epidemics. Royal Society, 115(772), 700–721.
Lik Ng, W. (2020). To lockdown? When to peak? Will there be an end? A 
macroeconomic analysis on COVID-19 epidemic in the United States. Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 65, 103230.
Lovasz, E., Schipp, B. (2009). The impact of HIV/AIDS on economic growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 77(2), 245–256.
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., Weil, D. N. (1992). A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407–437.
Murray, J. D. (2003). Mathematical biology, II, spatial models and biomedical 
applications, in Interdisciplinary applied mathematics, 3rd ed., vol. 18, Springer-
Verlag, New York.
 Modelling the impact of an epidemic 115
Ruan, S. (2007). Spatial–temporal dynamics in nonlocal epidemiological models, in 
Y. Takeuchi, K. Sato, Y. Iwasa (Eds.), Mathematics for life science and medicine, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, pp. 99–122.
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65–94.
Xiao, D., Ruan, S. (2007). Global analysis of an epidemic model with nonmonotone 
incidence rate, Mathematical Biosciences, 208, 419–429.
6
6.1  Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic in Poland, as well as in Ukraine, started in March 
2020. The first measures to limit the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus were 
implemented as early as the beginning of 2020. In Poland, preventive meas-
ures were introduced well before the first case of the SARS infection was reg-
istered (4 March 2020, in Zielona Góra) and the first person died because of 
it (14 March 2020). As early as 25 January 2020, Warsaw Chopin Airport 
introduced special security procedures for passengers arriving from China 
(Lotnisko Chopina w Warszawie, 2020). On 31 January 2020, the National 
Institute of Hygiene in Poland began laboratory testing of people with sus-
pected SARS infection (Medonet, 2020). In Ukraine, on the other hand, 
the National Security and Defence Council at its meeting on 25 February 
2020 decided to introduce temperature screening for all persons entering the 
territory of Ukraine (Ukrinform, 2020), and the public was informed about 
the risks and health hazards related to this virus infection and the recom-
mended precautions.
In Ukraine, the first person infected with SARS-CoV-2 was registered on 
3 March 2020, in the Chernivtsi region of western Ukraine, and the first 
death caused by the virus was registered on 13 March 2020 (Indexminfin, 
2021). Following the KMU Decree,1 the so-called lockdown (defined as a 
national quarantine) was introduced in Ukraine on 12 March 2020. The 
decree provided for the introduction of a quarantine in the entire terri-
tory of Ukraine from 12 March to 3 April 2020 involving mainly a num-
ber of restrictions including, among others, the closure of all educational 
institutions and a ban on all mass gatherings for more than 200 people2 
(KMU, 2020a).
1  KMU Decree no 211 of 11 March 2020.
2  With the exception of the meetings necessary to ensure the work of public authorities and 
local governments.
Simulations of the pandemic 
propagation patterns on the 
example of Poland and Ukraine
Paweł Dykas, Katarzyna Filipowicz, 





 Pandemic simulations on Poland and Ukraine 117
Pandemic simulations on Poland 
and Ukraine
The situation was very similar in Poland, where the epidemiological sta-
tus3 was introduced 16 days after the first infection (Serwis Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, 2020a). In Poland, the following measures were introduced: an 
obligatory 14-day quarantine for persons entering the territory of Poland,4 
a ban on the circulation of certain protective goods, restrictions on the func-
tioning of certain educational and cultural institutions and workplaces, and 
a ban on gatherings for more than 50 people. As of 25 March 2020, when 
the total number of infected people fluctuated around 1,050, further restric-
tions were introduced (Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 2021). Despite 
these restrictions, the number of infections continued to rise dramatically, 
with 2,311 infections and 33 deaths recorded in Poland at the end of March, 
so the government introduced further restrictions as of 1 April 2020 under 
which, among others, persons under 18 were not allowed in public spaces 
without an adult guardian, parks, forests and beaches were closed to visi-
tors and the activity of hairdressing and beauty salons was suspended. In 
shops and service outlets, there were restrictions on the number of custom-
ers served at the same time.
As part of Ukraine’s national quarantine, border checkpoints were par-
tially closed (only 49 out of 219 remained open), while educational and 
cultural institutions were forced to operate online. As of 16 March 2020 
(when there were seven infected individuals in Ukraine), a ban on foreign-
ers entering the territory of Ukraine was introduced. On the following day, 
international air, bus and rail traffic was suspended. Similar restrictions 
were applied on 18 March within Ukrainian regions and cities, preventing 
people without their own transport from travelling outside their places of 
residence. Due to the increasing rate of infections in Ukraine (on 1 April, 
the total number of infections in Ukraine amounted to 794 and 20 people 
died), on 2 April the Ukrainian government adopted another decree,5 which 
extended the national quarantine until 24 April 2020 and introduced even 
more restrictions for Ukrainian citizens (e.g. the restriction of movement 
in groups of more than two persons, obligatory covering of the mouth and 
nose in public places, a ban on visiting parks and forests, the suspension of 
the activity of catering and sports facilities). Just like in Poland, administra-
tive and criminal liability for non-compliance with quarantine rules was 
introduced (VRU, 2020).
After four weeks of quarantine in Poland, the total number of infected 
persons was 9,593 and 380 persons died due to SARS-CoV-2 infection. At 
this time, the lockdown easing started as part of stage one out of four stages 
of restriction relaxation. The number of customers in shops was increased 
while parks and forests were opened. The next stage involved the opening 
3  Pursuant to the Resolution of the Health Minister of 20 March 2020.
4  With the exception of some categories of people.
5  Decree no 255 of 2 April 2020.
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of shops with construction materials on weekends as well as hotels and cul-
tural institutions. In the third stage, hairdressing and beauty salons, catering 
facilities and shops in shopping malls were opened.6 Sporting events could 
be attended by no more than 50 people,7 and nurseries and kindergartens, 
as well as schools for children from classes 1–3, were opened. The final 
stage of the quarantine abolition involved the opening of sports and rec-
reational facilities, as well as theatres and cinemas (Serwis Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej, 2020b).
In April, the Health Ministry of Ukraine announced its intention to 
lift some of the restrictions. Just like in Poland, the process was extended 
over several stages. At the beginning of May 2020, when the total num-
ber of infected persons was around 15 thousand, the Ukrainian govern-
ment introduced the first stage of the national quarantine relaxation, which 
resulted in parks and forests being opened and non-food shops, dental and 
cosmetology surgeries resuming their economic activity (Glavcom, 2020). 
On 22 May 2020, when the total number of infections was 20,148, people 
could resume using public transport (KMU, 2020b). Further steps in the 
quarantine abolition in Ukraine involved the opening of cultural and sports 
institutions in June 2020, and on 15 June 2020 international air traffic was 
partially restored (Unian, 2020).
The total number of infected persons in Poland at the end of May 
2020 fluctuated around 24,000 (more than 1,000 deaths were also regis-
tered), and as early as the end of August the number had almost tripled and 
amounted to 67,372 persons (and 2,039 deaths). Although in the first two 
months of the summer season the situation in Poland relatively normalized 
and the daily number of newly infected persons fluctuated around 350, by 
August this number had almost doubled. In September, the rate of infections 
increased even more and at the end of the month the number of new infec-
tions was over 1,300 per day.
The situation was similar in Ukraine, with an average of 700 newly 
infected persons per day (and 15 deaths per day) in June and 800 persons 
per day (and 17 deaths per day) in July. In August, however, the number 
of infected persons began to increase dramatically and by the end of the 
month already exceeded 2,000 persons per day, which is why the Ukrainian 
government decided to introduce another restriction, i.e. a ban on entry for 
foreigners from 28 August 2020 to 28 September 2020 (MSZU, 2020).
In autumn, both Poland and Ukraine reported increasing infection rates. 
In October 2020, the number of newly infected persons in Poland fluctuated 
around 8,500 persons and in Ukraine the number was 6,000. The number 
of deaths per day, in both countries, averaged around 100, so by the end of 
October the total number of infections in Ukraine was 387,481 and there 
6  With sanitary restrictions.
7  Without the participation of the audience and in open space.
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had been 7,196 deaths, while in Poland these numbers were (respectively) 
362,731 and 5,631.
Due to the dramatically rapid increase in the number of infections,8 the 
governments of both countries were forced to introduce further restrictions. 
In Ukraine it was done in November 2020 when the Ukrainian govern-
ment introduced the so-called weekend quarantine from 13 November to 
30 November 2020 (KMU, 2020c). The restrictions primarily involved a 
ban on services provided by cultural institutions, sports and catering facili-
ties during the weekend. However, as the Ukrainian government later 
admitted, the weekend quarantine did not have the desired effect and by the 
end of November 2020, the total number of infected persons was 732,625.
In Poland, the aforementioned restrictions took effect as of 24 October 
2020. Restrictions on movement and the operation of schools (including 
universities) were reintroduced, the business activity of sports venues and 
catering facilities was suspended (allowing only takeaway options) and the 
number of customers in shops was limited (Portal miasta Gdańsk, 2020).
At the end of the period analyzed in this chapter, i.e. on 3 December 
2020, the total number of infected persons was 772,760 and 12,960 people 
had died in Ukraine, while for Poland these numbers were, respectively, 
1,028,610 and 18,828. Due to the rapid rate of SARS-CoV-2 propagation 
and the high risk of health system collapse, in early December the govern-
ments of both countries announced the possibility of introducing another 
lockdown during the holiday season. According to the announcement of 
December 2020, it was to last until the end of January 2021.
6.2  The epidemiological model and calibrations 
of its parameters
The empirical analyses of the epidemiological situation in Poland and 
Ukraine in Chapter 6 are based on the extended SIR (Susceptible–Infected–
Removed) model of Kernack, McKendrick (1927), which was presented 
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8  In late October, the number of cases per day exceeded 20,000 people in Poland and 8,000 
in Ukraine.
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where:
St – percentage of uninfected individuals,
It – percentage of infected individuals,
Ht – percentage of convalescent individuals,
Dt – percentage of deaths,
Pt – percentage of the vaccinated population.
Parameter β describing the rate of the epidemic spread was chosen numer-
ically, so that the proportion of the population determined by the model on 
day 275 of the epidemic was equal to the empirical value of this proportion 
on 3 December 2020. As a result of numerical analyses, the value of β for 
Poland was adopted at the level of 0.1015 and for Ukraine at 0.1053. Just 
like in Chapter 5, it is assumed that the average duration of an infection 
caused by SARS-CoV-2 is 14 days, hence the value of parameter γ obtained 
is 0.071429. In numerical analyses, it is assumed that the average percent-
age of convalescent persons h is 0.985, which means that the mortality rate 
of infected persons is at the level of 1.5%. In further deliberations, it is also 
assumed that on the first day of the epidemic the proportion of infected 
persons was one per one million inhabitants.
This model introduces the indicator describing the degree of socioeco-
nomic activity. This kind of approach can be found in the works of Bärwolff 
(2020) or Atkeson (2020), among others. In this chapter, it is assumed that 
the socioeconomic activity index κt in both countries is achieved by means 
of the following relationship:
 k q ht t= × ,  (6.6)
where variable ηt is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 when 
restrictions are introduced on a given day and 0 when there are no socio-
economic life restrictions on a given day. In Poland, the value of parameter 
θ was assumed at the level of 0.804; in Ukraine it was 0.792. Just like in the 
case of parameter β, the values of parameter θ were chosen in such a way 
that the proportion of infected individuals resulting from the model coin-
cided with the empirical proportion.
In the model described by equations (6.1–6.5), dichotomous variable δt 
takes the value of 1 when a vaccination programme was introduced on a 
given day and 0 when there were no vaccinations. In further analyses, it is 
assumed that in Poland vaccination starts on 28 December 2020, i.e. on day 
300 of the pandemic, and in Ukraine on day 335 of the pandemic. It is also 
assumed that in Poland 50% of the population declares the willingness to 
be vaccinated (ρ = 0.5), while for Ukraine this indicator is 60% (ρ = 0.6), 
but in the scenario analysis it is assumed that the values of this parameter 
in both countries deviate by ±50% from the adopted values. Furthermore, 
in further considerations it is assumed that vaccine efficacy ε is 95% and 
daily vaccination rate π for those declaring their willingness to be vaccinated 
equals 2‰ in both countries.
 Pandemic simulations on Poland and Ukraine 121
6.3  Results of numerical simulations
Numerical simulations were conducted in four scenarios. Scenario one, 
called the baseline scenario, assumes that the epidemic spreads naturally, 
without any state intervention. In subsequent scenarios, it is assumed that 
the state introduces restrictions on socioeconomic life. In scenario A, it is 
assumed that restrictions are maintained until the proportion of infected 
individuals falls below half of the empirical proportion on day 275 of the 
epidemic. Scenario B assumes that the lockdown restrictions are gradually 
lifted starting from day 321 after the outbreak; furthermore, the rate of 
restriction easing in this scenario is 5% per week. In scenario C, all restric-
tions will be lifted on day 321 of the epidemic. Each scenario includes four 
variant options. In variant 1 there is no vaccination, while the subsequent 
variant options include a vaccination programme. In variants 2–4, it is 
assumed that in the case of Poland 50%, 75% and 25% of the popula-
tion declare their willingness to be vaccinated (respectively). In the case of 
Ukraine, the proportions are 60%, 90% and 30%.
6.3.1  Results of numerical simulations for Poland
The baseline scenario assumes that the pandemic spreads freely, without 
any government intervention. This scenario will serve as a reference for the 
other scenarios. In the hypothetical situation considered, the peak of the 
epidemic would occur on day 311 since its beginning (i.e. about 8 January 
20219) with the maximum proportion of infected individuals at the level 
of 4.94%. The cumulative death rate would be 7.9‰, i.e. about 303,000 
people10 would die in Poland. The epidemic in Poland would end 968 days 
after its outbreak and convalescent individuals would make 52.12% of the 
population (cf. Figure 6.1).
In scenario A, it is assumed that socioeconomic life restrictions will be 
maintained until the proportion of infections falls below 4.73‰ (i.e. half of 
the empirical percentage on day 275 of the epidemic). In option A1 (without 
a vaccine), the lockdown would end on day 544 of the epidemic, i.e. on 29 
August 2021. The maximum proportion of infections would be recorded on 
day 363 of the epidemic and it would be equal to 1.24% (i.e. 3.7 percentage 
points lower than in the baseline scenario). After the lifting of restrictions, 
the proportion of infections would rise again slightly to the level of 7.21‰ 
on day 672 of the epidemic, decreasing in the following months (on day 
1,500 of the epidemic the number of infected people in Poland would be 
 9  It is assumed that the first day of the epidemic is the day of the first confirmed case of the 
virus infection, i.e. 4 March 2020 in Poland.
10  Calculated on the basis of the data provided by the Chief Statistical Office (GUS). Accord-
ing to GUS, Poland’s population in September 2020 was 38,351,000 people: https://stat .gov 
.pl /podstawowe -dane/.
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about 313). In this scenario, 38.7% of the Polish population would make 
the group of convalescents. The cumulative death rate would amount to 
5.9‰, i.e. about 226,000 persons would die (about 77,000 fewer than in the 
baseline scenario, cf. Figures 6.2 and 6.6, Table 6.1).
The next three variants of scenario A (A2 – 50% vaccinated, A3 – 75% 
vaccinated, A4 – 25% vaccinated) focus on the spread of the epidemic in 
the situation when the vaccination process has begun. It is assumed that on 
18 January 2021 (i.e. on day 321 of the epidemic), the first individuals with 














































































































































Figure 6.1  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for the baseline scenario. Source: 







































































Figure 6.2  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario A1 (without a vaccine). 
Source: the author’s own study.
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the proportion of the population at the risk of infection). In scenario A2 
it is assumed that 50% of the Polish population will be willing to be vac-
cinated. In this hypothetical situation, socioeconomic restrictions would be 
maintained until June 14, 2021. The epidemic peak would occur on day 
342 of the epidemic with an infection rate of 1.21% (slightly lower than in 
variant A1). The cumulative death rate would be 3.4‰, i.e. about 130,000 
people would die (96,000 fewer than in variant A1 and 173,000 fewer than 
in the baseline scenario). It is also worth mentioning that, in contrast to 
scenario A1, the lockdown abolition combined with an ongoing vaccina-
tion process does not actually cause an increase in the proportion of infec-
tions (six days after the lockdown easing this proportion falls again). The 
epidemic would end on day 1,084 after its onset. On the day of its end, 
the proportion of the convalescent population would be about 22% and 
about 40% of the Polish population would be vaccinated (cf. Figures 6.3 
and 6.6, Table 6.1).
Table 6.1  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario A 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
A1 0.6077 0.0124 0.3865 0.0059 0 362
A2 0.2567 0.0121 0.2204 0.0034 0.5195 342
A3 0.1537 0.0120 0.1957 0.0030 0.6476 338
A4 0.4176 0.0122 0.2665 0.0041 0.3119 349
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Figure 6.3  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A2 (50% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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Variants A3 and A4 are, in turn, optimistic and pessimistic predictions 
concerning the vaccination of Polish citizens. In the first one, it is assumed 
that 75% of the population will be interested in vaccinations, in the second 
only 25%.
In the optimistic variant, the lockdown would end on 27 May 2021. The 
peak of the epidemic would occur on day 338 with the maximum propor-
tion of infected individuals at 1.2% (a similar value to the one in options 
A1 and A2).
The cumulative proportion of deaths would be 3‰, i.e. about 
115,000 people (15,000 people fewer than in variant A2). The epidemic 













































































































































S I H P
Figure 6.4  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A3 (75% of the 
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Figure 6.5  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A4 (25% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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of vaccinated persons at the level of 48.0% and convalescents at 19.6% 
(Figures 6.4 and 6.6, Table 6.1).
In the pessimistic variant, assuming that the willingness to become vac-
cinated in Poland will be low, restrictions would be lifted on 12 July 2021. 
The maximum proportion of the infected persons would be 1.22% (similar 
to the value in the previous variants of scenario A) and it would take place 
on day 349 of the epidemic. After the lockdown abolition, the proportion of 
infected persons would again start to increase slightly until day 539 of the 
epidemic, i.e. 24 August 2021, when it would be equal to 5.1‰ (a similar 
increase after the lockdown easing could be observed under option A1). The 
cumulative proportion of deaths would be 4.1‰, i.e. 157,000 people would 
die in Poland (42,000 more than in variant A3). In Poland, the epidemic 
would end 1,321 days after its beginning, with the proportion of conva-
lescents equal to 26.7% (7.1 percentage points more than in variant A3) 
and the proportion of vaccinated persons equal to 27.6% (20.4 percentage 
points fewer than in variant A3, cf. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 and Table 6.1).
The next scenario (B) assumes that the restrictions on socioeconomic life 
are gradually lifted as of 18 January 2021 (the 321st day of the epidemic). 
This scenario assumes that the rate of the lockdown easing is 5% per week 
and thus the restrictions are abolished entirely after four weeks, on day 
349 of the epidemic. In variant B1 of scenario B (without a vaccine), the 
maximum number of infected persons will fall on 6 May 2021 (day 429 of 
the epidemic, see Table 6.2). The proportion of those infected would then 
be 3.65%, 1.29 percentage points lower than in the baseline scenario (see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.7). In variant B1 the proportion of deaths would be 7.5‰, 
which would translate into about 288,000 persons dying as a result of the 











































































No action A1 (no vaccination)
A4 (25% of the population vaccinated) A2 (50% of the population vaccinated)
A3 (75% of the population vaccinated)
Figure 6.6  Trajectories of death rates for Scenario A. Source: the author’s own 
study.
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15,000. Moreover, in variant B1 the maximum proportion of convalescents 
would amount to 49.02% of the Polish population. On the 1,174th day of 
the epidemic the number of infected persons would fall below one, and on 
that day the proportion of those who recovered would be about 49.02% 
(cf. Figure 6.7).
In subsequent variants, similarly to Scenario A, the vaccination pro-
gramme is taken into account.
In variant B2 (50% of the population vaccinated), it is assumed that the 
declared proportion of the population that expresses the willingness to 
receive vaccinations is 50%. In this option, the maximum proportion of 
infected persons would fall on 18 April 2021, the 411th day of the epidemic, 
and it would be 2.6% of the population (28.8% lower than in option B1 
without a vaccine). The number of people who died as a result of the epi-
demic under this option would decrease by 77,000 compared to option B1 
Table 6.2  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario B 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
B1 0.5023 0.0365 0.4902 0.0075 0 429
B2 0.2033 0.0260 0.3617 0.0055 0.4295 411
B3 0.1242 0.0229 0.3159 0.0048 0.5551 402
B4 0.3239 0.0301 0.4196 0.0064 0.2501 420









































































Figure 6.7  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario B1 (without a vaccine). 
Source: the author’s own study.
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and would be about 211,000. With variant B2, the epidemic would end on 
day 945, when there would be 29.5% of vaccinated persons and 36.2% of 
convalescents in the Polish population (see Figure 6.8).
Figure 6.9 illustrates the trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P resulting 
from numerical simulations for variant B3, where the proportion of persons 
declaring the willingness to be vaccinated is 75% of the population. With 
this option, the maximum number of infected persons would occur 27 days 
earlier than with option B1 and would be on 9 April 2021 (day 402 of the epi-
demic, see Table 6.2). The proportion of people infected on this date would 
be 2.29%, approximately 37.4% lower than for the no-vaccine option.
The proportion of deaths in variant B3 decreased as compared to both 
variant B1 and variant B2 (by 36.0% and 12.7% respectively) and was 
4.8‰. This would translate into approximately 184,000 people dying as a 
result of the epidemic. Moreover, on 7 August 2022, i.e. on the 887th day, 
the epidemic would end (counting from the onset) and on that day there 
would be 38.8% of vaccinated persons and 31.6% of convalescents in the 
Polish population.
The final, fourth variant (B4) of scenario B assumes that only 25% of the 
Polish population declare their willingness to be vaccinated (variant B4).
The maximum number of infected persons would then be recorded on 
27 April 2021, i.e. on day 420 of the epidemic. The maximum proportion 
of infected persons in this variant would be 3.01% of the population and 
it would be 17.5% lower than in the variant without a vaccine and, respec-
tively, 15.8% and 31.4% higher than in variants B2 and B3 (cf. Table 6.2).
In the variant B4 the maximum proportion of deaths is 6.4‰ of the Polish 
population, which translates into about 245,000 dead people, and in com-
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Figure 6.8  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B2 (50% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own work.
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people by about 34,000 for variant B2 and by about 61,000 for variant B3 
(compare Figure 6.11 and Table 6.2). The epidemic in Poland would end 
on day 1,026 when there would be 17.2% vaccinated persons and 41.9% 
convalescents in the Polish population (cf. Figure 6.10). 
In the third scenario (C), the socioeconomic restrictions associated with 
the lockdown are to be lifted on 18 January 2021 (day 321 of the epidemic). 
In scenario C1 (without a vaccine), the maximum number of infected per-
sons would be recorded on 25 April 2021 (418th day of the epidemic).
The proportion of infected persons on that day would be 3.8% of the 
population and it would be 1.15 percentage points lower than in the base-
line scenario (cf. Table 6.3). The maximum proportion of deaths would 
translate into over 291,000 people dying as a result of the epidemic, which 
is approximately 12,000 fewer than compared with the baseline scenario.
In Scenario C1, the epidemic would be extinguished after 1,145 days 
and the proportion of convalescents on that date would be 49.6% (see 
Figure 6.12). In scenario C including a vaccination programme with a 50% 
vaccination coverage rate, the maximum number of infected persons (day 
402 of the epidemic) is observed 16 days earlier as compared with scenario 
C without a vaccine (see Table 6.3). In variant C2 (50% of the population 
vaccinated), the maximum proportion of deaths in the population would 
be 5.8‰, which would translate into approximately 222,000 deaths. What 
follows is that in scenario C with a vaccination programme and 50% of the 
population declaring their willingness to be vaccinated there will be a reduc-
tion in deaths due to the epidemic by about 69,000 people. Analyzing the 
trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P (cf. Figure 6.13) it can be seen that 
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Figure 6.9  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B3 (75% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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Figure 6.10  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B4 (25% of the 









































































































































No action B1 (no vaccination)
B4 (25% of the population vaccinated) B2 (50% of the population vaccinated)
B3 (75% of the population vaccinated)
Figure 6.11  Trajectories of death rates for Scenario B. Source: the author’s own 
study.
Table 6.3  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario C 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
C1 0.4966 0.0379 0.4958 0.0076 0 418
C2 0.1976 0.0293 0.3787 0.0058 0.4180 402
C3 0.1202 0.0264 0.3357 0.0051 0.5390 394
C4 0.3171 0.0330 0.4318 0.0066 0.2445 410
Source: the author’s own study.
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the population will include 28.1% vaccinated persons and 37.9% convales-
cents. Considering variant C3 (75% of the population vaccinated) it can be 
seen that the peak of the epidemic would then fall on 1 April 2021 (day 394 
of the epidemic).
The maximum proportion of people infected in this variant of scenario C 
would be lower as compared to both variant C1 (reduction by 1.15 percent-
age points) and variant C2 (reduction by 0.29 percentage points) and equal 
to 2.6%. The maximum proportion of deaths in variant C3 would be 5.1‰, 
which, taking into account the population of Poland, translates into over 







































































Figure 6.12  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario C1 (without a 
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Figure 6.13  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario C2 (50% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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at which date there would be 37.2% vaccinated persons and 33.6% conva-
lescents (see Figure 6.14).
In the final variant C4 (25% of the population vaccinated) of this sce-
nario, it is assumed that the proportion of the population declaring a will-
ingness to be vaccinated is 25%. In this scenario, the maximum proportion 
of infected people would be 3.3% and it would fall on April 17, 2021 (the 
410th day of the epidemic). Under option C4, the maximum proportion of 
deaths would be 6.6‰, corresponding to more than 253,000 people dying 
from the epidemic. As compared with options C1–C3, the number of the 
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Figure 6.14  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario C3 (75% of the 
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Figure 6.15  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for Scenario C4 (25% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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and 58,000 people, respectively, and lower by 38,000 people when com-
pared with C1 (see Table 6.3 and Figure 6.16). The epidemic following this 
variant would cease as of day 1,004 (cf. Figure 6.15). Moreover, on that day 
there would be 16.4% vaccinated persons and 43.2% convalescents. 
6.3.2  Results of numerical simulations for Ukraine
The baseline scenario assumes that the government of Ukraine has not intro-
duced any epidemic-related restrictions in March 2020. This scenario will 
serve as a baseline for the other scenarios. The peak of the epidemic would 
occur on day 283 after the outbreak (i.e. around 11 December 2020), and the 
maximum proportion of infections on that day would be 6.9%. The cumu-
lative death rate would be 8.5‰, i.e. about 355,000 people would die. The 
epidemic would die out after about 2 years (day 774) with 43.2% uninfected 
persons and 55.9% convalescents at the end of the epidemic (cf. Figure 6.17).
In scenario A, it is assumed that the lockdown would be lifted when the 
proportion of infections falls below 50% of the empirical proportion on 
day 276. In the case analyzed, this proportion would be 4.21‰. In scenario 
A1 (without a vaccine), the lockdown would end on 8 October 2021 (day 
584 of the epidemic). The maximum proportion of infections is 1.46% on 
day 391 of the epidemic, which is 4.4 percentage points lower than in the 
baseline scenario. When the restrictions are lifted, the proportion of infected 
individuals would only rise to 5.9‰ on day 714 of the epidemic and then 
fall to 728 people on day 1,500 of the epidemic. In this scenario, the propor-
tion of uninfected persons at the end of the epidemic was equal to 59.9%, 
while the proportion of convalescents was 40.2%. The cumulative death 









































































































































No action C1 (no vaccination)
C4 (25% of the population vaccinated) C2 (50% of the population vaccinated)
C3 (75% of the population vaccinated)
Figure 6.16  Trajectories of death rates for Scenario C. Source: the author’s own 
study.
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99,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. (See Figures 6.17 and 6.18, 
Table 6.4).
Scenario A, options A2 (60% of the population vaccinated), A3 (90% of 
the population vaccinated) and A4 (30% of the population vaccinated), in 
addition to the lockdown abolition when the proportion of infections falls 
below 50% of the actual proportion on day 275, also took into account the 
spread of the epidemic when the vaccination process began. On 1 February 
2021 (day 335 of the epidemic) the first people with immunity after vac-
cination will appear (thus reducing the proportion of the population at the 
risk of infection).
According to option A2, 60% of the Ukrainian population will be vacci-
nated. In this situation, restrictions would be maintained until 11 July 2021 
(day 495 of the epidemic).
The highest proportion of infections would be on day 364 of the epi-
demic and account for 1.36%. The cumulative proportion of deaths would 
be 3.4‰, i.e. approximately 142,000 people would die. This is 112,000 
fewer than in option A1 and 213,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. 
The epidemic would die out around two and a half years (943 days) after 
its onset. The population would contain 14.9% uninfected persons, 20.6% 
convalescents and 39.4% vaccinated persons at the end of the epidemic (see 
Figures 6.19 and 6.22, Table 6.4).
According to option A3, 90% of the Ukrainian population would be vac-
cinated. In this situation the lockdown would be maintained until 20 June 
2021 (the 474th day of the epidemic). The epidemic peak would occur on 















































































































































Figure 6.17  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for the baseline scenario. Source: 
the author’s own study.
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The cumulative death rate would be 2.8‰, i.e. about 118,000 people 
would die. This is almost the same as under option A2, 138,000 fewer than 
under option A1 and 237,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. The epi-
demic would die out 2 years (827 days) after its onset. There would be 6.5% 
uninfected individuals, 18.6% convalescents and 46.3% vaccinated persons 
at the end of the epidemic (cf. Figures 6.20 and 6.22, Table 6.4).
In scenario A4, it was assumed that the willingness to become vaccinated 
would be low, thus 30% of the Ukrainian population would be vaccinated. 
In this situation, restrictions would be maintained until 12 August 2021 
(the 527th day of the epidemic). The highest proportion of infected indi-
viduals would be on 24 February 2021 (day 373 of the epidemic) represent-
ing 1.4%. The cumulative proportion of deaths would be 3.7‰, or about 














































































































































Figure 6.18  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario A1 (without a 
vaccine). Source: the author’s own study.
Table 6.4  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario A 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
A1 0.5923 0.0146 0.4016 0.0061 0 714
A2 0.149425 0.013683 0.206078 0.003138 0.641359 364
A3 0.065211 0.013493 0.186179 0.002835 0.745775 358
A4 0.326729 0.014001 0.245820 0.003743 0.423707 373
Source: the author’s own study.
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scenario. In contrast, this option predicts the highest number of deaths of all 
the variants that include a vaccine. The epidemic would die out three years 
(1,190 days) after its onset. There would be 32.7% uninfected individuals, 
24.6% convalescents and 28.8% vaccinated persons at the end of the epi-
demic (cf. Figures 6.21 and 6.22, Table 6.4).
In scenario B, it is assumed that restrictions on socioeconomic life are 
to be gradually lifted starting from 30 January 2021 (the 333rd day of the 
epidemic). It is assumed that the rate of lockdown easing is 5% per week. 
In this scenario, restrictions will be entirely removed after four weeks, on 
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Figure 6.19  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A2 (60% of the 
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Figure 6.20  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A3 (90% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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epidemic would be on 13 May (the 436th day of the epidemic) with the 
maximum proportion of infections at 4.37%, which is almost 2 million 
people. The cumulative death rate would be 8‰, i.e. about 334,000 people 
would die. This is 21,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario.
The epidemic would die out nearly three years (983 days) after its onset. 
There would be 46.2% uninfected individuals and 52.9% convalescents 
after the end of the epidemic (cf. Figure 6.23 and 6.27, Table 6.5).
The following variants of scenario B take into account the vaccination of the 
population. In variant B2 it was assumed that 60% of the population would be 
vaccinated. In this situation the highest proportion of infected persons would 
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Figure 6.21  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario A4 (30% of the 









































































































































No action A1 (no vaccination)
A2 (60% of the population vaccinated) A3 (90% of the population vaccinated)
A4 (30% of the population vaccinated)
Figure 6.22  Trajectories of death rates for Scenario A. Source: the author’s own 
study.
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the epidemic, 246,000 people would die. Thus, the cumulative proportion of 
deaths would be 5.9‰. This is 87,000 fewer than in variant B1 and 109,000 
fewer than in the baseline scenario. The epidemic would die out after two years 
(839 days). There would be 10.9% uninfected individuals and 38.7% conva-
lescents after the end of the epidemic (cf. Figure 6.24 and 6.27, Table 6.5).
The following variants of scenario B take into account the vaccination 
of the population. In variant B2 it was assumed that 60% of the population 
would be vaccinated. In this situation the highest proportion of infected per-
sons would fall on 27 April 2021 (the 364th day of the epidemic) at 3.12%. 
As a result of the epidemic, 246,000 people would die. Thus, the cumulative 
proportion of deaths would be 5.9‰. This is 87,000 fewer than in variant 
B1 and 109,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. The epidemic would die 
out after two years (839 days). There would be 10.9% uninfected individu-
als and 38.7% convalescents after the end of the epidemic (cf. Figure 6.24 
























































































































































Figure 6.23  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario B1 (without a 
vaccine). Source: the author’s own study.
Table 6.5  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario B 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
B1 0.462102 0.043753 0.529830 0.008068 0 436
B2 0.109040 0.031281 0.386877 0.005892 0.498192 420
B3 0.050093 0.027247 0.334960 0.005101 0.609845 412
B4 0.228571 0.036675 0.451814 0.006880 0.312734 428
Source: the author’s own study.
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Variant B3 assumed the most optimistic scenario in which 90% of the 
Ukrainian population would be vaccinated. The highest proportion of infec-
tions would fall on 19 May 2021 (day 412 of the epidemic) at 2.72%. 
The cumulative death rate would be 5.1‰. Approximately 213,000 people 
would die, which is 3.4‰ fewer than in the baseline scenario, 2.9‰ fewer 
than in option B1 and 0.8‰ fewer than in option B2. The epidemic would 
die out after two years (795 days). There would be 5% uninfected individu-
als, 33.4% convalescents and 37.8% vaccinated persons at the end of the 
epidemic (cf. Figures 6.25 and 6.27, Table 6.5).
On the other hand, variant B4 is the most pessimistic scenario in which 
30% of the Ukrainian population is vaccinated. In this variant the peak of 
the epidemic would fall on 5 May (the 428th day of the epidemic) with the 
maximum proportion of infections at 3.66%, i.e. 1.5 million persons. The 
cumulative proportion of deaths would be 6.88‰.
As a result, about 288,000 people would die. This is 75,000 more people 
than in option B3, 42,000 more than in option B2, 49,000 fewer than in 
the no-vaccine option and 67,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. The 
epidemic would die out after two years (895 days). There would be 22.8% 
uninfected people, 46.4% convalescents and 16.1% vaccinated people at 
the end of the epidemic (see Figures 6.26 and 6.27, Table 6.5).
In the final scenario C, it is assumed that the lockdown restrictions are 
to be lifted on 30 January 2021 (the 333rd day of the epidemic). In sce-
nario C1 (without a vaccine), the epidemic peak would fall on 1 May (day 
424 of the epidemic) with the maximum proportion of infections at 4.67%. 
The cumulative death rate would be 8.16‰, i.e. about 341,000 people 
would die. This is 14,000 fewer than in the baseline scenario. The epidemic 
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Figure 6.24  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B2 (60% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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uninfected individuals and 53.6% convalescents at the end of the epidemic 
(see Figures 6.28 and 6.32, Table 6.6).
In the following variants of scenario C, the vaccination programme was 
taken into account. In variant C2, it was assumed that 60% of the popula-
tion would be vaccinated. On the basis of Figure 6.29 it can be deduced 
that the peak of the epidemic in this variant would fall on 18 April 2021 
(day 411 of the epidemic) with the rate of infection at 3.56%. In this vari-
ant, 260,000 people would die. Thus, the cumulative proportion of deaths 
would be 6.2‰. This is 81,000 fewer than in option C1 and 95,000 fewer 
than in the baseline scenario. The epidemic would die out after 2 years (821 
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Figure 6.25  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B3 (90% of the 
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Figure 6.26  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario B4 (30% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.






















































































































































No action B1 (no vaccination)
B2 (60% of the population vaccinated) B3 (90% of the population vaccinated)
B4 (30% of the population vaccinated)

























































































































































Figure 6.28  Trajectories of proportions S, I and H for scenario C1 (without a 
vaccine). Source: the author’s own study.
Table 6.6  Minimum proportion of uninfected persons (Sm), maximum proportion 
of infected persons (IM), maximum proportion of vaccinated persons (PM), 
maximum proportion of convalescents (HM) and the deceased (DM), day 
of the epidemic with the highest number of infections (T) for scenario B 
with different variants
variants Sm IM HM DM PM T
C1 0.455823 0.046713 0.536014 0.008163 0 424
C2 0.105171 0.035679 0.407456 0.006205 0.481168 411
C3 0.048006 0.031926 0.359403 0.005473 0.587119 404
C4 0.222649 0.040525 0.466172 0.007099 0.304080 417
Source: the author’s own study.
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and 48.1% vaccinated persons at the end of the epidemic (cf. Figure 6.29 
and 6.32, Table 6.6).
In scenario C3, with 90% of the Ukrainian population vaccinated, the 
highest proportion of infections would fall on 11 April 2021 (day 404 
of the epidemic) at 3.19%. The cumulative death rate would be 5.47‰. 
Approximately 229,000 people would die. This is 126,000 fewer people 
than in the baseline scenario, 112,000 fewer people than in option C1 and 
31,000 fewer people than in option C2. The epidemic would die out after 
two years (782 days). There would be 27.6% uninfected individuals, 35.9% 
convalescents and 58.7% vaccinated persons at the end of the epidemic (see 
Figures 6.30 and 6.32, Table 6.6).
In the final variant C4 of this scenario, 30% of the population is assumed 
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Figure 6.29  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario C2 (60% of the 
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Figure 6.30  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario C3 (90% of the 
population vaccinated). Source: the author’s own study.
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epidemic would fall on 24 April (day 417 of the epidemic). The maximum 
proportion of infections on that day would be 4.05%. The cumulative death 
rate would be 7.1‰, i.e. about 297,000 people would die. This is 58 000 
fewer than in the baseline scenario. The epidemic would die out after 2 
years (874 days). There would be 37.4% uninfected individuals, 46.7% 
convalescents and 30.4% vaccinated persons at the end of the epidemic (see 
Figures 6.31 and 6.32, Table 6.5).
6.4  Conclusions
This chapter analyzes three scenarios of the spread of the epidemic in two 
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Figure 6.31  Trajectories of proportions S, I, H and P for scenario C4 (30% of the 



















































































































































No action C1 (no vaccination)
C2 (60% of the population vaccinated) C3 (90% of the population vaccinated)
C4 (30% of the population vaccinated)
Figure 6.32  Trajectories of death rates for Scenario C. Source: the author’s own 
study.
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the government as regards the time and manner of the easing of socioeco-
nomic restrictions. According to scenario A, the lockdown would be lifted 
when the proportion of infections fell below 50% of the actual proportion 
on day 275 of the epidemic. According to scenario B, restrictions would be 
lifted gradually over one month, beginning on 18 January 2021 in Poland 
and 30 January 2021 in Ukraine. According to the final scenario C, the 
lockdown restrictions would be lifted on a single date (18 January 2021 
for Poland and 30 January 2021 for Ukraine). Additionally, each of the 
scenarios includes four variants, one without vaccination and three with the 
respective vaccination of 50% (60%), 75% (90%) and 25% (30%) of the 
Polish (Ukrainian) population.
An important parameter in the assessment of the course of the epidemic 
is the proportion of deaths. The best results for Poland are achieved with 
Scenario A in its variants with vaccination. Assuming that 75%, 50% and 
25% of the population will express their willingness to be vaccinated, 
the proportion of deaths will be as follows: 3‰ (115,000 people), 3.4‰ 
(130,000 people) and 4.1‰ (157,000 people), respectively. For these vari-
ants the lockdown would have to be maintained until May 27, June 14 
and July 12, 2021, respectively. The highest proportion of deaths can be 
observed for scenarios C and B without vaccination; they are respectively 
7.6‰ (291,000 people) and 7.5‰ (288,000 people), differing relatively lit-
tle from the base scenario as regards the free spread of the epidemic (7.9‰, 
303,000 people).
Regardless of the variant adopted in Ukraine, the cumulative proportion 
of deaths would not exceed 8.16‰, which represents about 341,000 people. 
Therefore, the most pessimistic variant would be C1 (lockdown restrictions 
are lifted on 30 January 2021, there is no vaccination). In the scenario with-
out socioeconomic restrictions, the proportion would be 8.5‰ (355,000 
people). The most optimistic variant of all discussed is the one where the 
lockdown would be lifted when the proportion of infections falls below 
50% of the empirical proportion on day 275 and 90% of the A3 population 
is vaccinated. In this situation about 118,000 people would die (2.8‰).
Another important parameter is the proportion of the population infected 
at the peak of the epidemic. This parameter indirectly affects the burden on 
the country’s health care system – the more infected people there are, the 
more people are likely to require hospitalization. Also in this aspect the 
best results would be achieved by implementing scenario A. In different 
variants of this scenario, the value of this parameter for Poland oscillates 
between 1.20–1.24% (460–476 thousand people), and the pandemic peak 
would occur relatively early, i.e. on days 338–362 of the epidemic. In con-
trast, in scenarios C and B without vaccination and with the vaccination of 
25% of the population, the proportion is between 3.01–3.79% (1,154,000–
1,454,000 people) and the peak would occur on days 410–429 of the epi-
demic. With the free spread of the epidemic at the peak, i.e. day 311, the 
number of active cases would be 4.94% (approximately 1,895,000 people).
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In each scenario, the peak of the epidemic in Ukraine would fall the soon-
est in variant 3 (90% of the population would be vaccinated). The most pos-
itive of these variants would be scenario A (socioeconomic restrictions are 
removed when the proportion of infections falls below 50% of the empirical 
proportion on day 275). In this case, the peak of the epidemic would occur 
on 24 February (day 358 of the epidemic). In addition, this variant has the 
lowest maximum proportion of infections at 1.35%. On the other hand, the 
highest maximum proportion of infections would be 4.67% in variant C1 
(the lockdown restrictions would be lifted on 30 January 2021). The peak 
of the epidemic would fall on 1 May (day 424 of the epidemic). The peak of 
the epidemic would occur the latest on 13 May 2021 (the 436th day of the 
epidemic) with the maximum proportion of infections at 4.37%, represent-
ing almost 2 million people. This would be scenario B in its variant without 
a vaccine (where the lockdown restrictions are gradually lifted starting on 
30 January 2021). In the baseline scenario, the peak of the epidemic would 
fall on day 283 after its onset (i.e. around 11 December 2020) with the 
maximum proportion of infections on that day at 6.9%.
In Poland, high maximum recovery rates (42–50%) are observed in sce-
narios B and C without vaccination and with the vaccination of 25% of 
the population. Low recovery rates are observed in scenario A in its vari-
ants with vaccination, i.e. 20–27% of the population. Moreover, the fastest 
extinction of the epidemic can be observed in scenarios C and B with the 
vaccination of 75% of the population (July–August 2022). On the other 
hand, in the case of scenario A with the vaccination of 25% of the popula-
tion, the epidemic would end in October 2023, and in scenario A without 
vaccination the epidemic would extend beyond the framework adopted in 
the simulations, i.e. 1,500 days (11 April 2024).
When analyzing the scenarios for the course of the epidemic in Ukraine, 
it is worth noting that the minimum timeframe for the epidemic to expire is 
two years. The epidemic would expire the soonest in the baseline scenario 
(day 774 of the epidemic). It would last the longest in scenario A – more than 
1,500 days (variant 1 without a vaccine, the lockdown would be lifted when 
the proportion of infections falls below 50% of the empirical proportion on 
day 275). Out of all the variants, the epidemic would end the soonest in vari-
ant C3 – on day 782 of the epidemic (90% of the population would be vac-
cinated and the lockdown restrictions would be lifted on 30 January 2021).
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The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS CoV-2 virus, which struck in 
the years 2020-2021, was characterized by a global scale, an unprecedented 
pace of spread, fundamental uncertainty and interrelation of health, social 
and economic phenomena. The 2020+ pandemic entailed a worldwide 
exogenous demand and supply shock.
Restrictions imposed on social and economic activities in March 2020, 
aiming to contain the pandemic, involved dramatic changes in the econo-
mies of western and eastern regions of Europe. The economic collapse began 
at the turn of Q1 and Q2. Such dramatic and massive changes have not been 
observed in any business cycle after World War II. The sharpest fall in the 
value of GDP per capita between Q2 of 2019 and Q2 of 2020, in absolute 
figures, was experienced by the countries that in the years 2006–2019 were 
classified in the group characterized by mean, high and highest levels of 
wealth of an average citizen. All analyzed European countries experienced 
in Q2 of 2020 a dramatic fall in both exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices compared to Q2 of 2019, due to restrictions imposed in H1 of 2020.
All countries except Sweden imposed a state of emergency with limited 
mobility of employees, closed border checkpoints, and a ban on certain 
business activities. The first lockdown lasted on average 20 to 94 days. 
Emergency programmes were launched and a record-breaking fund dubbed 
Next Generation EU was established at the European Union level. The 
methods employed to support the economies of Europe were convergent. 
All support packages imposed heavy financial burdens on the budgets of the 
states covered by the survey.
Russia faced an extremely high mortality rate caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic in 2020. The Russian population decreased, in 2020, by almost 
700,000 people. It was the deepest annual decrease in the last 15 years. 
Non-residents invested in the business enterprise sector in 2020 five times 
less capital than in 2019. The 2020+ pandemic was only one of the factors 
causing problems in the Russian economy.
The Ukrainian ministry of economy announced that inflation in 
2020 reached 5%, principally due to a dynamic increase in revenues from 
retail sales and a rise in prices for energy sources on the global market that 
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affected local expenses on public utility services, finally reducing the con-
sumer demand. The volume of passenger transport dropped in 2020 to 46% 
of its value in 2019.
The proposed multi-level pandemic narrative, a national and an interna-
tional perspective, led us to a series of speculative scenarios.
In a theoretical analysis, falls in production in an economy without access 
to a vaccine reach, at peak incidence, 18.3% to 19.9% if severe restrictions 
are imposed in response to the epidemic, or 10.4% to 10.9% if a liberal 
approach is adopted. Slow progress in immunization coverage of the popu-
lation combined with severe restrictions imposed in response to the epidemic 
reduces falls in production by 17.7% to 19.5%. If a liberal approach to the 
epidemic is adopted, estimated falls in production will reach (respectively) 
10.2–10.6%. Additionally, rapid progress in immunization coverage has no 
material effect on falls in production at peak incidence.
Scenario analyses of the epidemic process in selected countries of Eastern 
Europe indicate that the minimum time required to curb the epidemic is two 
years in Ukraine and almost two and a half years in Poland.
The deep recession of 2020 and the great uncertainty as to the medium 
term (2021–2022) accelerated changes in the model of social and economic 
life, promoted by the technology revolution, towards a digital economy and 
remote education system. Those stimuli cannot be overestimated. Specific 
institutional consequences can be expected (established and commonly used 
telework and remote education models).
Secondary consequences of the 2020+ health disaster, including a fall 
in employment (in selected service industries), interrupted supply chains, a 
reduction in social capital level (repudiation and/or partial repudiation of 
contracts, limited social relations) and limited spatial mobility of workers 
and tourists, will be suffered for a longer period than drops in production, 
consumption spending, investment and trading turnover.
The post-pandemic economic recovery will be accompanied by an accel-
eration of the fourth industrial revolution. We can expect mass digitaliza-
tion, common use of robotics in manufacturing processes and of artificial 
intelligence in services. Low labour costs will no longer represent an advan-
tage. Advantages will include the quality of education, IT infrastructure, 
supportive business environment, transparency of law, the quality of the 
research and development (R&D) and science sector.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus will come 
to an end. But its economic and social consequences will be suffered for a 
long time. Digital tools and products will commonly and durably affect the 
ways we work, learn and relax. The popularity of countries still affected by 
the pandemic as tourist destinations will decline. Public debt will burden us 
for decades. Can we survive another exogenous global demand and supply 
shock without huge social costs?
Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures and bold indicate tables in the text.
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